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Abstract 
This thesis examines the experience of maternity as a lens through which to 
refract questions concerning women's knowledge and the relationship between 
embodied experience and knowledge. Much work in recent and contemporary 
feminist epistemology is devoted to showing that there is something special 
about women's knowledge, either because of a unique female social standpoint 
or because of the nature of women's bodies and the kinds of experiences they 
engender. Much of this work, I argue, essentialises women, fails to recognise 
the generality of women's epistemic powers, and involves a commitment to 
the view that mere sensory experience constitutes knowledge. This latter view, 
I argue, is the core error in this body of work: In the guise of allowing women a 
special kind of knowledge, it reinforces the idea that what is distinctive about 
women's knowledge is its primitive, sensory character. This in turn lends 
comfort to the disenfranchismement of women in pregnancy and childbirth 
and the assumption of an expert position by the medical profession. I argue that 
there is no unique feature of maternity that could issue in any epistemically 
distinctive feature of women. While this means that simply experiencing 
pregnancy and maternity does not give women any special privilege in these 
domains, it is liberative in that it restores the epistemic equity between the 
sexes. 
I investigate accounts of maternal experience which promise to establish 
the special epistemic authority of mothers. I show that the Hegelian vision of 
experience as knowledge seeps into many contemporary feminist texts, through 
the work of theorists like Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Lacan. In 
particular, I show in chapter two that Iris Young's account of 'pregnant 
embodiment' inherits a private knowledge claim from Hegel through Merleau-
Ponty. In chapters three and four I show how Lacan's work carries private 
knowledge claims into our understanding of maternal experience. In chapter 
three I show how this occurs in Kristeva and, in chapter four, in Hartsock's 
'feminist standpoint epistemology'. In chapter five I draw on Bataille's 
revision of Hegel to put right a feminist generalisation about masculine 
knowledge based in sexual perversity. Finally, in chapter six I show that when 
we dismantle the Hegelian 'myth of the given' through a Sellarsian analysis of 
the relation between experience and knowledge, we regain a coherent vision of 
the nature of our epistemic authority about experience, one that explains why 
pregnant women are in an especially good position to know about pregnancy, 
but also why they are in just as good a position to know about a lot of other 
things besides.* 
*Thanks to Jay Garfield for his work in preparing this abstract. 
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Chapter One 
Simone de Beauvoir and Hegelian experience 
This thesis is about one of the central domains of life: the embodied 
processes and experiences in maternity. But, rather than present either a 
metabiological or metapsychological account of these processes I take this 
investigation to bridge the explanatory gap between body and mind. My aim 
is to avoid conflating epistemology with ethics to show that maternity is 
neither more nor less natural than any other domain of human life. By 
avoiding this conflation we can see more clearly that our understanding of 
sex and gender is riddled with confusions and inconsistencies. The 
inconsistencies I will focus upon centre around our understanding that there 
is something uniquely natural about pregnancy, childbirth, or even about 
motherhood in general. I shall argue that there is no such unique natural 
feature of maternity. Moreover, the price we pay for acknowledging these 
inconsistencies in our vision of sex and gender is a complete loss of 
justification for the current socio-political model.of western capitalist 
societies, summed up in the term "economic rationalism." 
In this chapter I shall concentrate on two philosophers, nineteenth century 
natural philosopher GWF Hegel (1977)1 and twentieth century existential 
feminist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir (1953) 2• My approach to Hegel is 
limited by my questions about femininity and maternity, so I shall begin by 
looking to de Beauvoir to establish the nature of the problem. De Beauvoir's 
1 All citations present section number from this edition of the Phenomenology. 
2 I recognise that this translation is inaccurate at some points, see LaCaze (1999). 
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use of the term "immanence" frames the question, which leads me to read 
Hegel's philosophy in The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
i. sex and biology 
Simone de Beauvoir opens the first book of The Second Sex with a 
biological account of reproduction, where she singles out Hegel as the 
philosopher who takes the liberty of claiming that biological differences 
between men and women produce different versions of psychology. She uses 
the terms "immanence" and "transcendence" to describe these two versions 
of psychology; Immanence means indwelling consciousness and I will show 
in the next section that de Beauvoir's use of the term describes the natural 
states of maternity as though these could also be described under the category 
of Hegel's "sense-certainty." Finally I will show that de Beauvoir's 
characterisation of immanence might be different from Hegel's 
characterisation of sense-certainty for teleological reasons. Unlike Hegel, de 
Beauvoir does not take meaning to be given by existence, recognising that the 
meaning of life is something to be discovered rather than something 
inscribed within our genetic material. 
To put their difference another way, de Beauvoir denies that there could be 
any such thing as maternal instinct. She sets out to show this in her 
discussion of the female reproductive function, suggesting that humans 
could just as easily be hermaphrodites but that sexual difference is beneficial 
for natural selection (1953: 37nn) She summarises Plato myth: 
there were at the beginning men, women and hermaphrodites. Each individual had 
two faces, four arms, four legs, and two conjoined bodies. At a certain time they were 
split in two, and ever since each half seeks to rejoin its corresponding half. Later 
the gods decreed that new human beings should be created through the coupling of 
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dissimilar halves. But it is only love that this story is intended to explain; 
division into the sexes is assumed at the outset. (1953: 37-38) 
So, even though Plato explains sexual equality as an equality of that which 
is given, his explanation of the division of the sexes fails to rescue the woman 
from her now different, biologically determined destiny. De Beauvoir's idea 
of a hermaphrodite is more liberal: she does not see how reproductive 
differences leads to a social division between the private domestic sphere and 
the historical, philosophical, scientific and political domains so dominated by 
men. Plato fails to rescue the once equal flesh of the woman from the burden 
of childbearing and childrearing, even though he assumes that her 
psychology remains intact. But there is nothing to stop the woman from 
doing all of the domestic work, and so long as the man wants time to think 
and to create himself as a subject who can change the world, sexual difference 
can hardly be benign. And, as we shall discover, de Beauvoir sees that the 
childbearing woman becomes a mere object in relation to the man who can 
create himself as a subject for so long as the assumption about sexual 
difference remains intact. 
De Beauvoir does not have much to say about Aristotle, except that he does 
not explain the sexual distinction "for if matter and form must co-operate in 
all action, there is no necessity for the active and passive principles to be 
separated in two different categories for individuals." (1953: 38) Aristotle's 
distinction between matter and form is mapped onto sex by associating the 
woman with matter and the man with form. The active and passive 
principles also can be mapped onto sexual differences, creating woman as the 
passive principle and man as the active principle. The passive principle can 
be used to describe feminine psychology on the grounds that the pregnant 
woman does not have to consciously create the foetus. Aristotle's claim that 
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woman is passive and that man is active suggests that men have to put more 
conscious effort into life, and that their efforts sustain a special human 
purpose; over and beyond the natural. She cites recent work by Merleau-
Ponty and Heidegger as discrediting the Aristotelian view. 
De Beauvoir takes as true Merleau-Ponty's view of "content that does not 
contribute to the formation of its aspect" because she does not think any 
epistemic content is given by experience. She agrees with Merleau-Ponty that 
"it is only through existence that facts are manifested." {1953: 39) In other 
words, living a human life reveals shared facts by which we come to 
understand our existence. The facts do not reveal themselves just in virtue 
of having life, however, because the facts are always learned. Or, to use de 
Beauvoir's words: "To be present in the world implies strictly that there 
exists a body which is at once a material thing in the world and a point of 
view towards this world; but nothing requires that this body have this or that 
structure." {1953: p. 39) 
I agree with de Beauvoir that the body can be at once a physical thing in the 
world whilst at the same time having a perspective on the world. But I must 
warn that agreeing with her on this raises an important philosophical 
dilemma: how can humans be explained as having both mind and body? 
Moreover, when we associate the mind with psychology and the body with 
biology, how can we explain their interaction so as to make sense of 
significant gender differences? 
De Beauvoir accepts Heidegger's view that we create for ourselves both a 
past and a future, being situated in the world as mortal creatures. But she 
adds that our mortality remains the sole limit for all people. The 
perpetuation of the species is as much everybody's responsibility as it is a 
limitation on life, giving reproduction metaphysical importance, but we must 
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stop ourselves from shifting all of this responsibility onto one sex. She rejects 
the reductionist metaphysics of a mind without a body (idealism) or of a 
soulless body (historical materialism) as strictly inconceivable, preferring the 
non-reductive vision of a parthenogenetic or hermaphroditic society. 
It will become evident that de Beauvoir is rejecting both the Platonic view, 
that there could be ideas that stand alone from human conventions, and the 
Aristotelian view that the body is a mechanism as distinct from its form; and 
that the form is an essence of some sort, determining different social 
functions, making women essentially distinct from men. De Beauvoir sees 
that Aristotelian mechanism as preferable to Plato's idealism, but she does 
not like the fact that the physicalist reduction must be played out in terms of 
gender difference. There appears to be two distinct kinds of psychological 
states, mentioned above in the context of Aristotle's distinction between the 
active and passive. But it is the way in which Hegel takes up this distinction 
that de Beauvoir notes as crucial to recognising what is happening. 
The history of philosophy presents a wide range of views about the nature of gender 
difference. At first they had no scientific basis, simply reflecting social myths ... With the 
advent of patriarchal institutions, the male laid eager claim to his posterity ... Aristotle's 
ideas were not wholly discredited, however. Hegel held that the two sexes were of 
necessity different, the one active and the other passive, and of course the female would be 
the passive one. (1953: 39) 
With the scientific revolution behind him, Hegel's world is remarkably 
different from Aristotle's: but he still has to make up a story about sexual 
difference so that his metaphysics works. 
De Beauvoir disagrees with Hegel's metaphysical use of sexual difference as 
necessary, not only for the continuation of life, but also for the explanation of 
psychological differences between the sexes. He makes out that the existential 
nature of being a man is achieved by rising above the more natural 
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psychological states to develop scientific reasoning. The meaning of human 
existence is defined by Hegel according to his vision of the historical progress 
of mankind. 
As de Beauvoir says, Hegel imagines that the meaning of a woman's life is 
sewn up in her genetic material, defining her purpose according to some 
innate knowledge. Her calling in life, from an early age, is to become some 
man's wife and to produce children in his name. In the following section I 
will show that for Hegel, the female body is programmed to produce and rear 
children. In Hegel's view, the woman is destined to look after others; her 
reward for this work is maternity. 
De Beauvoir says "I do not intend to offer here a philosophy of life: and I 
do not care to take sides prematurely in the dispute between the mechanistic 
and the purposive or teleological philosophies." (1953: 41) Hegel can be read 
as traversing this divide between the mechanistic and teleological 
philosophies, and it seems to me that the genuine lack of attention to Hegel's 
claims about sexual difference outside feminist and cultural studies circles 
leads to a genuine misrecognition of his metaphysics. 
I shall turn now to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. In this section I have 
traced, with de Beauvoir, a sketch of sexual psychology as though there are 
two distinct kinds of human nature. If it is the case that sexual difference goes 
beyond reproductive function to produce two kinds of human psychology, 
the woman is destined to be a mother and to know how to mother from 
birth. Biology is destiny.3 But if it is not the case, as de Beauvoir suggests, 
Hegel fails to adequately explain human psychology. 
3 Freud famously says this, citing Napoleon, as though man and woman are different countries. 
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ii Hegel's notion of sense certainty 
Hegel has attracted some attention from those working in the western 
analytic tradition on contemporary theories of mind.4 Elder (1980) argues that 
Hegel divides his philosophy into three main categories: physical 
philosophy; social philosophy; and philosophy of history. Concentrating on 
the physical philosophy, Elder shows that Hegel explains everything in terms 
of two sorts of concepts: physical concepts and psychological concepts. 
Physical concepts include concepts of material objects and concepts of mind; 
and psychological concepts include concepts of psychological objects and 
concepts of rational agency. Elder argues that Hegel needs to provide a 
physicalist explanation in which he uses non-psychological predicates to 
explain humans as the embodiment of ideas, and as players of roles created by 
history. But he also needs to succeed in using non-psychological predicates to 
explain that individuals have the choice to model their behaviour, and not to 
simply accept that which is given. I will turn now to Hegel to see how this 
works. 
The Phenomenology of Spirit is divided into three main sections. His 
physical philosophy of mind is described in the first section, which is titled 
Consciousness and is divided again into three: sense-certainty; perception; 
forces and the understanding. Sense-certainty is the first of three steps in 
consciousness, and is superseded by "perception." Perception, in turn, rises 
above itself to become what Hegel calls "force and the understanding." (§132-
165) This latter phase prepares the conscious being for self-consciousness, 
which is divided into the following phases: "Self- Certainty" (§166-177); 
"Independence and Dependence of Self consciousness: Lordship and 
4 See for example de Vries (1988) and Elder (1981). 
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Bondage" (§178-196); and "Freedom of Self-consciousness." (§197-230). The 
conscious being must move through all of these phases in order to enter the 
stage of Reason (§231-437). Reason is raised to the truth of Spirit when the 
conscious being is certain that its truth is its own, and that the world is as it is. 
(§438) 
This first section describes the states of consciousness associated with 
feelings a.rid sensations in our body in sense-certainty; followed by states of 
consciousness in which we develop our perceptual knowledge in relation to 
commonsense objects and behaviours to develop commonsense 
understanding. But commonsense understanding is not what human life is 
all about, according to Hegel, leaving that more natural way of acquiring 
knowledge to women and to slaves while select men get on with the real 
work of tending to historical development. The issue of selection criteria 
brings maternity to the foreground of my inquiry into Hegel's theory of the 
mental. I choose maternity because it is often thought to hold a special clue to 
human nature: that vital clue will soon to be lost to the human genome 
project. 
Hegel's sense-certainty is the most basic version of consciousness, shared 
between all conscious creatures and explaining our conscious existence as the 
ground upon which all human understanding develops. Sense-certainty just 
happens, without any active participation on behalf of the conscious being 
who simply experiences whatever presents itself to awareness. In Hegel's 
view, the conscious being only knows a succession of physical objects in 
sense-certainty. There is no attempt to grasp the objects notionally, or to have 
a linguistic comprehension of an object in relation to anything else. There is 
no awareness of the object's parts or qualities. Instead, there is only awareness 
that there is an object, giving certainty of that object's existence. The object is 
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sensed and its existence is confirmed because, in Hegel's view, the sensation is 
the most primordial way of knowing anything. (§90-91) 
The crucial issue for determining whether Hegel's explanation of 
psychological predicates works towards a physicalist description will include 
whether or not the states contain some pre-ordained meaning, or whether 
the meanings of the states are determined by human convention. Hegel 
argues that the states are meaningless even though he claims that the latter 
states come to occupy meaningful roles. But, even in this early stage of just 
having the states of consciousness there is some knowledge. The knowledge 
given by sense-certainty is a version of empiricist sense-data which, when 
pushed, does not explain anything. I will examine the status of knowledge 
given by the senses in more detail in chapter 2. 
Hegel' s version of sense-data is supposed to explain what it is like to have 
consciousness and is best understood if we imagine that our awareness is 
played out on a kind of inner screen, with a succession of impressions each 
vanishing into the next.5 Moreover, Hegel uses demonstratives to explain 
this kind of awareness. There is already someone present in this 
consciousness, and this person already has a vocabulary which includes terms 
like "this" "here" "now." There is also a vague recognition of the self in 
sense-certainty, but only in so far as the object is in awareness. So there is 
vague self-consciousness in sense-certainty, enabling the conscious being to 
read off the environment and to register various kinds of sensations in 
5 De Vries (1988) suggests otherwise but I take Hegel's claims about sexual difference to show 
this is the case as will become clear in the course of this thesis. See Dennett (1991) for a good 
discussion of the myth of the so-called Cartesian theatre. 
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consciousness. The ability to register sensations requires only that there is 
consciousness, since for Hegel the 'I' is nothing more than the knowing. (§92) 
Neither the self as a subject nor the object registered are defined as the 
kinds of things they are; they are merely registered to form the ground for 
self-consciousness. But this primitive version of self-consciousness is also 
the ground for developing the capacity to transcend the limitations of the 
physical teleology enabling men to create the socio-political history of 
mankind. Whether or not one will be able to go beyond the limits of their 
natural capacities will be determined primarily by sex. All of women's 
knowledge will be predetermined by her biology, whereas man's knowledge 
can be self-determined. But in Hegel's view, we each begin to identify in 
sense-certainty as a self who has immediate knowledge, given by the senses. 
Hegel postulates that each sensation is superseded by the next and the 
conscious being can do little more than use the demonstrative term "This." 
But the term "This" does not help others understand that which Hegel claims 
is the truth of sense-certainty. Sense-certainty is a purely subjective way of 
knowing which is 'not at once intersubjective. For, in Hegel's view, the true 
meaning of sense-certainty is an inner episode which is deeply private and 
sensuous. He says "it is just not possible for us to ever say, or express in 
words, a sensuous being that we mean." (§97) Sense-certainty therefore fails 
to meet the inter subjectivity requirement by which others may agree that the 
conscious being's knowledge is true or false. No-one else has access to the 
conscious being's knowledge in Sense-certainty so that knowledge can be 
checked and verified. Sense-certainty is thus open to scepticism.s 
6 I present a detailed analysis of the scepticism of knowledge about sensations in Chapter two. 
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To avoid the sceptical view that different beings sense the same things 
differently, Hegel claims that the meaning of sense-certainty is "universal" 
rather than particular: each conscious being has the same types of sensations 
when faced with the same sorts of objects. (§102) If we are facing a tree, for 
instance, we each see the same thing; if we are facing a house, we also see the 
same thing; and so on. The universal nature of sense-certainty is important, 
in his view, because the person with sense-certainty cannot say what she 
means; or express her knowledge about sensations. 
Space and Time play an important role in sense-certainty to ensure the 
succession of sensations so that each 'Here' and 'Now,' vanishes into the next, 
making it impossible to focus on anything. There is constant flux, or change 
in sense-certainty. (§94) 
There may be a tree presenting itself to consciousness, for instance, as 'This' 
tree which is 'Here.' But, turning around, there is no longer a tree. The tree 
is negated by the house which is 'here.' But, he says, the 'here' is constant and 
the objects inconstant. Each awareness of 'here' and 'now' is replaced by the 
next, being different from the last and therefore a negation. Day is negated by 
night and the tree is negated by a house, and so on. (§98-99) That which 
remains, according to Hegel, is "pure being." 
Pure being is consciousness itself. But, for Hegel, having consciousness is 
sufficient for knowing the objects which are presented to consciousness. As 
Hegel describes it, immediate knowledge is the constant stream of negation 
and mediation in space and time of things presenting themselves to 
consciousness. The negation is brought about by the fact that the tree is 
replaced by a house, which is not-tree. The replacement of a tree by a house is 
possible only because the conscious being is situated in space and time. Time 
enables the consciousness to move so that the house is a negative in relation 
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to a tree. Each awareness of 'here' and 'now' is replaced by the next, being 
different from the last and therefore a negation. Each successive image or 
sensation in inner space negates the last in a perpetual movement of 
supersession. 
iii Hegel, de Beauvoir, women and knowledge 
I said above that Hegel distinguishes three levels of conscious 
development. There is consciousness, self-consciousness and reason. 
Consciousness is divided again into three phases. The first, self certainty, I 
have discussed. My concern in this section is with the second, the universal 
consciousness of sensory knowledge, which Hegel associates with women. 
In this section I will show that Hegel does not attribute any self-
consciousness to women, leaving them in the most immature phase of the 
phenomenology, described as consciousness. But, this basic consciousness is 
far from limited to passive awareness of self-presenting sensations inasmuch 
as the development of all non-inferential commonsense knowledge is , 
explained in the next two stages. In perception the images and sensations are 
impressed into inner space as they are in sense-certainty. But in perception 
the meaning of the prior stage is negated by the "principle of the object." He 
says the principle of the object is universal. (§112) The principle of the object 
enables a mediation between a shared principle, or concept, and the felt 
quality, or sensation. The shared principle, or concept, enables the conscious 
being to develop an awareness of difference so that the immediate "this" of 
sense-certainty is superseded by the concept. (§113) 
The supersession occurs because a concept is introduced to represent the 
object. The concept is an abstract principle and, as such, the concept is not the 
sensuous quality of the impression given by sense-certainty. So the concept is 
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not the "this" to which Hegel refers as the unmediated but nonetheless 
meaningful impression of sense-certainty. He says the concept of perception 
is not this. The negation of the sensuous "this," such as the impression of a 
tree, could be construed as leaving the conscious being with not this and 
therefore nothing. The negation of the sensation with a concept could be 
construed as leaving consciousness empty of content. But the concept is not 
nothing, in Hegel's view, because the concept is determinate. So the concept 
is present to consciousness even though it takes the place of the sensuous 
content which preceded the concept. In Hegel' s words, the concept is a 
"determinate Nothing, the Nothing of a content, viz. of the This." (§113) 
Nevertheless, in Hegel's view, the sensory quality of consciousness is still 
present. In perception, however, the "sense-element" takes on a new form: 
no longer 
as the singular item that is 'meant', but as a universal, or as that which will be 
defined as a property. Supersession exhibits its true twofold meaning which we 
have seen in the negative: it is at once a negating and a preserving 7 Our Nothing, 
as the Nothing of the This, preserves its immediacy and is itself sensuous, but it is a 
universal immediacy. Being, however is a universal in virtue of its having 
mediation or the negative within it; when it expresses this in its immediacy it is a 
differentiated, determinate property. (§113) 
In his discussion of sense-certainty, Hegel claims that the meaning is 
impressed upon what we could call the "inner screen" and that, as such, this 
7 In sense-certainty Hegel discusses the negative as being both negating and preserving in the 
context of the "J)OW." The preservation takes place in consciousness, which is not an actual day or 
an actual night. The consciousness is the negative because it preserves the "now" of night. But the 
truth becomes stale as night turns to day. Day is not night. Negation is sense certainty is thus 
mediated through time. But the knowledge of day and night is preserved. See § 96. 
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sensuous meaning is deeply individual. But, he argues, language is more 
truthful than the individual sensuous meaning. (§97) Even in sense-
certainty Hegel claims we make basic utterances, like "this," or "it is" but 
these utterances are too general, leading to a kind of refutation of what we 
mean to say. The meaning is held in the particular sensation and the 
utterance is too general to hold any truth. (He says "it is just not possible for 
us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean." (§97)) 
But, in perception, the conscious being learns to utter a universal truth about 
her sensation. She does this, in Hegel's view, by distinguishing the properties 
of the object. Previously, however, the properties could not be discerned 
because the objects were negated by moments in time and space. In 
perception, the objects are negated by the concepts of properties. In so doing, 
the perception contains two "immediately self-differentiating moments:" one 
being the active pointing out of properties and the other being the passive 
event in which the object is impressed into consciousness. (§ 111) 
In other words, perception enables the conscious being to know the object 
as a whole entity which can be divided into parts. This is possible because 
there are two functions: one active and one passive. The active function is 
conceptual because it requires the use of shared principles and is "logically 
necessitated." As I will show below, this is possible because the community 
plays a role in perception. The passive function, on the other hand, is the 
continuation of sense-certainty, in which objects impress themselves upon 
consciousness. Hegel uses the example of salt. Salt is 'here' as in sense-
certainty, but it is also understood by a perceiver as having different 
properties: salt is white, tart, cubical and so on. He claims that the sensation 
is preserved through the development of concepts about the different 
properties of salt. (§ 111-113) 
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Only one thing is sensed in perception, but the conscious being develops 
an ability to mediate her sensations with concepts. Hegel brings the 
community into his discussion of perception, indicating that the conscious 
being's knowledge makes a developmental turn in which other conscious 
beings take a part. The conscious being thus develops an ability to determine 
the many properties of things as the sorts of properties they are. (§ 115) He 
says the objective essence is found not in the subject's own awareness, but in 
the community. But the object is what counts in perception and the 
awareness itself remains unnoticed. The conscious being learns about the 
object from the community. The knowledge of the particular type of object is 
universal, in Hegel's view, because knowledge about perception is shared 
universally within the community. He locates the truth of perception in the 
universal expression of an object's unity, rather than in the qualitative 
sensation. But, he says, from the broader communal perspective, the 
knowledge in perception is incorrect. Hegel indicates that, unlike the merely 
conscious perceiver, the self-conscious members of the community are able to 
discern the object as a particular object. He says the realisation that the object 
is particular drives the perceiver back to sense-certainty: the universal 
perception is negated again by the sensation of particular object/ subject. (§117) 
Despite Hegel's claim that the cycle is completed and has returned to its 
sensuous beginnings, he says a new truth emerges. The ability to see the 
object universally with others in the community adds knowledge to the once 
immediate sense-certainty. The knowledge is no longer a passive impression, 
being instead the combination of the impression with a shared concept. The 
ability to break down the whole into parts also adds knowledge. Each object is 
more complicated than it first appeared in the passive state of sense-certainty. 
In Hegel' s view, the apparent return to sense-certainty is not really a return at 
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all, because a new truth has emerged: a truth that was impossible in sense-
certainty. Hegel says that the new truth emerges because the subject of sense-
certainty is now able to see the untruth of sensuality. The subject is apparent 
as a simple 'I,' he says, who has a grasp of universal concepts for objects. The 
new truth emerges through the division of a once singular stream of 
impressions into a two-fold movement between the concept and the 
sensation. 
Sense-certainty is recognisably false in Hegel's view because the cycle of 
perception enables the subject to see herself as an individual perceiver in 
relation to the community. But while perceptual knowledge is only 
universal, she is not really an individual in Hegelian terms, because the 
individual must rise above all sensual knowledge. The perceiver is not able 
to rise above sensual knowledge because she is only developing the notion 
that truth is conceptual and that impressions cannot substitute for truth. But, 
Hegel says, the perceiver is "reflected out of the True and into itself." He says 
the inwards reflection mingles the basic self consciousness with the "pure 
apprehension" of sense-certainty. Basic self consciousness therefore emerges 
in perception. This conscious reflection enables a shift from the simple 
apprehension of sense-certainty, in Hegel's view. (§118) 
Certain tensions nevertheless arise in Hegel's view, because each thing is 
perceived in relation to other things and to other knowers. The merely 
conscious perceiver mistakenly thinks she has the concept of a particular 
perception. But, Hegel emphasises, perceptual knowledge is only universal. 
The conscious being of perception has not yet developed any particular 
knowledge. Instead she shares the universal observational knowledge she 
has learnt from others in the community. In Hegel's view, the knowledge 
gained in perception is always universal even though the perceiver mistakes 
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her knowledge to be particular. The subject's perceptual truth is not specific 
to one person but shared between everyone. 
Hegel refers to perception as "sound common sense" but argues that such 
knowledge is often poor when mistakenly taken as the richest form of 
knowing. He says that the perceiver sees herself as having a grasp of abstract 
essences, or "mental entities" because she comes to see that things are 
impressed in consciousness. This is poor, in Hegel's view, because the 
perceiver contradicts herself when she says one thing is true and then claims 
the same is an untruth. The bent stick in water is an example of perceptual 
untruth, although Hegel does not offer an example. The stick looks bent in 
water and looks straight when removed from the water. In perceptual 
knowledge, there is no way of showing whether the stick is really bent or 
straight. 
He says the richer form of knowledge 
recognizes them in their specific determinateness as well, and is therefore master 
over them, whereas perceptual understanding [or sound 'common sense'] takes them 
for the truth and is led on by them from one error to another. (§132) 
The perception nevertheless combines an individual experience with a 
universal concept or notion of the object in question. But, he argues, in 
perception the person has not realised that the notion, or concept is a shared 
principle. Without this recognition of the principle of an object, Hegel says 
the person cannot yet properly recognise itself in relation to the object. In 
perception, then, Hegel argues that the conscious being brings universal 
concepts to particular objects in the world. Importantly, the concepts are 
universal because they are shared within the community of knowers. Both 
the conscious beings of perception and the objects are universal. (§ 111) The 
conscious beings are characterised as "I," but a universal rather than 
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particular "I." Becoming a particular "I" entails moving beyond the sensual 
field of universals and putting to death experience in pursuit of the freedom 
of reason. But, in Hegel's view, women cannot move beyond the sensual. As 
shown, however, sensual knowledge is already linguistic knowledge so he 
does not suggest women cannot speak. It is just that sensual knowledge does 
not enable women to develop any sense of themselves as individuals; or to 
develop any interests beyond that which lies immediately before them. 
In Hegel's view, women are members of the community and have a place 
in the "ethical order." But their place requires that they tend to matters of 
sensuality: the production of children, tending to their husbands emotional 
needs and taking care of death. To develop an understanding of these 
matters, women must go through the final stage of development Hegel 
describes in his section on consciousness. Note that this stage is a preliminary 
step for males, but a final step for females. 
Hegel suggests that the self-consciousness of the conscious being depends 
upon other conscious beings showing her that she can become self-conscious 
through her awareness of an object. (§133) The conscious being must realise 
that other conscious beings make the same observations of the same objects. 
(§134) This realisation is made possible through mutual agreement about the 
diverse properties of an object in order to see that each has the same sense-
contents. (§135) But first, in Hegel's view, the understanding must develop 
through the movement of two opposing forces. 
In his account of "force and the understanding," Hegel describes the 
movement of two forces: one which can be expressed and the other which 
cannot. I suggest that this is the turning of linguistic concepts on perceptions. 
Hegel describes a sorting of properties and things and a perpetual movement 
of the two forces, each vanishing into the other. The wheel of cognition is 
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really starting to turn now in the Hegelian consciousness as things move 
from their unexpressed sensuality into expressible notions. (§135-137) 
The development of notions is an important step towards self-
consciousness, in Hegel's view, but the conscious being does not yet see them 
as such. He says the conscious being mistakenly thinks the notions exist in 
the objects themselves. He says self-consciousness remains negative, or not 
present, because the notions absorb the conscious being's attention. The 
notions are the positive forces so long as the consciousness keeps vanishing 
into the things it is perceiving. The notions keep drawing the conscious 
being's attention towards the object so that she cannot yet clearly see that they 
appear in her own consciousness. (§ 143) 
Hegel says that, in understanding, the self is "empty," or void because it is 
not aware of its own experiences, as it was in Sense-certainty. The qualitative 
nature of sensuous experience is sublated into to the perceptual concepts in 
Hegel's vision of understanding. Nothing positive is known in Sense-
certainty because of the endless succession of moments vanishing into each 
other because the conscious being is glued to her inner screen. But, even 
though the objects are still impressed on the inner screen in perception, the 
understanding draws the conscious being's attention into the external world. 
The perception includes inner content, but the awareness becomes outwardly 
directed through the development of concepts. Inner experience stands in a 
negative relation to perceptions because the latter can be expressed to confirm 
the positive existence of the object. (§147) 
In Hegel's view, perception develops as a play of forces and movements in 
which the concepts are properly aligned with sensations. He says 
understanding deepens only because the subject grasps certain Laws. These 
Laws correctly align inner sensations with concepts derived from others in 
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the world. In Hegel's view, the Notion is expressed in language, enabling the 
conscious being to stabilise the succession of sensations. Hegel says the Law is 
the universal principle that stabilises the flux of the inner to integrate 
sensations with concepts. He indicates that language enables the conscious 
being to see that others see things as she does. The conscious being thus 
comes to understand her sensations as universal rather than particular. 
Moreover, through language her perceptions are expressible and determinate 
rather than being deeply private and indeterminate. 
Hegel argues that sensations and concepts are bound together through the 
dialectical movements, relating inner and outer, subject and object, self and 
world. Through these movements Hegel argues that we finally see "behind 
the so called curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner world." But, alas, 
he says, "there is nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves, as 
much in order that we may see, as that there may be something behind there 
which can be seen." (§165) Moving behind the alleged curtain takes Hegel 
into the second level of conscious development: self-consciousness. Those 
who attain self-consciousness can stand back from the inner screen and claim 
it as their own particular consciousness. 
In Hegel's words, "self-consciousness is desire in general." (§167) He 
indicates that the conscious being's desire enables the distinction between self 
as desiring, on the one hand; and the desired object outside the self, on the 
other. He says desire enables the conscious being to negate his experience of 
the object in order to get a positive grasp of himself as conscious. Through 
desire, then, the merely conscious being is able to stand back from the screen 
and claim it as self in opposition to the desired object. But as I will argue 
below, Hegel's prejudice about the sexes suggests the conscious being must be 
male to reach this stage. 
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Hegel characterises the positive self-consciousness as "being-for-itself," as 
distinct from the negative consciousness of the previous stages, in which the 
self is characterised as "being-in-itself." (§173) The objects, once experienced 
as being-in-itself, now enter into being-for-itself in the properly defined self-
world distinction. The conscious being stands back from his inner screen and 
distinguishes himself from the succession of sense-impressions. He is 
properly able to conceive of himself as a particular consciousness in 
distinction from the world. 
Hegel refers to this knowledge as "commonsense knowledge." The 
community comes into play, in which everyone has authority about 
immediate perceptions, or non-inferential knowledge. This could be seen as 
third person knowledge, which carries less authority in Hegel's view than the 
first person knowledge he describes in later chapters. Or it can be understood 
as first person sensory knowledge, as women's epistemic specialty, in 
opposition to first person abstract knowledge, which is men's epistemic 
specialty. Hegel says the self-conscious subject develops only through desire 
for gratification from others, by seeing that others have something which the 
conscious being does not have.s Looking to others for satisfaction of desire 
8 Willett (1995) argues that the desire is better understood as "will - or what for Hegel must be 
a bold indifference to life and death - [which] seeks to establish that it is free from nature." 
(1995: 110) She says that the important negation of the "in-itself" is better understood as an act of 
will. That is, the self-conscious being wills the experience out of consciousness so that it can 
achieve a properly human teleology. Willett argues that "[t]he problem with Hegel's analysis 
of the foundation of recognition is that it allows for only a single concept of the moral person, and 
this concept defines the person as anti-woman, antinature, and anti-African" (1995:112). The one-
sided development is the development of knowledge as determined by a white middle class male. 
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nevertheless enables the conscious being to see its own consciousness 
reflected back. 
The conscious being comes to see herself as others see her. For women to 
see themselves as closer to nature than to the cultured lives of men, for 
example, they must have some self-certainty. Men, on the other hand, will 
see themselves reflected by others as being more alienated from nature than 
women. But, if women were to reach this stage of self-certainty, it is not clear 
why they would agree that they are any closer to nature than men. (It is more 
likely that only men see their superiority reflected in the eyes of their 
women.) 
Hegel's discussion of life in the early part of his discussion of self-
consciousness influences the views of Lloyd and others who discuss the 
master/slave narrative.9 Being-in-itself is a simple 'I' in Hegel's view, and 
must develop via desire into the complex self-conscious 'I.' Women thus 
characterised are subjects, but they do not know themselves as such so they do 
not have any of the freedom which Hegel associates with the subject of self-
consciousness. Women, when associated with being-in-itself, have the 
preliminary phases of consciousness unfolding through sense-certainty to 
She concludes that, read as a first person narrative of development, "Hegel's presuppositions 
concerning childhood conceal the one-sided mythology of a patriarchal culture." (1995:113) Read 
as phylogeny, on the other hand, this narrative tells us about "feminine gatherers then masculine 
hunters, and finally an ethical community whose common principles presuppose shared rites of 
manhood." (1995:112) I will have more to say about the privileging of abstract knowledge, or 
"culture" over concrete existence (or "nature") in chapters four and five. 
9 See Appendix, and also Willett (1995) and Oliver (1996). 
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understanding. The female subject has awareness of things around her, 
including having awareness of her body, but is not aware of herself as a 
particular individual. She remains in the sphere of life as though she never 
desires certainty for its own sake. Those who have self-certainty no longer 
have time for life, except when at home with the family. Women's duty to 
care for life and death does not give them time to develop the self-certainty 
Hegel takes to be necessary for developing what is in fact inferential 
knowledge. 
In his later chapter on "The Ethical Order," Hegel claims that the two sexes 
form an antithesis in which men and women are directly opposed, but who 
come together in the synthesis of family. (§459) They join in marriage to 
become "universal ethical beings." In marriage, women are understood by 
Hegel in terms of universal consciousness; and men as particular 
consciousness. Marriage unites the two types of consciousness, enabling men 
to access inner experience through their women; and women to access reason 
through their men.10 
Having only universal consciousness, women are apparently unable to 
develop self-certainty. He says they are alienated from desire, and from 
Particularity. (§457) Instead, they continue to thrive on a sensuous version of 
10 Oliver (1996), indicates a contradiction in Hegel's argument. On one hand Hegel argues that 
"femininity" assumes that woman, and her "ethical" domain of family is natural and unconscious. 
This contrasts his view that family duties "are properly ethical only insofar as they are not 
merely natural and unconscious, but rather willed and conscious {1996:70) ". The contradiction lies 
in the question: how can something be both unconscious and ethical? As Oliver points out 
"[e]thical relations are relations that take the individual beyond nature and move him into 
culture", yet Woman is supposedly both "ethical" and immersed in nature. 
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knowing in which things are passively presented to consciousness as the 
kinds of things they are. It is also worth noting that their maternal 
experiences, like pregnancy and childbirth, are not had by men. Hegel's 
conception of private knowledge indicates that those who do not have these 
feminine experiences cannot properly know about them. But, in maternity, 
as in life, consciousness does all the work, and women are passive observers 
of everything which takes place around them. 
Men's consciousness, on the other hand, actively develops through desire 
into a recognition of consciousness as their own, and a subsequent ability to 
control their consciousness. Reason preserves the sensuous only as a 
foundation for knowledge about science, history, culture, religion and ethics. 
The more men develop their knowledge, in Hegel's view, the more they gain 
understanding in the context of notions or ideas rather than experiences. The 
more abstract notional knowledge is the movement of Spirit, he argues, to 
understand fully the History of humanity. Nevertheless, Hegel does not 
entirely dispense with experience in the most absolute forms of knowledge. 
His account of the dialectical forces enables an understanding of concepts 
which are grounded in sensuous qualities. 
Hegel's claim that "true meaning" is embedded in sensations suggests that 
we know sensations as the sensations they are just by having them. We are 
unable to express their meaning without the appropriate conceptual 
development because all we have is the sensation and we are unable to make 
anything more of it. The sensation gives us a quality which we are not yet 
able to quantify, or to distinguish as being part of the self in distinction from 
the world. Mature knowledge, on the other hand, has a quality of self-hood 
in relation to an inference. The qualitative component of mature knowledge 
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is of thinking - awareness of the thoughts - rather than awareness something 
in the world. 
In sense-certainty there is a basic quality of sensing something. This could 
be visual, auditory, olfactory or tactile sensations of the immediate 
environment - images, sounds, smells and feels. Or it could be inner 
experiences of tickles or gurgles or pains. But for sense-certainty to count as 
knowledge, these sensations and feelings would need to be seen as the tree in 
front of her, or felt as a tickle. It is reasonable to suppose that sensations 
register the environment, in other words, but this needs not be an epistemic 
claim. To claim that we know something about the sensations indicates that 
we can specify that we are having a particular type of sensations. This, in 
turn, requires that we meet the inter subjectivity requirements by which we 
are able to make something of our own sensations according to what we 
know about others' sensations. 
I will now show that de Beauvoir can be read as claiming that experiences 
are not a type of immature knowledge, in which case immanence and 
transcendence need not be mutually exclusive. I will argue that these terms 
are better understood as denoting two distinct domains: experience and 
knowledge. 
iv de Beauvoir on immanence as non-knowledge 
In earlier sections of The Second Sex de Beauvoir dwells on the Hegelian 
idea that men live out their immanence only through women in the form of, 
first their mothers, and later their wives. Her discussion of immanence 
develops in her discussion of the myths that men construct regarding 
women. Here she turns to a discussion of erotic desire. It is in her discussion 
of erotic desire that she gives us insight into immanence as non-knowledge. 
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The first myth in her discussion is taken from the Book of Genesis. In de 
Beauvoir's words: 
Eve is given to Adam so that through her he may accomplish his transcendence, and 
she draws him into the night of immanence. His mistress, in the vertigoes of 
pleasure, encloses him again in the opaque clay of that dark matrix which the 
mother fabricated for her son and from which he desires to escape. He wishes to 
possess her: behold him the possessed himself! Odour, moisture, fatigue, ennui - a 
library of books has described this gloomy passion of a consciousness made flesh. 
(1953: 196) 
What is Adam's project, in de Beauvoir's view, if not to possess Eve? But 
de Beauvoir also indicates that Adam does not succeed precisely because Eve 
draws him into the night where consciousness is lost to sensation. He no 
longer dwells in the light of reason - the only place where he has the 
transcendent liberty for which we must all yearn. He is as possessed as she is 
in those moments of sensory awareness that are just odour; just moisture; 
just fatigue. They are not moments, as Hegel may suggest, in which an odour 
presents itself as an odour; or moisture as moisture; or fatigue as fatigue. For 
de Beauvoir they are simply sensations of which there is no certainty 
concerning their general character; sensations as the flesh rise up and engulf 
any conscious thoughts. Experience is a "dark matrix" which is distinct from 
the ability to reflect upon experiences in order to know about them. 
Beauvoir's depiction of sensory experiences is less Hegelian than 
Bataillian. Georges Bataille's philosophical interest lies in the epistemic 
nature of inner experiences, such as intense erotic experiences alongside 
laughter, ecstasy and violent experiences like sacrifice and death. In his book 
Inner Experience (1954), Bataille argues that these experiences take us beyond 
the limit of Hegelian knowledge. According to Bataille, these adult 
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experiences are characterised as non-knowledge; not as an immature version 
of knowledge. 
Bataille is a contemporary of de Beauvoir's and they, along with Sartre, 11 
Lacan and various other French intellectuals of their time, attended the 
lectures on Hegel presented by Alexandre Kojeve. De Beauvoir mentions 
Bataille only twice in The Second Sex - and he does not stand out as a figure 
for whom she holds much admiration. Nonetheless, she does note that 
Bataille characterises eroticism as a state "in which the individual exceeds the 
bounds of self;" and "seeks to lose himself in the infinite mystery of the 
flesh." (1953: 183) All that counts is the experience itself, not the fact that it is 
the experience of a particular subject, or individual. De Beauvoir thus 
indicates that eroticism enables men to lose their identities as particular 
individuals. De Beauvoir also notes that, for Bataille, the woman does not 
appear "simply as an object of pleasure;" (1953: 183) a point with which I 
agree.12 In other words, for Bataille, eroticism enables one to move into a 
11 The contention exists, however, in the relationship between Sartre and de Beauvoir and 
what we may conclude from Sartre's ideas about Bataille. Sartre privileges the human project as 
valuable to human life. Indeed, the fulfilment of freely chosen projects is a necessary component 
of the Sartrean version of transcendence. Bataille, however, does not privilege the project and is 
criticised by Sartre on this issue. It is a common assumption that de Beauvoir's philosophy is 
faithful to Sartre's, in which case she would have to uphold the importance of projects in her 
work. But, projects and transcendence aside, there is something about de Beauvoir's vision of 
immanence that resonates with Bataille's. 
12 This is a contentious issue. Nancy Hartsock takes the opposing view on Bataille, claiming 
that he epitomises "masculine perversity." I will present Hartsock's position in Chapter five, 
where I also examine Bataille's claims in more detail. 
27 
state in which one is no longer conscious of being a distinct self, or a distinct 
subject. But nor is their consciousness of an Other, or an object. He thus 
indicates that transcendence into self-consciousness does not eliminate the 
possibility of pure experience. 
Bataille's philosophy begins at Hegel's point of closure. Hegel presents a 
closed system of knowledge, from the immature knowledge of Sense-
certainty to the abstract knowledge in which linguistic concepts are 
independent of sensations. Believing himself to have developed his own 
knowledge to the point of Hegelian closure, Bataille identifies "a blind spot" 
in Hegel's understanding. (1988b: 110) In Bataille's words 
if the spot absorbs one's attention: it is no longer the spot which loses itself in 
knowledge, but knowledge which loses itself in it. (1988b: 110-111) [my italics]. 
The spot is the sense-certainty which, in Hegel's vision, becomes lost once 
we use abstract concepts competently. According to Hegel, sense-certainty "is 
shrouded to become a mere shadowy outline" once knowledge advances. 
(§28) But, in Bataille's view, there are times that knowledge is lost in 
experience. At such times, according to Bataille, we become so absorbed in 
our experience that we lose sight of any abstract concepts, including the 
awareness of ourselves as subjects. Hegel does not account for this. But 
Bataille further argues that, contra Hegel, experience is non-knowledge. 
Remember that, for Hegel, sense-certainty is an immature version of 
knowing that we lose once we are able to use abstract concepts. Sensations are 
negated by and sublated into the more developed concepts of comprehension. 
It is therefore impossible, in Hegel's vision, to have pure sensations in the 
absence of the associated concept once you have advanced down the 
knowledge trail. Bataille, on the other hand, sees that pure sensation is not 
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always negated and sublated into comprehension. Moreover, for Bataille, 
these pure experiences are not an immature version of knowing. They are 
not knowledge at all in Bataille's view. They are, rather, pure experience. In 
intense erotic experience, for instance, we may be so absorbed by the 
sensations that, in Bataille's words 
Experience attains in the end the fusion of object and subject, being as subject non-
knowledge, as object the unknown (1988b: 9) 
In other words, for Bataille, there is no distinction between self and world, 
or between subject and object in such cases.13 Without this distinction, 
according to Bataille, there is no knowledge whatsoever. The conscious being 
is not aware of herself as having the experience, nor is she aware of the 
experience as any particular type of experience. There is a type of rudimentary 
awareness but, as mentioned above in de Beauvoir's comments on erotic 
immanence, this rudimentary awareness amounts to darkness. The 
awareness of experience is therefore not knowledge because the light of 
reason is cast upon experience only after the fact, in Bataille's view. 
Bataille claims that we can reflect on inner experiences at some later time 
in order that we can comprehend them. De Beauvoir shows that this is 
possible simply in virtue of writing about erotic experiences. She describes 
that experience above as "night of immanence," "opaque clay," "dark matrix." 
Metaphor is used to direct us towards sensation; or to give us a sense of 
something that is difficult to define literally. 14 It could be said that metaphor 
evokes both transcendence and immanence within us: it evokes our 
I3_Sports people speak of "flow" as another example of an incidental experience when this 
fusion takes place. I am grateful to Cynthia Townley for pointing this out. 
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transcendence in virtue of the fact that we need to be competent language 
users to understand metaphor - we need to think about the metaphor to 
interpret it; and the metaphor evokes immanence inasmuch as it makes us 
feel something - it evokes our sensual existence. 
De Beauvoir's use of metaphor to describe immanence suggests that her 
conception of immanence is more akin to Bataille than to Hegel. Recall that 
Hegel sees immanence and transcendence as being mutually exclusive within 
the individual. For Hegel we are either immanent, particularly if we are 
female, or transcendent in the case of a mature male. Moreover, in Hegel's 
view, women cannot transcend experience, and depending upon men for 
reason. Men, in his view, rise above the passive consciousness of experience, 
and depend upon women to reflect their inner lives. As Lloyd says, Hegel 
does this to exonerate male reason without fully sacrificing the sensual realm. 
(1983: 84) Lloyd claims that the association between women and "natural 
feeling" gives them their own moral superiority in the relationship between 
the sexes. But it is my view that there is a better way to explain how we know 
about experiences without casting them into the primordial soup as 
immature knowledge. (See Appendix 1 for a detailed analysis of Lloyd.) 
I am suggesting that de Beauvoir takes this alternative view. She argues 
that women are as able to reason as men. But she also claims that men are as 
vulnerable to experiences as women. Unlike Hegel, de Beauvoir does not 
claim that women and men have two fundamentally different types of 
existence. She says 
to say that Woman is Flesh, to say that the Flesh is Night and Death, or that it is 
the splendour of the Cosmos, is to abandon terrestrial truth and soar into an empty 
14 I discuss metaphor as evoking experience in more detail in Chapter three. 
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sky. For man also is flesh for woman; and woman is not merely a carnal object; and 
the flesh is clothed in a special significance for each person and in each experience. 
And likewise it is quite true that woman - like man - is a being rooted in nature; she 
is more enslaved to the species than is the male, her animality is more manifest, 
but in her as in him the given traits are taken on through the fact of existence, she 
belongs also to the human realm. To assimilate her to Nature is simply to act from 
prejudice. (1953: 285) 
In de Beauvoir's vision, men like Hegel take a purely selfish vision of 
women as bodies to satiate desire and to produce offspring. But this is merely 
an indication of men's fantasy to transcend their bodies - and soar into an 
empty sky. I gather the empty sky is the realm of abstract ideas which lose 
touch with a concrete reality. 
De Beauvoir says that each experience has its own significance depending 
upon the context. She indicates that women may not be in control of 
pregnancy, for instance, but that there are also times when men lose control 
of their flesh. When their organ swells, for instance, and they thrash around 
in the midst of desire. To be sure, pregnancy, childbirth and lactation make 
women's animality more manifest. But it is prejudicial to assume, on the 
basis of the maternal function, that women are more like animals than men. 
De Beauvoir concludes that 
As a matter of fact, man, like woman, is flesh, therefore passive, the plaything of 
his hormones and of the species, the restless prey of his desires. And she, like him, 
in the midst of carnal fever, is a consenting, a voluntary gift, an activity; they live 
out in their several fashions the strange ambiguity of existence made body. In those 
combats where they think they confront one another, it is really against the self 
that each one struggles, projecting into the partner that part of the self which is 
repudiated; instead of living out the ambiguities of their situation, each tries to 
make the other bear the abjection and tries to reserve the honour for the self. {1953: 
737) 
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De Beauvoir clearly states that the adult human experience of immanence 
is not restricted to the female reproductive body. It is, rather, a feature of 
adult embodied experience, irrespective of sex. Men, she reminds us, are as 
embodied as women in their servitude to the conditions of embodiment. 
Together, in erotic passion, they face an ambiguity as they find themselves 
experiencing something that Hegel denies - immanence in the face of 
transcendence. This is a gift when it is offered voluntarily and by consent of 
both parties. But it is an ambiguous gift inasmuch as the experience takes 
each human beyond the bounds of the self-aware individual into a state of 
awareness that is selfless. The experience is selfless because it is immanent: 
in inner experience there is no distinction between self and world; or self and 
other. Without the awareness of distinction, there is no self in experience. 
There is no knowledge; there is only experience. Knowing the experience 
requires the ability to use language so that we can know each experience as 
the kind of experience it is. In the next chapter I will provide a more detailed 
discussion of how we know experiences by learning a language. 
In the absence of a distinction between subject and object, experience is, as 
de Beauvoir puts it "abject." No-one, man or woman, is subject or object 
whilst we are in this abject state together. But, as de Beauvoir says, we often 
try to pretend that we are not abject. This, in fact, is part of Hegel's error: 
denying his own abjection and presuming that all men are subjects and that 
all women are not. Hegel's analysis is misguided and prejudicial. 
v. de Beauvoir on the liberation of mothers 
De Beauvoir indicates that there is something about losing ourselves to 
experience that is as important to humanity as developing our knowledge in 
the context of a history of ideas. Her use of the term "immanence" misleads 
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us towards a Hegelian vision of experience as immature knowledge. In 
Hegel's view, immanence is an immature version of knowing that develops 
towards transcendence just as a child is an immature version of a human 
who develops into an adult. I have argued above that de Beauvoir does not 
see immanence as an immature version of transcendence. Instead, her 
conception of immanence reveals that experience is not a way of knowing 
anything. I will now argue that de Beauvoir does not claim that motherhood 
restricts women to immanence.is 
At a glance, it does appear that de Beauvoir claims that motherhood 
restricts woman to immanence. Recall passages such as "in maternity 
woman remained closely bound to her body, like an animal." (1953: 97) Note, 
however, that this statement follows Beauvoir's discussion of Hegel, and of 
other "men [who] have presumed to create a feminine domain - the kingdom 
of life, of immanence - only in order to lock up women therein." (1953: 97) 
De Beauvoir is not presenting her own view of maternity, or of immanence, 
but is showing us Hegel's ideas, albeit expressed in.Sartre's terms, as an 
example of male theorists' views about these matters. It is therefore not clear 
that de Beauvoir subscribes to the vision of maternity that she presents in 
these passages. 
De Beauvoir also argues that men value reason over the flesh and that a 
consequence of this valuation is the valuation of men over women due to 
the associations between men and reason, on the one hand, and women and 
embodiment on the other. There is no doubt that de Beauvoir values reason, 
for it is, she argues, only in virtue of reason that we can be free. The problem, 
as she sees it, is that "women have never set up female values in opposition 
15 Lundren-Gothlin, for instance, holds this view. See her 1996:235-238. 
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to male values" and that this lack of values constructed by and for women 
leads to a devaluing of that which is considered to be feminine: nature, the 
flesh and immanence. (1953: 96) The Second Sex goes some way towards 
presenting a more positive conception of women as agents in their own right. 
De Beauvoir draws from existential ethics to argue that women can be 
liberated. In existential ethics, according to de Beauvoir, 
[e]very subject plays his part as such specifically through exploits or projects that 
serve as a mode of transcendence; he achieves liberty only through a reaching out 
toward other liberties. (1953: 28) 
In de Beauvoir's view, we must actively pursue freedom in our lives. 
Engaging in projects by choice is a stepping stone towards greater freedom. 
Engaging in these freely chosen projects confirms our transcendence; or our 
ability to make conscious choices about our lives. But, in de Beauvoir's 
words, 
what peculiarly signalizes the situation of woman is that she - a free and 
autonomous being like all human creatures - nevertheless finds herself living in a 
world where men compel her to assume the status of the Other. They propose to 
stabilise her as object and to doom her to immanence since her transcendence is to be 
overshadowed and for ever transcended by another ego (conscience) which is 
essential and sovereign. The drama of woman lies in this conflict between the 
fundamental aspirations of every subject (ego) - who always regards the self as the 
essential - and the compulsions of a situation in which she is the inessential. (1953: 
29) 
As de Beauvoir says, women can think and, as such, they are as free and 
autonomous as any other member of the human species. But the situation of 
women compels them into a position of subordination to men. Women are 
taken as the inessential, in her view, through men's association between 
maternity, the flesh and a passive indwelling consciousness. In pregnancy 
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women have little control of the development of the foetus, making that 
aspect of maternity an unconscious process. But, of course, pregnancy is only 
the beginning of mothering. The creation of a new life in utero apparently 
eclipses maternal autonomy in the more general sense because the creativity 
in utero is not active on the part of women. The assumption follows that all 
maternal authority is as natural as pregnancy. De Beauvoir does not agree 
that there is any such thing as natural knowledge in maternity. 
De Beauvoir cites a number of cases of maternal indifference in an 
argument against maternal instinct. {1953: 522-526) She argues that the "word 
hardly applies, in any case, to the human species." Each situation must be 
assessed on its own merits, she says, claiming that different contexts give 
differing insights into the experiences of maternity. De Beauvoir's book sets 
out, in part, to show that maternity is not a necessary project for all women. 
But she also claims that we could have choices, and therefore freedom, if 
maternity was not pressed upon us. She argues that maternal experience 
need not be an impediment to reason. 
In her view, then, epistemic authority is possible for women and men. 
Persons from either sex have the epistemic resources that enable them to pay 
attention to the facts and to make choices accordingly. Maternity does not 
effect the ability to reason. Maternity is only a constraint to reason, in de 
Beauvoir's view, when people take seriously the idea that maternal 
consciousness is more animal than human. But that very idea is a vital 
move in the subordination of women to men, in her vision, and liberation is 
possible through women's active participation in deciding whether they want 
to rear children and to create a society in which childbearing and childrearing 
are compossible with the sorts of projects men have valued as their own. 
In her conclusion, for instance, de Beauvoir writes 
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A world where men and women would be equal is easy to visualize, for that 
precisely is what the Soviet Revolution promised: ... maternity was to be voluntary, 
which meant that contraception and abortion were to be authorized and that, on 
the other hand, all mothers and their children were to have exactly the same 
rights, in or out of marriage; pregnancy leaves were to be paid for by the State, 
which would assume charge of the children, signifying not that they would be 
taken away from their parents, but that they would not be abandoned to them. 
(1953: 734) 
In other words, Beauvoir envisages a world - not unlike the one we 
inhabit 50 years on - where women are given freedom to make a range of 
choices about maternity. Women can choose whether or not to have a child; 
when to have a child; who to have a child with and so on. Thanks to 
feminists who have followed in de Beauvoir's footsteps, in both academic 
and grass roots organisations, we now have a greater range of contraception 
choices and of abortion providers.16 De Beauvoir's vision is also one in 
which the State provides support for women with children, now evident in 
the form of childcare, family payments, family courts, counselling and 
emotional support centres, and so on. In a practical sense, then, de Beauvoir 
has helped us to prove that we are no less human and rational than men. 
Women, whether or not they are mothers, clearly do not have some peculiar 
childlike version of knowing. Women can make choices; and they can and 
do enter public life as mothers. 
conclusion 
I show that Hegel presents the indwelling consciousness as a version of 
immature knowledge. He claims that such consciousness is a purely 
16 Clearly, the abortion debate rages on into the New Milennium. For a good discussion of 
feminist positions on the foetus, see Lyn Morgan and Meredith Michaels, 1999. 
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subjective way of knowing in which objects passively present themselves 
upon an inner screen. I have argued that his conception of experience as 
knowledge is untenable, however, because it is unlikely that anyone would 
know trees, for example, simply in virtue of being in the presence of trees. It 
is my view that knowing anything about experiences requires first learning a 
language according to the standards and practices of the conscious being's 
respective community. Hegel begins with experience as an immature type of 
knowing. I have presented an alternative view, that experiences are not a 
type of knowing but that they can be known after the fact if we turn our 
linguistically informed attention to them. 
Moreover, I suggest here that Hegel's idea of an inner screen upon which 
all knowledge passively presents itself opens the way for scepticism about 
human experiences. The knowledge on an inner screen is deeply private and 
cannot be checked or authenticated. It is therefore possible that the conscious 
being is mistaken, and that they do not have any experiences. I will dwell on 
the problem of scepticism about experiences in Chapter two, where I also 
present a more detailed account of how we come to know experiences 
through learning language. 
Simone de Beauvoir's vision of maternity as compatible with reason is 
made possible if she takes experience to be non-knowledge, as Bataille does, 
rather than as Hegelian immediate knowledge. I have drawn out passages in 
her text to support the claim that she characterises experience as non-
knowledge: as "darkness" rather than as "light." I have shown that she 
attributes these states of immanent darkness to men in erotic experiences as 
much as she does to women in pregnancy. Finally I show that her account of 
maternity aims to liberate mothers from the shackles of domestic 
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subordination so that they can enter public life with facilities which enable 
mothers the freedom that Hegel argues is only possible for men. 
In following chapters I will continue to investigate accounts of maternal 
experience which aim to improve our conception of the epistemic authority 
of mothers. It is my view that the Hegelian vision of experience as 
knowledge seeps into many contemporary feminist texts, through the work of 
theorists like Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Lacan. In chapter two I 
show that Iris Young's account of "Pregnant Embodiment" inherits a private 
knowledge claim from Hegel through Merleau-Ponty. In chapters three and 
four I show how Lacan's work transmits private knowledge claims into our 
understanding of maternal experience and into Feminist Standpoint 
Epistemology. In chapter five I return to Bataille's revision of Hegel to put 
right a feminist generalisation about masculine knowledge based in sexual 
perversity. Even if Bataille's practices are perverse, we can learn from his 
conception of the distinction between experience and knowledge. This, I 
argue, is helpful for better understanding how to dismantle the Hegelian 
monolith in order to gain epistemic authority about experience. 
In short, Hegel sets up the dichotomies in which women are associated 
with experience in opposition to male reason. In association with women 
and experience are the terms: nature, the body, inner experience, passive 
unconscious and private. In association with men and reason are the terms: 
culture, the mind, external world, active, conscious and public. These 
dichotomies fall neatly into line thanks to the Hegelian monolith. But this 
monolithic structure drains all epistemic authority from those who value 
experiences. Mothers, in particular, find themselves silenced and cast outside 
the properly human domain of creating reasons to live. 
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Appendix 111 
i Lloyd: Beauvoir's paradox 
Geneveive Lloyd argues that de Beauvoir's account of two different sorts 
of consciousness - "immanence" and "transcendence" - are derived from 
Hegel by way of Sartre. Immanence, in this light, is the immature 
consciousness of passive sensory awareness. The word means indwelling, 
indicating that the immanent consciousness is directed inwards, 
experiencing whatever is taking place inside itself. Transcendence is 
outward directed and, in Sartrean terms indicates the "Subject" who looks 
rather than the "Other" who is looked at. Women are cast as the "Other" 
in Lloyd's analysis of de Beauvoir's interpretation of Hegel. Women are 
"Other" on this view so long as they are engaged in the natural activities 
of childbearing. Lloyd argues that de Beauvoir's view of transcendence 
makes women powerless subordinates if they succumb to maternal duties. 
As Lloyd says, de Beauvoir argues that women are positioned as "Other" 
by men. Being inward focussed in maternity, for instance, women are not 
looking at others, but being looked at. Men, on the other hand, are 
actively looking around themselves at each other. The outward focus of 
men, she argues, makes men subjects in their own right, enabling them to 
have a sort of autonomous freedom which is impossible for those who are 
17 Appendix 1 is taken from an earlier draft of this chapter. It is included because the author 
was still undecided about whether to include it in the final version. Section ii, on Hegelian self-
certainty, repeats material which is in the body of the text, but is included here to indicate the 
original flow of argument, and because it throws light on the discussion in the main text. -eds. 
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not engaged in the business oflooking at others. For, in Lloyd's reading of 
de Beauvoir, freedom is only possible between subjects; in inter 
subjectivity. 
Women, on this reading, are too busily focussed on keeping the species 
going to be engaged in the struggle for freedom. They allegedly accept 
their subordinate positions, maintair:iing the spheres of life and death, 
whilst their men engage in the public arena of rational accomplishments. 
The two sexes are thus opposed with women tending to the more basic 
personal domestic needs while men keep the social sphere running 
smoothly. But Hegel's specific claims about women's consciousness are 
sketchy. Lloyd directs us to his view in The Philosophy of Right that the 
State would be in jeopardy if women were in control. (1983: 84) She cites 
his view that women have well developed intuition and a "'vague unity 
of feeling,' rather than a grasp of universality." (1983: 84) As I will show 
later, Hegel claims that women have consciousness which is universal as 
a type of consciousness, but that women cannot grasp universals. So, as 
Lloyd argues, Hegel reserves the clear light of reason for men who, he 
claims, are rightly placed in the socio-political sphere of human life. 
According to Hegel, women stay at home as dutiful wives and mothers. 
Lloyd argues that the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, presented in his 
account of self-consciousness, is important for understanding de 
Beauvoir's claim that women can transcend their roles as wives and 
mothers. As Lloyd says, de Beauvoir argues that women can rise above 
their immanence But, in Lloyd's view, "only at the expense of alienation 
from their bodily being." (1983: 101) She thus suggests that women's 
freedom is only possible if they give up maternity. 
Lloyd asserts that 
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In Hegel's original version of the transcendence of life, women were outside the 
drama, relegated to a nether world. In de Beauvoir's application of the model, 
mediated through Sartre, women are fitted into the conflict of hostile 
consciousnesses; her ideal is that they struggle to become lookers, rather than 
always looked-at. (1983: 101-102) 
As we discover below, in Hegel's view, becoming conscious of oneself as 
a particular consciousness requires first noticing that others are conscious. 
As Lloyd argues, Hegelian self-consciousness is produced through inter 
subjectivity. Initially, consciousness reaches out to the other and tries to 
make it part of itself. But, upon recognising another's consciousness, the 
conscious being sees its own consciousness mirrored back. This 
recognition of another being's consciousness, and the subsequent 
recognition of its own self-consciousness, enables the merely conscious 
being of to move into the second dialectical phase of conscious 
development. Hegel's three phases begin with consciousness. The second 
phase is self-consciousness; and the final phase is reason. Moving beyond 
consciousness requires the initial recognition of self-certainty and 
develops into reason through an ongoing confrontation with other self-
conscious beings. 
Lloyd claims that the Sartrean distinction between the looker and the 
looked-at is derived from the Hegelian struggle between conscious beings 
for recognition. She argues that the Sartrean vision is liberating for those 
who take the viewing position, and for those who create themselves as 
someone worth recognising. But, Lloyd complains, Sartre envisages some 
bodies as "bound to a body immersed in life," constraining them to 
immanence rather than transcendence. She argues that this reading of 
immanence and transcendence confines mothers to the subordinate 
position of the Other at whom men gaze. 
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Lloyd proposes that de Beauvoir's reading of Hegel excludes a middle 
ground between immanence and transcendence. She claims that Hegel 
places women in this middle zone "located between the merely 'natural' 
and full participation in the outer world of projects and exploits." (1983: 
98) De Beauvoir's reading, she claims, makes possible the movement 
from one side of the dichotomy to the other without recourse to the 
middle term. Lloyd claims that de Beauvoir is wrong to think women can 
share the mature consciousness Hegel attributes only to men. In Lloyd's 
reading of Hegel, transcendence requires suppression of the 'feminine' 
consciousness associated with the term "immanence." But, unlike de 
Beauvoir, Lloyd conceives of Hegel's feminine consciousness as wedged 
into the middle zone, as capable of attaining self-certainty. De Beauvoir, 
on the other hand, argues that women can be both immanent and 
transcendent, omitting any discussion of the middle ground to which 
Lloyd refers. 
Women have self-consciousness, or "self-certainty" in Lloyd's view. It 
is worth pointing out that Hegel's treatment of the master-slave dialectic 
takes place in this middle ground. The master-slave dialectic is crucial in 
Lloyd's reading of Beauvoir to show why women are positioned as 
"Other" in de Beauvoir's work. Self-certainty is more advanced than 
immanent sense-certainty but, Lloyd argues, women cannot progress 
beyond this middling stage to join with men in reason. Self-certainty 
gives women the most basic sort of self-consciousness which, in the 
Hegelian picture is the middle ground between experiential consciousness 
and reason. It is my view, however, that women do not even get as far as 
this middle ground in Hegel' s work. 
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In Lloyd's understanding, according to which Hegel takes women to 
move beyond sense-certainty into self-certainty, Hegel does not conceive 
of women as immanent. The middle zone to which Lloyd refers takes 
women beyond the domain of universal consciousness to develop self-
consciousness as particular individuals. But, as I argue in the main text of 
this chapter, Hegel's claims about women's roles in the ethical order 
denies them the particularity he associates with men. I am therefore more 
inclined to agree with de Beauvoir that Hegel does conceive of women as 
immanent. 
The universal consciousness is grounded in experience in Hegel's view, 
in contrast to the particular consciousness who develops abstract thought. 
Whereas men's conscious development enables them to know 
themselves as particular individuals, in Hegel's view, women's 
consciousness denies this possibility. Women's consciousness is universal 
because the consciousness of any particular woman will be similar to that 
of any other. In Hegel's view women simply register in consciousness 
whatever lies before their senses. Having only universal consciousness, 
women are more like thermometers which read off their environment 
than self-conscious human beings. 
Lloyd argues that de Beauvoir's idea of immanence and transcendence is 
based on a misunderstanding of the Hegelian dialectic. Hegelian 
transcendence is a progressive development away from immanence. 
There is a series of stages whereby each supersedes the next in a constant 
stream of coming to know. But, as Lloyd says, each previous stage remains 
intact. For men, the realm of "merely natural feelings" is transcended in 
such a way that they come to understand their own individual 
particularity. For mothers, on the other hand, the realm of feeling is not 
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transcended: "there is no such realm which she can both leave and leave 
intact." (1983: 102) Lloyd correctly indicates that maternal experience 
makes impossible the transcendence of embodiment if we are to agree 
with the Hegelian process. 
As Lloyd argues, Hegel's version of conscious development requires that 
experiences are repressed to make way for rational knowledge. She claims 
that his association between women and experience is constitutive of our 
understanding of femininity. "What has happened has been not a simple 
exclusion of women, but a constitution of femininity through that 
exclusion." (1983: 106) Femininity is constructed through an 
understanding of experience as an immature version of reason. 
Femininity is excluded from the public domain, however, because 
experience is deeply subjective. As a sort of knowledge, then, experience is 
not granted the same degree of value accorded to abstract reason precisely 
because the latter can be checked and verified. In Hegel's vision women's 
lives are immersed in experiences. He is unable to see that experiences of 
life and death are compossible with reason. Seeing that women's 
experiences are valuable to life in general, Hegel associates femininity 
with the sort of experiential knowledge which, for males, must be negated 
and sublated, or suppressed so that inter subjectivity is possible. In Hegel's 
view, freedom requires inter subjectivity through the development of 
reason. 
According to Simone de Beauvoir, women only need to develop reason 
so that they have the inter subjectivity required for freedom. But, as Lloyd 
argues, Hegel says that developing inter subjective reason is only possible 
through the suppression of experience. De Beauvoir's use of the terms 
"immanence" and "transcendence" indicate this Hegelian vision, whereby 
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one starts out in a conscious state that is indwelling and rises above that 
state towards reason. To argue that one can both have indwelling 
knowledge and abstract knowledge is paradoxical, however, because the 
former is an immature version of the latter. De Beauvoir's view is either 
paradoxical or she has a different conception of the terms "immanence" 
and "transcendence." 
Lloyd argues correctly that a Hegelian vision of transcendence represents 
the male idealisation of reason: as knowledge that no longer depends on 
having sensations. Lloyd says that this notion of transcendence "feeds on 
the exclusion of the feminine" in theories like Hegel's, which places 
women outside the rational domain. The feminine, is contextualised as 
"greater biological involvement in 'species life'." (1983: 100) Women's 
ethical responsibilities to keep life going, she says, are "relegated to a 
nether world" by Hegel. (1983: 101) Lloyd thus claims that de Beauvoir's 
call for female transcendence is paradoxical precisely because this entails 
rising above their own biological constitution. 
Lloyd's reading of de Beauvoir suggests that maternal experience gets in 
the way of Hegelian transcendence. This would be the case if de Beauvoir 
were being faithful to Hegel, or even to Sartre. Indeed, feminists such as 
Catriona MacKenzie (1986) and Eva Lundgren-Gothlin (1996) agree with 
Lloyd's drawing out the paradox of her claims that women can both bear 
children and enter public life. To do both suggests the paradox of both 
rising above and not rising above the sort of knowledge Hegel argues is 
given in embodied experience. 
It is my view that de Beauvoir challenges Hegel's vision of sexual 
difference by showing that he is wrong about experience. Rather than 
suggesting that women give up maternity to overcome their immanence, 
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she establishes that inner experience is not knowledge. She argues that, as 
a kind of non-knowledge, immanence is as apparent in male erotic 
experience as it is in female experience. 
I will show that de Beauvoir's conception of erotic experience is more 
like that of Georges Bataille (1988) than Hegel' s. Bataille does not conceive 
of inner experience as immature knowledge, seeing it instead as being 
outside knowledge. Placing experience outside knowledge, as non-
knowledge is significant because it changes the status of experience from 
being an immature sort of knowing to something that can be known. 
Before returning to de Beauvoir and Bataille (see main text -ed), I shall 
examine Hegel's version of experience as a type of universal knowledge. 
ii Hegelian Sense-certainty 
Hegelian sense-certainty is immediate knowledge of the world as distinct 
from knowledge of the self as a self in relation to the world. Hegel's "middle 
zone," between consciousness and reason, is the stage in which we come to 
know ourselves as selves, and to peer into our own consciousness, rather 
than into the world, to see what is going on. But in sense-certainty we have 
no such opportunity to see into our own minds. Sense-certainty is first 
person knowledge if it is knowledge at all, and there are times when Hegel 
says it is. Taking sense-certainty to be the undeveloped first person 
knowledge indicates that the conscious being knows whatever is presented to 
her consciousness as the kind of thing that it is. The problem with first 
person knowledge is that it is immature because it does not meet the inter 
subjectivity requirements so that such knowledge can be authenticated. 
Sense-certainty just happens, without any active participation on behalf of 
the conscious being who simply experiences whatever presents itself to 
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awareness. Hegel's discussion of sense-certainty is best understood if we 
imagine that the awareness is played out on a kind of inner screen, with a 
succession of impressions each vanishing into the next. There is no 
distinction between the succession of impressions and the conscious being. It 
is as though the conscious being just is the screen, reflecting the world within 
a mind that can not yet distinguish itself as a mind. In Hegel's view, the 
conscious being only knows a succession of physical objects in sense-certainty. 
There is no attempt to grasp the objects notionally, or to have a linguistic 
comprehension of an object in relation to anything else. There is no 
awareness of the object's parts or qualities. Instead, there is only awareness 
that there is an object, giving certainty of that object's existence. The object is 
sensed and its existence is confirmed because, in Hegel's view, the sensation is 
the most primordial way of knowing anything. (§90-91) 
According to Hegel, there is a vague rernguiliuu uf Ll1e self in sense-
certainty, but only in so far as the object is in awareness. The self awareness 
just is awareness of the object in consciousness. The conscious being merely 
reads off the environment registering various sensations in consciousness. 
The registering of sensations requires that there is consciousness, since for 
Hegel the 'I' is nothing more than the knowing. Neither the self nor the 
object are defined; they are merely registered to form the structure of 
consciousness. (§92). In Hegel's view, then, the fact that there is a 
consciousness with which to register the world is sufficient to claim that there 
is some sort of knowing taking place. Sense-certainty is immediate 
knowledge. 
It is important to recognise that this immediate knowledge can be 
understood in two different ways. Immediate could mean non-inferential, 
taking basic utterances, such as "this" to indicate that the conscious being has 
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a very undeveloped vocabulary at this early stage. With non-inferential 
utterances, the immature conscious being comes to know that there are 
things around her, even though she does not yet know these things as the 
kinds of things they are. The epistem~c status of this sort of knowledge will be 
dubious, however, because it is not yet clear how standards and practices of 
the community will impact on knowledge. The relevance of such standards 
and practices to anything which can properly said to be knowledge is 
discussed below. 
The second way to understand what Hegel means by immediate 
knowledge is to say that the knowledge is given by sensations. If this is so, we 
cannot be sure that we each have the same kinds of sensations, let alone 
whether anyone else does. There is no way to check other peoples sensations 
directly whereas others can check whether they are behaving in the expected 
way associated with the sensations they claim to have. Others have more 
authoritative knowledge about the correlation between behaviour with 
different kinds of sensations, or with feelings, than the conscious being with 
sense-certainty. 
For example, someone might point at a sore tooth but is not guaranteed 
epistemic authority just by pointing or even by uttering "this." Such 
authority does not carry epistemic status. The dentist who looks at the tooth 
and makes some prognosis will have the epistemic authority. If the pregnant 
woman claims to have anything like sense-certainty, this will not grant her 
epistemic authority in relation to medical knowledge, as I shall argue in 
chapter two. The problem with this kind of knowledge is that it is deeply 
private and cannot be checked as knowledge by anyone other than ourselves. 
Sense-certainty is a passive way of knowing. The sensations just register 
anything that is present and the conscious being only knows that which lies 
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within the sensory field. Even though the conscious being tries to get a better 
grasp of things, sense-certainty is unable to sustain anything in consciousness 
because of its fleeting nature. The conscious being is unable to control its 
knowledge in sense-certainty, being simply a passive recipient of information 
from its immediate environment. 
Hegel postulates that each sensation is superseded by the next and the 
conscious being can do little more than use the demonstrative term "This." 
But the term "This" does not help others understand that which Hegel claims 
is the truth of sense-certainty. Sense-certainty is a purely subjective way of 
knowing which is not at once inter subjective. For, in Hegel's view, the true 
meaning of sense-certainty is an inner episode which is deeply private and 
sensuous. He says "it is just not possible for us to ever say, or express in 
words, a sensuous being that we mean." (§97) Sense-certainty therefore fails 
to meet the inter subjectivity requirement by which others may agree that the 
conscious being's knowledge is true or false. No-one else has access to the 
conscious being's knowledge in Sense-certainty so that knowledge can be 
checked and verified. Sense-certainty is thus open to scepticism. IS 
To avoid the sceptical view that different beings sense the same things 
differently, Hegel claims that the meaning of sense-certainty is "universal" 
rather than particular: each conscious being has the same types of sensations 
when faced with the same sorts of objects. (§102) If we are facing a tree, for 
instance, we each see the same thing; if we are facing a house, we also see the 
same thing; and so on. Hegel's account of sense-certainty discusses images 
rather than other sorts of experiences, but it follows that we will all smell the 
lS I present a detailed analysis of the scepticism of knowledge about sensations in Chapter 
two. 
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same thing when sniffing a rose, or feel the same thing when cut by a knife. 
The basic idea is the registration of sensory information in consciousness, and 
being able to identify each distinct sensation as "This." In Hegel's view, the 
knowledge is given by the sensation and is universally held by all conscious 
beings with the same sensory apparatus. The universal nature of sense-
certainty is important, in his view, because these beings cannot say what they 
mean; or express their knowledge about sensations. 
Space and Time play an important role in sense-certainty to ensure the 
succession of sensations so that each 'Here' and 'Now,' vanishes into the next, 
making it impossible to focus on anything. There is constant flux, or change 
in sense-certainty. (§94) There may be a tree presenting itself to 
consciousness, for instance, as 'This' tree which is 'Here.' But, turning 
around, there is no longer a tree. The tree is negated by the house which is 
'here.' But, he says, the 'here' is constant and the objects inconstant. Each 
awareness of 'here' and 'now' is replaced by the next, being different from the 
last and therefore a negation. Day is negated by night and the tree is negated 
by a house, and so on. (§98-99) That which remains, according to Hegel, is 
"pure being." 
Pure being is consciousness itself. But, for Hegel, having consciousness is 
sufficient for knowing the objects which are presented to consciousness. As 
Hegel describes it, immediate knowledge is the constant stream of negation 
and mediation in space and time of things presenting themselves to 
consciousness. The negation is brought about by the fact that the tree is 
replaced by a house, which is not-tree. The replacement of a tree by a house is 
possible only because the conscious being is situated in space and time. Time 
enables the consciousness to move so that the house is a negative in relation 
to a tree. Each awareness of 'here' and 'now' is replaced by the next, being 
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different from the last and therefore a negation. Each successive image or 
sensation in inner space negates the last in a perpetual movement of 
supersession. 
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, Hegel's discussion of sense-
certainty as a flowing stream of consciousness indicates that there is a 
projection of images and impressions on an inner screen. But Hegel claims 
that no-one is present to make anything of the sounds, images (and other 
senses) as they are projected into inner space. There is no self-consciousness 
during sense-certainty, he argues. There are only objects in the absence of a 
subject. For, in Hegel's view, the object is the passive component of 
consciousness and the subject is the active component of consciousness. The 
conscious being of Sense-certainty is not yet a subject. If she is aware of 
herself at all, the conscious being of sense-certainty is aware of herself only as 
a fleeting succession of inner objects. 
Moreover, the knowledge a conscious being has in sense-certainty cannot 
be authenticated. Her knowledge is private precisely because the conscious 
being is unable to show anyone else her screen, and it is on the screen that 
Hegel claims the meaning of her knowledge is to be discovered. All these 
sensory images, sounds or otherwise have in common is that they are present 
on the inner screen in a succession of ever-changing heres and nows. Hegel's 
conception of sense-certainty is therefore immanent if we understand the 
term to mean indwelling. I will now examine some of de Beauvoir' s claims 
about immanence to show that she refers to the inner experiences Hegel 
places under the category sense-certainty. 
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iii de Beauvoir and maternal immanence 
In her Introduction to The Second Sex, de Beauvoir claims that women are 
free and autonomous beings, like men. Women's freedom is constrained, in 
her view, by the views of men who see maternity as being more animal than 
human. The problem with maternity is that women do not have to 
consciously control their reproductive abilities. Maternal consciousness is 
passive in this sense and is thus opposed to the active consciousness with 
which humans are associated. The properly human consciousness, she 
suggests, is not determined by nature. But maternity, on the other hand, is 
purely natural. (1953: 28-29) 
As Lloyd argues, de Beauvoir sees that women are defined as Other, rather 
than as free autonomous agents, or subjects in their own right. She 
characterises maternity as "a degradation of existence into the 'en-soi' - the 
brutish life of subjection to given conditions." (1953: 29) The "en-soi"' is the 
French translation of "in-itself" which Hegel uses to describe the 
consciousness of sense-certainty. "Being-in-itself" is not yet self-conscious in 
contradistinction to "being-for-itself" which is self-conscious. There is no 
self-certainty in the earlier stages of consciousness described above, so it is 
apparent that de Beauvoir associates maternal experience with the "in-itself" 
of Hegelian consciousness in which there is no subject. Lloyd argues that 
Hegel does regard women as spiritual subjects, and sees de Beauvoir 
"illuminating an inner tension in Hegel's position." (1983: 98) Women's 
subjectivity is less advanced than men's, but is nonetheless ethical. To have 
an ethical duty requires that one be a subject, in Lloyd's view, even though 
women's participation in the higher levels of spirit is vicarious. 
On de Beauvoir's reading of Hegel's Phenomenology women lack freedom 
because they do not reach self-consciousness: they are looked-at rather than 
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lookers. As de Beauvoir makes clear, freedom is only possible in inter 
subjectivity. Hegel's version of sense-certainty makes experience purely 
subjective and private, so does not meet the inter subjectivity requirement 
necessary for freedom. Lloyd claims that de Beauvoir's idea of freedom 
through self-hood is "quite uncompromising. Nothing short of actual 
engagement in 'projects' and 'exploits' will do. In the lack of that, human 
subjects are forced back into mere immanence." (1983: 98) 
De Beauvoir disputes Hegel' s claim that women do not have self-
consciousness. She argues that women are taught how to be subordinate to 
men from childhood. Women learn that they will be wives and mothers - to 
look after men and their children who they must put before their own 
interests. De Beauvoir does not accept that it is impossible for women to 
become self-conscious, but sees a certain blindness of women to their own 
predicament preventing freedom from subordination. Most decisively she 
sees theories like Hegel's as associating women's maternal function more 
with animals than with rational humans. In de Beauvoir's words: 
The female, to a greater extent than the male, is the prey of the species; and 
the human race has always sought to escape its specific destiny. The support 
of life became for man an activity and a project through the invention of the 
tool; but in maternity woman remained closely bound to her body, like an 
animal. It is because humanity calls itself in question in the matter of living -
that is to say, values the reasons for living above mere life - that, confronting 
woman, man assumes mastery (1953: 97). 
Now, de Beauvoir clearly implies that women's reproductive function 
impedes the possibility of becoming human. Passages like this support views 
like Lloyd's, suggesting de Beauvoir presents a negative account of female 
embodiment. Humanity is, for de Beauvoir; a matter of acting; of reasoning; 
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of calling things into question; of having values. Mothers, on the other hand, 
are more like animals roaming the primordial swamp of mere life. 
But, the views expressed here by de Beauvoir are not so much her own 
as those of Hegel. In the context of her discussion of Hegel, de Beauvoir 
says: 
Men have presumed to create a feminine domain - the kingdom of life, of 
immanence - only in order to lock up women therein. (1953: 96-7) 
She sees Hegel constructing femininity as "the kingdom of life," in 
association with sense-certainty. Quite rightly, however, de Beauvoir 
disagrees that the female body necessarily ties women to an animal-like 
existence. De Beauvoir argues that women can and do attain independent 
consciousness and want to lib~rate themselves from the animal-like status 
attributed to them by men. She claims that Hegel bestows the animal type of 
life upon women because he uues 11ul lake iulu accounl the fact that women 
recognise and aspire to the same values as men. In so doing, she says, Hegel 
creates two domains: one of masculinity and one of femininity. The former 
domain, masculinity, presumes to have mastery over the other because of the 
ability to call into question life itself. Calling life into question is, as de 
Beauvoir indicates, a matter of reason, or of self-consciousness. Femininity, 
according to de Beauvoir, is constructed as the domain of immanence, or 
sense-certainty. (1953: 96-97) 
Nevertheless, de Beauvoir's account of maternal immanence is 
ambiguous. In her Introduction, de Beauvoir claims that maternity causes 
women to fall back from transcendence into immanence. (1953: 29) This is 
the point with which Lloyd disagrees because in Hegelian terms one cannot 
go back to sense-certainty once one has self-consciousness. In Hegel's view, 
sense-certainty is knowledge through sensations alone and the development 
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of self-consciousness preserves the sensual component of experience by 
binding it to a more advanced concept. Those who become self-conscious 
move out of the domain of this purely private subjective sort of knowing and 
into the community of knowers. Hegel's dialectical movement beyond the 
universally held sense experiences enables the subject to have authentic 
knowledge because, unlike the private knowledge of sense-certainty, the self-
conscious being has knowledge which is inter subjective. Being subject to 
authentication by others is thus an important part of the maturation of 
knowledge in Hegel's vision. 
The question posed by Lloyd, then, is how women can fall back into 
immanence if they have developed self-consciousness. Importantly, Lloyd 
argues that Hegel gives women some self-consciousness insofar as he claims 
that women are "ethical." But, as I will show later, this contradicts his claim 
in the Ethical Order that women are not particular individuals, having only 
the universal consciousness. I have shown above that Hegel conceives of the 
universal consciousness as sense-certainty. But I have also made clear that 
Hegel conceives of sense-certainty as a sort of deeply subjective knowing, in 
which things simply present themselves to consciousness. Moreover, it is 
clear that Hegel allows that the conscious being has knowledge of the things 
presented, like trees and houses, as the kinds of things that they are. To fall 
back into sense-certainty from self-consciousness would thus entail 
unlearning that one is a distinct individual in relation to the world and 
becoming fixated on the inner screen. The point is that once the sensations 
are discerned as being those of a self who is distinct from the objects they 
represent, it is impossible to just represent objects without also being aware of 
the self as representing these. 
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Like Lloyd, de Beauvoir recognises that women have self-consciousness. 
Women are aware of themselves as distinct from the objects they represent to 
themselves. The contention, I think, arises out of Lloyd's generosity to Hegel, 
on one hand, and a general ambiguity in de Beauvoir's use of the term 
"immanence" on the other. I say that Lloyd is generous in her reading of 
Hegel because she argues that women reach the middle zone of self-
consciousness. To be sure, the master-slave dialectic of this section of the 
Phenomenology does shed light upon the mechanism of domination and 
subordination. But I think this struggle is also read as the mediating struggle 
of an individual consciousness who must suppress his own experience in the 
pursuit of reason.19 Most significantly, though, I take it that Lloyd sees self-
consciousness as going hand in hand with using language. Even Hegel must 
acknowledge that women can speak so it does not make sense that he gives 
women anything less than self-consciousness if that is necessary for using 
language. As I show in the following section, however, Hegel brings 
language in to the story of consciousness, in his articulation of perception and 
understanding. I will return to de Beauvoir' s ambiguous use of the term 
"immanence" in section five. (ie section 4 in main text - ed) ... 
19 I have more to say about this in later chapters. In chapter three this struggle is reiterated 
in Lacan's version of the Oedipus complex, for instance, in which all experiences must be repressed 
to make way for speech. 
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Chapter Two 
Iris Young and Zola the pregnant zombie 
Iris Marion Young breaks the silence about what it is like to be pregnant in 
her attempt to understand what is unique about the experience of pregnancy 
(Young 1984). Her first person phenomenological account of pregnancy aims 
to show that first person descriptions of pregnancy have the status of 
authentic knowledge. She says that Cartesian metaphysics informs medical 
discourses which produce a mechanistic view of pregnancy. Young says that 
the mechanistic view is so influential over Western conceptions of pregnancy 
that the pregnant woman often views her own body as a container for a 
foetus: the body is thus understood as a baby producing machine which is 
distinct from and opposerl to the thn11shts imrl fP.P.linss of thP. prngmmt 
woman; and over which the pregnant woman does not have any control or 
authority. 
Young turns to Maurice Merleau-Ponty and existential phenomenology for 
an alternative account of pregnant embodiment. But Young is not entirely 
faithful to Merleau-Ponty who maintains that authority depends upon an 
"abstract unifying consciousness." Young takes Kristeva's psychoanalytical 
account of the divided subject to support her own view that the sense of self 
is bi-located: in the abstract consciousness and in the torso. With a bi-located 
subjectivity, Young argues that the pregnant woman has two different sorts of 
knowledge: objective, public knowledge is produced in the unifying 
consciousness whereas subjective and private knowledge is produced in the 
torso. Young says the pregnant woman's phenomenological access to her 
foetus gives her private knowledge that is incommunicable. (1984: 57) 
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Whilst I agree with much of what Young says about pregnancy, there is 
nevertheless an important problem arising from her claim that the pregnant 
woman has a unique knowledge in pregnancy. The problem arises from the 
claim that experiences are private knowledge. Young's commitment to 
private knowledge shows that she is a neo-Cartesian in the company of 
thinkers like Frank Jackson. I will show that this form of neo-Cartesianism 
has absurd consequences; it commits its holders to the possibility of zombies; 
or worse, pregnant zombies. But I then introduce Wilfrid Sellars' argument 
about the causal necessity of experiences for knowing anything as a better 
alternative for characterising the experiences of pregnancy. 
i. Young's phenomenological account of the self - world distinction 
Iris Marion Young is interested in defending the epistemic authority of the 
pregnant woman about states of her own body. She claims to do this by 
overcoming Cartesian mind-body dualism and offering an alternative 
phenomenological description of pregnancy in which body-world, and self-
foetus distinctions break down. Young argues that the pregnant woman is 
alienated from her own experiences by Western medicine, identifying as a self 
who is distinct from her embodied condition. She argues that Cartesian 
metaphysics informs the Western medical approach to pregnancy and 
birthing, so that the woman's body is viewed like a foetal container or 
humidicrib which is out of the woman's control. Her point is that the self, or 
subject of Cartesian metaphysics is non-physical and is distinct from the 
physical body. 
Young takes Maurice Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology as an 
alternative metaphysics that does not buy into the Cartesian mind-body 
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distinction. She says existential phenomenology situates consciousness and 
subjectivity in the lived body. Her aim is to show that the pregnant woman 
experiences herself as spatially located in the body rather than being located in 
the mind and associated with disembodied spirit. Young describes pregnancy 
in terms of embodied consciousness. Her notion of embodied consciousness 
is fleshed out as having embodied, rather than strictly mental experiences. 
Young presents a brief survey of existential phenomenology as the key to 
locating subjectivity in the body rather than the mind. She argues that 
Merleau-Ponty and others upset the Cartesian exclusivity between categories 
like "subject and object, inner and outer, I and world." (47) She claims that 
these are false distinctions because all experience originates in the flesh. 20 
Young takes the existential phenomenological view that perceptual 
awareness entails that the body is a complex sensory apparatus. Young says 
that Merleau-Ponty "locates the 'intentional arc' that unifies experience in the 
body rather than in an abstract constituting consciousness." (47) The 
"intentional arc" refers to perception. The "abstract constituting 
consciousness" is another term for linguistic thought. Experience is unified 
in the intentional arc because the subject's awareness of the perception counts 
as a sort of knowing in which the subject and object are indistinct. The 
perception is not yet a content of linguistic thought, being instead a sort of 
pre-linguistic self-awareness. Perceptual awareness bridges the division 
between flesh and conscious thought precisely because having the feel entails 
20 Her argument stands in the following quote from Straus: "The meaning of 'mine' is 
determined in relation to, in contraposition to, the world, the All, to which I am nevertheless a 
party. The meaning of 'mine' is not comprehensible in the unmediated antithesis ofl and non-I, 
own and strange, subject and object, constituting I and constituted world. Everything points to the 
fact that separateness and union originate in the same ground." (Cited in Young 1984: 47) 
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having a body. It would be impossible to feel anything without the complex 
perceptual apparatus of the body. 
But according to Young the dichotomous terms, subject and object, are 
retained by existential phenomenologists because they are thought to be 
necessary for language. Young complains that the "dualist language" 
employed by existential phenomenologists maintains an implicit divide 
between self and world. The implicit distinction renders the body an object in 
relation to thought. The thinking subject thinks about her body as an object 
because there is a distinction between the awareness of oneself as thinking 
and that which is being thought about. Thinking about her own body in 
language therefore leaves the pregnant woman divided between a non-
physical self and the physical body, or world. Therefore the body is an object 
so long as we think about it in language. 
Yuung mulivales Llie dislinclion belween perception and linguistic 
thought through her claim that she has privileged access to her inner 
perceptions of pregnancy, not unlike the access she has to her thoughts and 
dreams. She says she can tell others about these phenomena but that they are 
not objects to herself and her audience in the same way. (48) Young thus 
characterises a distinction between perception and language; or between 
having an experience and telling others about it. She argues that the 
experiences of pregnancy can be understood in terms of Merleau-Ponty's 
version of pre-linguistic self awareness. But Young is critical of Merleau-
Ponty's "idea of a unified self as a condition of experience." She claims that 
the idea of a unitary self presupposes that the speaking subject rules supreme 
over the embodied self. Young disagrees that any singular linguistic thought 
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is sufficient to "achieve the unity of all [her] thoughts." (p. 48)21 In her view, 
linguistic thoughts are complemented with experiences. Young therefore 
dismisses Merleau-Ponty's idea that the self needs to think of him or herself 
as a unity, and becomes a unity only by thinking. 
She suggests that Kristeva's vision of a split subject is a better alternative 
for characterising pregnancy. But instead of reviewing Kristeva's 
psychoanalytic account of the divided subject, Young presents her own vision 
of pregnant embodiment. Her phenomenological description of pregnancy 
demonstrates that the pregnant woman is always both feeling and thinking. 
Young describes the paradoxical experiences of the pregnant body. The 
pregnant woman's body becomes unfamiliar to her: her nipples change 
colour; her belly "swells into a pear;" she feels tickles and gurgles "belonging 
to another, another that is nevertheless my body." (48) She says that the 
pa1 adox emerges when commonplace distinctions between self and other blur 
when she contemplates the experiences of her pregnant body. The body is the 
self, in Young' s view, but it is also not self. The self world distinction 
dissolves because another body, the foetus, feels like an extension of her own 
body even though she knows it is only temporarily so. Young argues that 
pregnancy is unique because there is no clear distinction between self and 
other. It is not clear that Young adequately addresses the mind-world divide 
in her claim that the body both feels and thinks. Instead of explaining how 
the felt consciousness of a body is reconciled with the thoughts one has about 
21 Again, she presents a quote to let Merleau-Ponty speak for himself. Here is some of her 
citation: 
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that body, Young describes pregnancy as paradigm of being a self "not in the 
mode of being myself." She refers to the experiences of her body as it changes 
to accommodate another. 
She says, for instance: 
Pregnancy challenges the integration of my body experience by rendering fluid the 
boundary between what is within, myself, and what is outside, separate. I 
experience my insides as the space of another, yet my own body (49). 
According to Young, the experience of pregnancy is radically different from 
other embodied experiences. We usually associate inner experiences with the 
self and not other because others are usually part of the external world. But 
this is not the case for the pregnant woman because her awareness of the 
foetus is a type of self-awareness in the same way that the awareness of 
heartbeat is a self-awareness. Importantly, however, the awareness of the 
foetus is also the awareness of someone else - at least potentially. To be sure, 
the foetus is not an independent being so long as it is a foetus, but it is often 
thought about in terms of what it will be after it is born. Thinking about the 
foetus as a foetus nevertheless requires thinking in language so this is not the 
sort of awareness with which we are most concerned here. So long as the 
pregnant woman is aware of the sensations produced by the foetus moving 
inside her, she is aware of sensations of self, not other. Therefore, 
experiencing her foetus gives the pregnant woman self-awareness even if she 
also thinks about her foetus as part of the world. According to Young, this is 
evidence that the distinction between self and world collapsed during 
pregnancy. 
There must be, then, corresponding to this open unity of the world, an open and indefinite unity 
of subjectivity .. .it is through one present thought that I achieve the unity of all my thoughts. 
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Nevertheless, the pregnant woman's awareness of her foetus is not unlike 
awareness of her heartbeat, or of wind in her intestines; each being a felt 
awareness of her inner states. The self-world distinction collapses in all cases 
of inner awareness, making our self-awareness of embodied states a similar 
type of awareness to the pregnant woman's awareness of her foetus. Even so, 
we do not question whether our inner sensations of heart-beats constitute an 
awareness of ourselves. The difference between sensations of heart-beats and 
sensations of foetal movements is the knowledge that, unlike the heart beat, 
the foetus is "other." Unlike the heart, or any other part of the human body 
for that matter22, the foetus will become an individual human being. But, it 
is not yet an individual human. The foetus is a temporary part of the 
pregnant woman's self that will later be in the world. Acknowledging that 
the pregnant woman's awareness of her foetus is a type of self-awareness is 
important in debates about rights of the foetus, for instance. The pregnant 
woman experiences the foetus as an extension of her own body. Moreover, 
the pregnant woman experiences her body as primarily self, not as other. 
It is worth noting that Young's idea of a split subject could be interpreted as 
claiming that there are two centres of consciousness. This brings to mind the 
idea of conjoined twins. Conjoined twins have two centres of consciousness 
with some shared bodily parts. Each consciousness experiences the sensations 
of the same heart beat, for instance, or of the same lungs inflating, or even of 
22 Here I acknowledge that genetic engineering and "cloning" techniques may enable 
reproduction via DNA, but I doubt that many people think about any part of their body as a 
potential "other life". I do not think organ transplants constitute the same awareness as foetal 
awareness because, although they may give another person life, the organs do not constitute an 
other life in and of themselves. 
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the same stomach rumbling. Each twin knows what it is like to share these 
body parts in a way that is not like the sharing of a body by the pregnant 
woman and her foetus. In the case of the twins we imagine different 
consciousnesses, or subjects, within a shared body. This is not Young's idea of 
a divided subject. Her vision is more accurately described as the pregnant 
woman having two types of consciousness: embodied awareness and rational 
thought. Young makes no claims about foetal consciousness. 
The pregnant woman's consciousness is divided between the "eyes" and 
torso. From the eyes, she sees her body as part of the world, in which case she 
is a subject thinking about her body. From the torso, she has a private 
unmediated awareness of her body, as distinct from her awareness of the 
world beyond. Young describes what it is like to feel weight and movement 
from within her torso but claims that such awareness is complementary to 
her awareness of goings on in the world around her. Moreover, she argues 
that the two complementary types of awareness give rise to two different sorts 
of knowledge. Young says she can share the first sort of knowledge, in which 
self and world are distinct as thinker and content of thought; but she cannot 
share the second mode of consciousness because the above mentioned 
distinction collapses in the experience. In Young's view, then, the pregnant 
woman is divided as a thinking subject between two radically different sorts 
of thoughts: abstract thoughts that she can share; and embodied experience 
that counts as private knowledge. 
Nevertheless, Young uncritically accepts the Cartesian view of the privacy 
of an inner world. The inner phenomena are associated with a deeply private 
centre of consciousness whilst the visible phenomena are associated with 
communicable thought; "comprehending, observing, willing and acting." 
(1984: 51) Descartes does not dispute the existence of a deeply private centre of 
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consciousness; that being the thinking subject who has not yet interpreted 
data from the world beyond himself. In Descartes' vision we have 
perceptions and judgments, with only the latter being properly articulated. 
He claims that his knowledge of the former is "imperfect and confused." In 
his contemplation of the wax, Descartes says: 
But what is the piece of wax that can be perceived only by the [understanding of] 
mind? It is certainly the same which I see, touch, imagine; and, in fine, it is the 
same which, from the beginning, I believed it to be. But (and this it is of moment to 
observe) the perception of it is neither an act of sight, of touch, nor of imagination, 
and never was either of these, though it might formerly seem so, but is simply an 
intuition (inspectio) of the mind, which may be imperfect and confused, as it 
formerly was, or very clear and distinct, as it is at present, according as the 
attention is more or less directed to the elements which it contains, and of which it 
is composed. (1984: 92) 
Descartes argues the perception of the wax is an act of the mind, not of the 
body. In his view, perception is a type of awareness, making perception a 
non-physical rather than physical event. The wax he is observing is like the 
body, on the other hand, inasmuch as each are extended in space. In Descartes 
view, things that are extended in space are publicly observable in 
contradistinction to the perception of these things. Perception, he argues, is 
non-physical because it is not extended in space. Moreover, the fact that 
perceptual experiences are not extended in space makes them unobservable to 
all but the person who has them. For Descartes, then, perception is a private, 
first person event of a self in opposition to the world. 
Young says that the pregnant woman has private sensations in her body, 
and that she knows these sensations immediately. But this does not show 
that the self-world distinction collapses; it reinforces that distinction. The 
distinction remains between a private, unmediated awareness of inner 
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experience and a publicly mediated awareness of the external world. The 
awareness is private giving her privileged access and thus authority about 
what goes on in her body. The sort of epistemic authority for which Young 
argues is decidedly Cartesian: it is the incorrigible awareness of the first 
person. 
Descartes' claim for first person authority is grounded in his scepticism. In 
the First Meditation he argues that he could be mistaken about many things, 
including: knowing he exists in the world as an embodied being; knowing 
that his experiences are not radically different from the experiences of others; 
and knowing that his experiences are as he thinks they are. The only thing 
that Descartes is unable to doubt is that he is doubting. In other words, 
Descartes is certain that he is aware of his own inner processes. He takes his 
unmediated self awareness as the indubitable first person knowledge upon 
which all more dubious mediated knowledge is grounded. Self-awareness is 
thus the most authoritative knowledge in Descartes view because self-
awareness is the most indubitable truth of human existence. 
Young thus takes a very Cartesian approach to first person epistemic 
authority. But the main issue is that her version of first person knowledge 
becomes incommunicable leaving us wondering how it enters into public 
discourse as authoritative. Whilst I agree with Young that the distinction 
between inner experience and communicable knowledge is important, I 
disagree with her claim that the experience be characterised as a sort of 
knowledge. Young's characterisation of experience as a sort of private 
knowledge suggests that the experiences of pregnancy are non-physical. To 
show why this is the case I turn now to Frank Jackson. 
66 
ii Frank Jackson's account of experience as non-physical 
Jackson describes a thought experiment in which a neuroscientist called 
Mary grows up in a black and white room. Mary has black and white books 
and a black and white television and she is well educated about many things, 
including having a sound knowledge in the physical sciences. She is taught 
all that there is to know about colour, including the details of what it is like to 
see colour. But, of course, she never sees colour in her black and white room. 
In short she knows every physical fact about seeing colour even though she 
has never experienced seeing colour. The question Jackson poses, then, is 
whether Mary learns anything new when she comes out of her black and 
white room and sees a ripe red tomato for the first time. Does the experience 
of seeing red add to Mary's knowledge of redness acquired in the black and 
white room? Jackson argues that Mary does acquire new knowledge by seeing 
red for herself. Mary is suq.Jrised by her experience. I Ier surprise is taken to 
show that some cognitive change has taken place in Mary, and that she is 
now acquainted with a new fact, a fact which prior to her experience she was 
not acquainted with. Jackson argues that she knew all the physical facts prior 
to her experience. She now learns a new fact which cannot be a physical fact 
so he claims she learns a non-physical fact. So knowing what it is like to see 
red turns out to be non-physical.23 Jackson thus challenges the thesis of 
23 Maxine Sheets-Johnstone {1999) rejects Jackson's argument because Jackson neglects to dwell 
on the kinaesthesic and proprioceptive knowledge that Mary has in her black and white prison. 
Sheets-Johnstone argues that Mary's "experience of movement would pointedly lack qualia" 
because Mary has no experiences whilst she is focusing on learning linguistic concepts in the black 
and white room. I suggest that Sheets-Johnstone's conception of experience is similar to Iris 
Young's in so far as each must agree with Jackson that the sensations in question count as epistemic 
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physicalism which holds that knowing all the physical facts-knowable in 
principle from any 3rd person perspective-is both necessary and sufficient 
for knowing all that there is to know. His conclusion that there are non-
physical facts makes him a dualist.24 
Let us consider the link between Jackson's argument about Mary and 
Young's argument about the pregnant woman. Both Jackson and Young hold 
that having an experience is a type of knowing. On this conception, just 
having an experience is a means of noticing the quality of inner episodes. 
Noticing is a cognitive episode so that experience is knowledge. In Jackson's 
though experiment, Mary does not just say "ho hum", she is surprised, 
because she gains new knowledge. But Mary's knowledge is incommunicable 
in language. Young's claim that embodied knowledge cannot be shared also 
makes experience non-linguistic knowledge. Again this implies that noticing 
that the one's experience has a certain character is the result of simply having 
that experience. The same notion of experience as a type of non-linguistic 
knowledge is implicitly held by both Jackson and Young. But this leads to a 
neo-Cartesian dualism precisely because experiences are understood as being 
non-physical. 
episodes. Sheets-Johnstone's view is that "if one were really to know "everything there is to 
know about the physical nature of the world" Oackson 1991: 392) one would have first of all to 
experience oneself as a moving, kinesthetically sentient creature." I shall urge below that, in line 
with the Sellarsian view, that having these experiences is different from knowing them. Sheets-
Johnstone and Young both argue that the kinaesthetic and proprioceptive knowledge is special but 
they miss the real issue here which is that this so called embodied knowledge is still a mental 
awareness and, as such, is not clearly embodied and physical. See Sheets-Johnstone, 1999: 170-173. 
24 He is a dualist about properties and facts. 
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iii. zombies 
From neo-Cartesian dualism there has been a growing interest in the idea 
of zombies who are physically like us but who lack inner experiences.25 So 
long as we agree with Jackson that experiences are not physical states, we are 
supporting the possibility of zombies who are physically like us but who do 
not have any qualitative states whatsoever. Jay Garfield {1997) argues that 
there is a really serious problem with accepting the possibility of zombies. 
Here is his argument. 
Garfield notes that Zombies have plenty of beliefs about what it is like, to 
see red for instance, but they never experience what it is like to see red. In 
short, zombies are mistaken in their belief that they know what it is like to 
see red because knowing what it is like entails having an experience. Zombies 
believe that they see red just like we do. So, if zombies are possible, we need 
to be able to show how we know that we are not zombies. Zombies really 
think they have experiences too, so perhaps we are mistaken about our 
experiences in which case we may be zombies after all. 
Jackson needs to be able to answer how we know we are not zombies for 
his argument against physicalism to work. Mary will only know she has the 
relevant experience of seeing red if she knows she is not a zombie. If she is a 
zombie, she will sincerely believe that she knows what it is like to see red. 
Her belief that she knows what it is like is not enough to prove that she is not 
a zombie because zombies also believe that they have the relevant 
25 My discussion of zombies is informed by Jay Garfield's public lecture at the University of 
Tasmania in 1997. But the literature is quite vast on the topic. See also Chalmers (1996), Moody 
(1994) and Dennett (1995). There are several papers in a "Symposium on zombies" in response to 
Moody's paper in the latter issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies. 
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experiences. Mary is cognitively identical to the zombie; they have the same 
beliefs. So how can Mary have any knowledge that the zombie lacks? There 
does not seem to be any way for her to show that she is not a zombie so long 
as we think zombies are possible. Any demonstration that she is not a zombie 
would simply involve her putting forward beliefs she has. But these are 
beliefs that the zombie has as well. So Mary fails to distinguish herself 
epistemically from the zombie. If zombies are possible, Mary cannot know she 
is not one. 
We each believe that we have experiences and that zombies do not but 
there is no way to show that we are not zombies if zombies are possible. Nor 
is there any way of proving that we have experiences so long as they are non-
physical, making zombies possible and making it possible that humans are 
zombies. The idea that we can't know we are not zombies if they are possible 
is logically equivalent to knowing we are not zombies making them 
impossible. Knowing we are not zombies makes zombies impossible because 
having experiences is a physical fact of being human. Having the experience 
is part of the physical story about humans. Therefore the complete physical 
story includes what we know about experiences. 
Our experiences must be a physical fact to play a caus~l role in our 
knowledge that we have them. Mary's belief that she knows what it is like to 
see red depends on two different sorts of states: causal and epistemic. 
Zombies, on the other hand, have only the latter epistemic states. The cause 
of their knowledge is a mystery. From the h~man perspective, it seems 
impossible that there could be any beings who not only look and act like us, 
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but also have beliefs, unless those beings also have the causally necessary 
states of experience.26 
Jackson is wrong about experiences being non-physical. Contra Jackson, the 
complete physical story about Mary includes facts about her experiences, or 
facts about what it is like. Jackson's view of experience is tied up with the 
Cartesian idea of private knowledge. Implicit in this account is the idea that 
the mental is projected onto some inner screen that is not physical. The 
inner screen makes our experiences private and non-physical in so far as the 
experiences are taken out of the body that has them and are projected into a 
private inner space. Whilst such an epistemology suits mythological 
creatures like zombies, it is too far fetched to help us understand humans' 
first person knowledge. We now turn to a conception of experience and 
knowledge that does not buy into this metaphysics. 
iv the Sellarsian picture of knowledge 
Wilfrid Sellars in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind eliminates the 
metaphor of an inner screen with his account of observational knowledge. 
We do not have to find our own inner screens so that we can make 
26 Another way of putting the problem is that if experiences were non-physical we would be at 
a loss to explain how we could know anything about them, since experiences would lack effects. 
Another curious fact about zombies is that these creatures can make observations without having 
experiences. This is entailed in the idea that zombies have the requisite beliefs about 
experiences without having any experiences. But it seems making observations requires that we 
have qualia and these qualitative experiences are a physical fact of being human. Zombies are 
impossible because experiences are part of the human physical story: Being physically like us 
entails having experiences. 
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observations before we can even speak about them. Sellars uses the phrase 
"myth of the given" to describe the view that our observations are private 
knowledge that grounds all other knowledge. He argues instead that 
observational knowledge is always public because we have two distinct but 
related sets of abilities. The first is the causal relation by which certain 
experiences lead to particular utterances under certain conditions; and the 
second is the normative relation by which we develop a holistic network of 
concepts in order to have epistemic authority. He argues that the causal 
abilities extend beyond noticing things in the external world to noticing inner 
episodes of experience. 
The first set of abilities appeals to regularities between utterances and states 
of affairs. For example the ability to utter "this is green" in standard 
conditions is symptomatic of the presence of green objects. The body of the 
perceiver reads off the envirunrnenl like a Lhermumeler gauges Lemµeralu1 e, 
registering the environment through utterance. But merely tokening 
utterances in this way is not sufficient for such utterances to count as 
observational knowledge. The speaker must have some other more general 
knowledge about language, green objects and the sorts of conditions that 
make such an utterance true. The speaker must also know that utterances of 
"this are green" are reliable indicators of the presence of green objects under 
standard conditions. (§35) In Sellars' view, then, we do not know the object is 
green, even if we can say "this is green," until we also know many other 
related facts. 
Sellars pre-empts any concern that his account of observational knowledge 
is circular on the basis that each particular fact depends on knowing some 
general fact that depends on some other prior fact ad infinitum. (§36) He says 
this circularity is not a worry because learning facts is a process that takes time 
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and that we can know retrospectively. The initiate to language will be 
engaged in this process, gaining various causal capacities over time until her 
utterances are understood to be reliable symptoms of the presence of certain 
things. At some stage the complexity of her language use will demonstrate 
that a normative stance is justified with respect to her behaviour. At that 
stage the language initiate will have acquired a range of knowledge that is 
developed holistically rather than atomistically. The initiate can only be said 
to have observational knowledge through developing the holistic network of 
concepts. Sellars argues that memory plays a part in his holistic vision of 
observational knowledge so that even though the initiate may not have 
known all the facts at the time, she knows retrospectively that the facts did 
obtain. (§37) The circularity objection is thus answered by an account of 
memory and recall. 
Sellars' story about observational knowledge prepares the way for his 
account of first person knowledge. He characterises inner episodes as being 
private in the sense that each of us has access to our own, but also being inter 
subjective because we can each know about others'. (§45) Our initial ability to 
make reports about external objects extends to observing others' behaviour 
but does not yet explain how we know about our inner episodes. In Sellars' 
view inner episodes are explained in "the Myth of Jones." His myth is a 
sophisticated science fiction story about how our imagined linguistic forebears 
develop linguistic resources to talk about inner experiences. He begins with a 
language community capable only of talking about external observations 
including behaviours. The persons within the community have thoughts 
and impressions, or inner states in general, but have not yet developed the 
language to talk about their inner states. Initially, then, the mythical 
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ancestors have inner states of experience but do not yet have any knowledge 
about these experiences. 
One of these forebears, Jones, invents psychology. (§53) Jones observes 
that language can be used to describe behaviour and notes that his peers 
behave intelligently even when they do not speak out loud. This leads him 
to the theoretical breakthrough that there are inner episodes present in agents 
both when they speak and when they are silent. He supposes these episodes 
cause overt behaviour. (§56) Sellars' hero, Jones, imagines that these inner 
episodes have an intrinsic nature modelled on overt utterances, or on 
speaking out loud. Just as overt speech has semantic properties, Jones 
proposes that there is also inner speech with the same semantic properties as 
overt speech. (§57) So overt speech becomes a model, perhaps not perfect, for 
these inner episodes. The theoretical role of these episodes is to explain overt 
behaviour. Sellars calls lhese eµlsuLles "irnH:H sµeed1," emphasising that they 
do not entail the "wagging of a hidden tongue." He emphasises that it is not 
built into Jones' theory that these episodes are separate substances, or that 
they constitute immediate experiences. They are introduced as theoretical 
episodes that are modelled upon and must be confirmed and thus mediated 
by language. 
The story develops as Jones teaches other members of his community how 
to use the new theoretical terms and notes that others are soon competent in 
explaining others' behaviours. Jones and his community are able to make 
claims about what each other is thinking. However, there is a self reflexive 
twist that develops from the abovementioned practices. After competently 
observing each other, Jones teaches his community members how to observe 
their own overt behaviours and to self-ascribe inner states. Jones frowns 
upon them when the behavioural evidence does not support their claims and 
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confirms their claims when evidence fits the general picture. At some stage 
the others are able to self-ascribe without overt behaviour. As Sellars puts it 
"What began as a purely theoretical language has gained a reporting role." 
(§59) Jones and his fellow community members have learnt to report their 
inner cognitive episodes. They are now properly ascribed self knowledge. 
But there is more. Jones has another theoretical breakthrough that 
concerns the invention of a new theoretical category for inner experiences, 
including perceptions. He calls these impressions. Although the ancestors 
can already make observational reports about external objects, such as "this is 
green" for instance, they are not yet able to observe their own perceptions. 
The cognitive aspect of perception - seeing that this is green - is an extension 
of the theoretical language Jones develops in his account of inner speech. 
The non-cognitive element, such as impressions of a red triangle, is not yet 
explained. Impressions are introduced by Jones to explain the common 
element between the following: 
(a) he sees that ~he object over there is red and triangular; 
(b) the object over there looks to him to be red and triangular; 
(c) there looks to him to be a red and triangular physical object over there. 
(§60) 
The common element, according to Jones, will be a visual impression. 
The impression is a state modelled on - as a type of replica - an ordinary 
visual object. So a red triangular replica is taken to be an analogue of a red 
and triangular object. The essential idea is that these theoretical entities have 
relations of comparative similarity holding between each other which 
correspond to the relations of comparative similarity that hold between 
counterpart physical objects in the world. 
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Jones' peers learn to use these theoretical entities to explain behaviours of 
others but soon use the theory to describe their own inner episodes. With 
time and practice the community members learn to make reports about their 
impressions. Note that the use of reports about these two kinds of theoretical 
vocabularies are to be understood as causal. Just as these speakers learn 
observational language for the external world, they learn also to gauge their 
own inner states without recourse to some mysterious inner looking. 
Introspection is just a causally based ability to use the theoretical vocabulary 
for making reports. The entities exist before we can describe them as Sellars 
makes clear in his claim that scientific entities like positrons exist before they 
are discovered. 
Although it can be said that each person has privileged access to her or his 
own individual states, the theoretical model entails that the states are not in 
principle private. The concepts used to describe the states are learnt according 
to the agreed standards and practices of the community. The content of any 
concepts and their conditions of use are developed according to publicly 
observable things and behaviours. The Sellarsian story shows not only that 
people have access to their own states because they have the required 
linguistic concepts, but also that each has authority about her or his own 
states. 
On this view zombies are not possible. Firstly our speech is symptomatic 
of states of affairs in the external world under standard conditions. Sellars 
argues that experiences are causally necessary and play an important role in 
our gaining knowledge but can never be reduced to being a type of 
knowledge. Our coming to know experiences, whether they be visual 
impressions, or other sorts of sensations, is possible only because these 
episodes are physical, and thus causally efficacious. Sellars argues that 
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experiences exist irrespective of whether we know about them, just like 
positrons exist irrespective of whether or not we know about them. 
Experiences have to exist so that external objects cause us to make certain 
utterances when we set out to learn language. Sellars says we can know about 
our experiences retrospectively in reply to the possible regress identified in 
his holistic vision of general and particular facts. Therefore, Wilfrid Sellars' 
vision of experiences as causally necessary for knowledge rules out the 
possibility that there could be creatures who are physically like us in every 
way but who lack experiences. 
Sellars' account of how we know about experiences is more informative 
than both Jackson's and Young's stories about first person knowledge. The 
"myth of Jones" tells us that first person knowledge is always mediated by 
observational knowledge; and that observational knowledge depends upon 
normativity. The normativity requirement for all knowledge entails that our 
experiences are not radically different from each others' because they depend 
upon public mediation in language. We come to know our own experiences 
through others' experiences and not vice versa. We can therefore describe 
our experiences, in Sellars' view, making our knowledge about experiences as 
public as any other knowledge. 
v. Hegel and Sellars 
In chapter one, I examined Hegel's claims about feminine knowledge. The 
puzzle I identify is this: Hegel develops a vision of human consciousness in 
which the teleological concerns with human progress are decidedly 
masculine. But we only see them as masculine in Hegel's discussion of 
family life and ethics, where he draws a duty-based distinction between the 
sexes. He says women's and men's knowledge are different in the same way 
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that plants and animals are different. Each has life, but plants are rooted to 
one place whereas animals are free to roam around the place. Women's 
knowledge is immediate, which is to say non-inferential; women only know 
about whatever lies in front of them. Men's knowledge, on the other hand, is 
inferential because men are not fixed on their surroundings and 
circumstances, being able to think about theoretical entities. 
As de Beauvoir argues, it is not that women cannot fix their attention on 
theoretical entities; it is that they are told they cannot so they do not. Besides, 
as de Beauvoir makes clear, women as mothers are too busy to contemplate 
theory with all the childrearing duties dumped upon them, without adequate 
social structures to make possible their participation in public life. But 
Young' s argument about pregnancy goes in a different direction from de 
Beauvoir's. In contrast to de Beauvoir, Young argues that women do have a 
special type of knowledge: knowledge that men cannot have. This, in turn, 
suggests that women have a different type of consciousness from men, 
bringing Young closer to Hegel' s characterisation of femininity than to de 
Beauvoir's. 
If we take Hegel as saying that women have a different type of 
cons,ciousness from men, we understand that the difference can be located in 
embodied experiences. Women have these whereas men do not. If we were 
to suppose that Hegel takes experience to be reading off the environment in 
the manner described above in relation to Sellars, the stage of sense certainty 
is early observational knowledge. Sense-certainty will apply less to women 
than to infants. But, as women lack self-certainty, their knowledge does not 
exceed the development of understanding in perception, giving women what 
Hegel calls "commonsense knowledge." Women have sensations and 
feelings, but these are not known in any particular sense. Women also have 
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an inner sense of unity which Hegel identifies with the sense of self, or "I." 
Women's knowledge, on the other hand, is never special and relates only to 
things in her immediate environment {including her body). Women's 
observational knowledge is thus well developed. 
But, when we read Hegel through Sellars, it is apparent that women never 
have the luxury of meeting Mr Jones. Sellars' myth of Jones marks the 
moment of self-certainty described by Hegel as the desire to be recognised by 
another self-conscious person. This is an act of stoicism, in Hegel's story, by 
which the previous modes of being in the world are repressed and replaced 
with an understanding of human progress and the history of ideas.27 But in 
Sellars' story, self-consciousness does not mean repressing anything. Instead, 
in Sellars' story, self-consciousness gives us the opportunity to focus upon 
our inner states by creating knowledge about them. The states are there 
before we know anything about these, according to Sellars, just as the tree is 
present before we properly know it to be so in Hegel's sense certainty. We 
know about the states as we know about trees according to Sellars and to 
Hegel: we know them only according to what we can agree upon: what they 
are for-us. We do not have to have private knowledge for these states in 
either view. 
vi. Zola the pregnant zombie 
Frank Jackson's story about first person knowledge and the consequent 
zombie problem, followed by Sellars' account of first person knowledge have 
prepared my way for a discussion of Zola the pregnant zombie. In this final 
27 Teresa de Lauretis (1990) makes the point about stoicism. 
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section I will show that Iris Young's discussion of pregnant embodiment 
entails that Zola is possible. 
Young argues that the pregnant woman is divided between consciousness 
in the eyes: observing, willing, acting and so on; and consciousness in the 
torso: private observations of heaviness and movements like gurgles and 
tickles. She says the first sort of consciousness can be shared but the latter 
cannot. Observing, willing, acting and so on is thus based on shared 
observations and normativity whilst knowledge about sensations in the torso 
are not based on others' knowledge. She says that she has immediate 
knowledge of her pregnant body and of her foetus and that she is unable to 
share this knowledge. The knowledge a pregnant woman has of her 
embodied experiences is thus deeply private, first person knowledge. 
Even though Young argues that this first person knowledge is embodied 
knowledge, it remains to be shown that this knowledge is based on physical 
fact. The private nature of this so-called embodied knowledge suggests 
instead that it is knowledge based on a non-physical fact. Jackson's argument 
clearly shows that private first person knowledge is based on non-physical fact 
because experiences cannot be shared. But the idea that experiences are non-
physical facts leads to the possibility of zombies who are physically like us in 
every respect except for the important one: zombies lack experience. 
Zola is a flesh and blood zombie whose pregnancy develops like any other. 
Zola claims to suffer from morning sickness, for example, and complains 
about horrible nausea in the early stages of her pregnancy. Zola behaves like a 
pregnant woman with morning sickness when she retches, and she looks 
relieved when the nausea subsides. During the second trimester of pregnancy 
Zola says she feels well and her eyes sparkle in such a way that everyone 
believes her. Zola's belly begins to protrude and around twenty-two weeks 
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into her pregnancy, she says she feels the foetus moving about inside her. 
Zola claims to feel foetal movements and no-one expresses any disbelief on 
the basis that they are quite commonly felt by other pregnant women. In the 
final weeks before the birth, she says she feels false contractions and, when 
the time comes, she behaves as though she has a normally painful labour. 
But Zola is a zombie entailing that she does not have any of the sensations 
she describes. 
Zola' s belief that she has these experiences is not sufficient evidence to 
show that she does have them. Saying that she has private knowledge of the 
fact does not help. In fact, claiming to have private knowledge of these 
experiences leads to the possibility that every pregnant woman is a zombie. 
The difference between Zola and the pregnant woman, of course, is that Zola 
does not feel these things and the pregnant woman does. But how can we tell 
that the pregnant woman is not Zola? 
Young. must be able to answer this question for her argument about 
embodied knowledge to succeed. She claims that the pregnant woman not 
only knows what it is like to be pregnant, but that the pregnant woman 
knows better than anyone else what it is like for her to be pregnant. These are 
important claims with which I agree. But, so long as the knowledge of what it 
is like remains inarticulable and non-communicable, there is no way of 
showing that the pregnant woman is not mistaken about the fact that she has 
the experiences she describes. 
Showing that the pregnant woman has these experiences entails showing 
that the pregnant woman is not Zola. This will only be possible if we can 
show that the experiences are physical states. Young assumes that experiences 
are physical states in her claims for embodied knowledge. But so long as 
experiences are physical states they are publicly observable. This is not 
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Young's view because she confuses private experiences with epistemic states. 
Epistemic states are based on publicly observable facts, however, so 
experiences cannot be a mode of knowing. I have shown that Zola is possible 
so long as Young claims that her experiences are a version of private 
knowledge precisely because knowledge is necessarily based on publicly 
observable physical facts. 
Sellars gives us a better understanding of the epistemic authority of 
anyone, including the pregnant woman. In Sellars' view we acquire 
observational knowledge without noticing any inner experiences even 
though experiences play a causal role. The experiences cause us to utter "this 
is green" for instance when we see something green but, importantly the 
utterance is caused by the green object effecting physical changes in the body 
that enable us to see. The utterances are indirectly caused by experiences 
inasmuch as we do not need to look at the experience to see the object. We 
see the object and our experience is part of the causal chain without needing 
recourse to noticing the inner episode. In Sellars' view the utterance plays 
the epistemic role, not the experience. The experience has a necessary causal 
role even though it lacks epistemic function. 
Our observational knowledge extends to noticing that someone is 
pregnant. Noticing a protruding belly might cause us to utter: "she is 
pregnant" so long as we have been introduced to the concept "pregnant." But 
we also need to know the conditions under which someone is pregnant: the 
person must be female, within an age range of teens to forties (usually) and 
sexually active. As Sellars argues, making a simple observation is only part of 
the holistic picture of knowing that what we see to be the case is in fact the 
case. Moreover, this external observation of someone else's pregnancy is a 
prerequisite for knowing anything about one's own state of pregnancy. In 
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other words, we need to develop a theoretical vision of pregnancy before we' 
can properly claim to know anything about that domain. 
Noticing our own experiences depends on using the theoretical language 
in a certain way. First, according to Sellars' "myth of Jones," there is inner 
speech - roughly modeled on overt speech. The pregnant woman privately 
talks to herself about her experiences as she figures out what is going on. 
Second there are the impressions, sensations and experiences that were once 
only theoretical but are now observed. Sensations are observed when we 
notice these as the sort of sensations they are. Noticing a tickle as a tickle 
requires that we already have beliefs about tickles according to normative 
standards and practices. We first know the language and later use the 
language to observe the sensations. The very fact that we can observe the 
sensations as the sorts of sensations they are depends on us knowing about 
them because they are publicly observable physical facts. 
In Sellars' view experience is neither a type of knowledge, nor something 
that we can notice without prior knowledge even though experience is 
present whether we know it or not. He uses the analogy of molecules of gas 
that are present in a room whether or not we have a theory about molecules 
as theoretical entities that explain the physical and causal facts about air. 
Similarly experiences are theoretical entities that explain physical and causal 
facts about human knowledge. Moreover, we can learn about our experiences 
when we have the necessary theoretical concepts in the analogous way that 
we can learn about molecules when we have the necessary theoretical 
concepts. 
Sellars' theory of experiences as causal rather than epistemic facts is 
preferable to Young's theory because he demonstrates that the pregnant 
woman not only has experiences but can also have authoritative knowledge 
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about what it is like to be pregnant. Young's version of authority depends on 
first person knowledge that cannot be communicated. Sellars' version of 
authority shows that first person knowledge can be communicated. 
Moreover, Sellars' vision of knowledge suggests that we need to 
communicate about our experiences so that we can continue to develop 
authoritative knowledge about our inner lives. He truly upsets the Cartesian 
apple-cart by showing that first person knowledge is grounded on third 
person knowledge and not vice versa. Authority thus depends upon 
reflection and discussion of experiences which are understood to be causally 
necessary for all knowledge and enriching to human life. 
Talking about what it is like to give birth enables the pregnant woman to 
prepare herself for a deeply embodied experience. Her preparation depends 
on what she can learn from the experiences of others who have given birth. 
She learns lhal her experience is uui4ue uuly uecause she is an individual 
body in a particular socio-historical context. But she is reassured by the fact 
that her experiences are not unique with respect to what can be known. The 
linguistically informed concepts we have about such experiences are only 
possibl~ because others have agreed on various observations in childbirth. 
The ideas that we have about what it is like to have contractions, for instance, 
are developed through talking about what it is like to feel our insides drawing 
our attention from the world into our bodies. The pregnant woman talks 
about her experience with others and agrees that it pulls like period pain, 
gently at first and rising to the crescendo of agony. There may be subtle 
differences between women, according to pain thresholds and so on, but the 
fact that there is something to feel cannot be denied. There are sensations of 
wetness as the amniotic fluid gushes down and sensations of stretching wide 
open as the newborn pushes its way through the birth canal. During 
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childbirth the pregnant woman may even wish she were a zombie because 
then she would not feel a thing. Prior knowledge about these experiences 
enables the pregnant woman to prepare herself accordingly. 
conclusion 
Young's paper breaks the silence about what it is like to be pregnant even 
though her argument goes some way towards making the phenomenological 
descriptions secondary to a mysterious incommunicable knowledge. As 
Young says, machines, male doctors and medical instruments are never going 
to replace the subjective knowledge of the pregnant woman in the female 
only domain of pregnancy. But Young's argument does not fully endorse the 
authority of her descriptions because she fails to show how her knowledge 
about private experiences can enter into public discourse. Her private 
knowledge claim leads instead to the absurd possibility that the pregnant 
woman does not know what it is like to be pregnant or to give birth just in 
case she might be Zola. I have recommended the Sellarsian route to knowing 
experiences as publicly observable physical facts is a better alternative for 
understanding the epistemic authority of the pregnant woman. His idea that 
experiences are causally necessary for knowledge without being a sort of 
knowledge makes Zola's existence impossible. 
Even though Hegel' s story about conscious development can be 
understood as compossible with Sellars' account of observational knowledge, 
it is not clear why women could not develop introspective knowledge of their 
own states as theoretical entities. But women are left in the scepticism Hegel 
associates with the observational knowledge described in the early section of 
the Phenomenology. Rather than address the scepticism outright, Hegel 
turns to an account of Stoicism, by which all sensations are eliminated as an 
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impediment to conscious thought. In chapter three I will argue that this 
Stoicism leads to a conception of all humans except mothers as psycho-
zom bi es .28 In chapter five I will examine the association between the psycho-
zombie and masculinity: the Stoic male who is so out of touch with his 
feelings that he is violent towards others. But stories about masculinity as 
such are only sustained by stories like Young's which claim that maternal 
experiences produce a special kind of knowledge. 
In Hegel's view, perceptions are only appearances and cannot be said to 
hold any rational truth. But having rational knowledge about experiences 
requires developing a controlled consciousness which is no longer concerned 
with having experiences, but with knowing about them. Women can reason 
about their experiences, but only because they have access to reason in the 
ethical order of marriage, by which they are assigned to men. Similarly men 
have access to sensuous experience with their women. Ilut I Iegel's causal 
story need not incorporate a private knowledge claim from Descartes. 
Whether or not the private knowledge claim is Merleau-Ponty's is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. It is my view that Young reads Descartes into Merleau-
Ponty's Phenomenology, and that the same reading can be transferred to 
Hegel's Phenomenology as we now find in my examination of Kristeva's 
vision of maternal consciousness. As I have mentioned, Young's private 
knowledge claim is made possible by drawing from Kristeva's claim that the 
pregnant woman is a divided subject. In chapter three I argue this division is 
made possible by reading Descartes into Hegel. 
28 My psycho-zombies are to be distinguished from the philosophical zombies discussed above 
in connection with Jackson's non-physicalist conception of experience. 
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Chapter Three 
Kristeva on maternal consciousness 
Following Lacanian psychoanalysis, Kristeva sees human consciousness as 
divided between consciousness and the unconscious. Consciousness, she 
argues, is meaningful only socially and is always linguistic or textual. But 
conscious meaning is further characterised as deeply impersonal and, to some 
extent, false. She refers to Freud's mythology about the beginning of human 
culture, and to Levi-Strauss' insights into monogamy, as a means to showing 
that language must have started somewhere as an agreement about the 
exchange of women between men.29 Consciousness is understood to 
constructed by men for men by the post-Freudian theorists. She claims that 
the psychological differences between the sexes are prescriptive, or normative, 
rather than being something with which each sex is born. 
Coming to France from Eastern Europe, Kristeva's self-proclaimed leaning 
towards feminism and towards Marxism is summed up in her own words as 
"We women, like the proletariat, have nothing to lose but our chains." 
{1982a:8) Seeing the association between linguistic consciousness and 
masculinity/false consciousness, Kristeva aims to show that the "feminine" 
consciousness is not entirely unconscious.30 In this chapter I shall examine· 
Kristeva's association between the unconscious and sensations, based on her 
understanding of maternity. She associates the feminine consciousness with 
maternity, on the grounds that this consciousness is supposed to tell us 
29 Juliet Mitchell (1974) spells out the patriarchal story very clearly in her final chapters. 
30 See chapter five for a detailed discussion of false consciousness. 
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something about pre-linguistic consciousness. Kristeva's association between 
maternal consciousness and prelinguistic consciousness is a response to 
Lacan's claim that the subject's "truth" lies in experiences which are ineffable. 
She says that Lacan argues that these experiences must be cut off from 
consciousness when humans learn to speak. In Lacan's theory, this is a 
Hegelian negation, or Marxian negativity, by which humans are blocked 
access to our inner experiences. The general idea is that humans are alienated 
from many of our experiences according to what men's laws tell us it is 
permissible to feel. We are allowed to enjoy sex only in heterosexual 
marriage, for instance, and we must overcome our innate desires to hurt 
others, and to behave otherwise indecently or anti-socially. The desires must 
be controlled and are rendered unconscious because they cannot be gratified. 
The only permissible domain in which the unconscious is gratified is 
maternity: but, according to Lacan such pleasure (and pain) is ineffable. 
Kristeva disagrees with Lacan that the pleasurable and painful experiences 
of maternity are not completely outside language, and thus ineffable. 
According to Kristeva, language has two distinct types of meaning. One type 
of meaning is applied to language as a system of symbols with which we come 
to agree about the world. This "symbolic" meaning is derived completely 
from standards and practices of capitalist societies, rather than being the sort 
of consciousness we are given by nature. But, she argues, the maternal 
consciousness, like the infantile consciousness which we are given by nature, 
can be expressed textually. This "semiotic" meaning is disclosed in the way a 
text is expressed to produce a response from the reader. The text conveys 
semiotic meaning because it communicates or evokes a visceral response in 
the reader. 
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Kristeva argues that the "semiotic" meaning helps us to understand how 
mothers have authority. But her project shows how we know about humans' 
sensual experiences. Kristeva argues that mothers have epistemic authority 
in the experiences of maternity. In the preceding chapter I argued that Iris 
Young fails to show why mothers have epistemic authority because she 
claims that the experiences of pregnancy are incommunicable. Kristeva, in 
contrast, argues that these experiences are communicable. But, in her view, 
understanding why embodied experiences can be communicated entails 
understanding that the human psyche is divided between three sorts of states. 
There are the infantile embodied sensations of desire, pleasure and pain; 
there is the imagination as a kind of inner screen; and there are linguistic 
thoughts. 
I will discuss Kristeva's claims for maternal authority in section ii, after 
presenting an overview of some relevant points in the psychoanalytic 
theories of Freud and Lacan. Lacan claims the infant must see itself in the 
mirror to distinguish between self and world; or inner and outer. The 
mirror image enables the infant to develop an imagination. In section iii I 
will review the "mirror phase" and "castration" before presenting Kristeva's 
alternative account in section iv. Kristeva presents a Hegelian conception of 
conscious development which she calls the thetic phase. She argues that we 
have access to our own experiences after we learn language. In section v, 
however, I compare Kristeva's view with Sellars' "myth of Jones" before 
identifying the problems with her claims about maternal authority in section 
vi. 
A series of dichotomies place the mother as unauthoritative in association 
with inner experience, privacy, nature and, in psychoanalytic terms, the 
unconscious. The father, on the other hand, has authority, in association 
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with the "body proper," public language, the laws of culture and hum an 
consciousness. The transitional stage between unconscious and 
consciousness is described in terms of the imagination. 
i. Freud and Lacan: an overview of psychoanalysis 
i.i Freud - investing the body with a sexual sort of consciousness 
In this section I examine Freud's claims that the "unconscious" is a 
remainder of the sexual experi~nces of early childhood: experiences which 
are prohibited in the transition from animal to human. Freud also suggests 
that mothers have this sexual kind of consciousness, particularly during 
breastfeeding. But most humans need to repress the sensuality of their bodies 
to enter into human discourse. Embodied sensations are unconscious 
because they do not fit into the general picture of minds as being a 
combination of images and words. In chapter two we encountered Young's 
distinction between embodied consciousness in the torso and abstract 
consciousness in the head. A similar distinction arises in psychoanalytic 
theory. But here the consciousness in the head is divided between an inner 
screen ("screen memory") and speech. Consciousness in the torso or, more 
precisely, felt sensations in the entire body fall under the psychoanalytic 
rubric "unconscious." 
Freud imagines the infantile consciousness as being a field of erotogenic 
sexuality.31 In Freud's view, infantile experience is focused on the mother 
whose breast brings a kind of erotic pleasure during feeding. He characterises 
the impressions of infants in three stages. Starting with awareness of oral 
satisfaction in suckling, the infant develops its primary drive in the "oral 
31 This is most explicit in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1977). 
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stage." (1977: 273) The satisfaction of emptying the bowels follows later, (the 
anal stage) and finally the infant develops genital awareness through 
emptying the bladder (the genital stage). He claims that infants, like the 
average woman, are "polymorphously perverse." (1977: 268) But in Freud's 
view, the impressions of infancy are uncivilized. The journey into 
civilisation is thus a journey which entails repression of these sensual 
impulses and the development of language and morality. In Freud's view, 
this journey also explains our identification as either masculine or feminine. 
Freud associates masculinity with paternalistic authority. He does not 
have anything positive to say about femininity.32 He is more interested in 
speculating about the mental development of infants and their relationship 
to, first, the mother and later the father. Freud claims that the mother is a 
source of infantile pleasure. He conceives of the pleasure of breast feeding as 
foundation for the erotic pleasure of both sexes. He says the mother leaves 
"memory-traces of the impressions and unfulfilled wishes" of infancy. (1977: 
392) In Freud's view, the unfulfilled wishes are particular to the male infant, 
who he argues sees the father as his sexual rival for the mother. Freud claims 
that the male infant desires a sexual relationship with his mother but the 
desire is repressed in the Oedipus Complex. 
Freud argues that the drives are repressed during the Oedipus complex: 
the time when the infant is supposed to identify with her or his same sex 
parent. Boys are far easier to explain than girls, in Freud's view, because it 
easier for him to imagine the heterosexual desire of a male child for his 
mother, and the subsequent recognition of his father's rivalry for their shared 
love object. The incest taboo is imposed by the father, with whom the male 
32 See Irigaray, especially (1991). 
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infant must identify in the knowledge that he will have his own wife some 
day. First, however, the male infant must learn how to be a good citizen in 
order to develop into a man who has authority. To do this, the child realises 
it must give up the pleasures of his incestuous relationship with his mother 
and learn to be a little man. 
In the case of females, the separation from the mother depends upon the 
girl's wanting a penis. He says girls develop penis-envy, masturbate over 
their father and feel jealousy towards their mothers. The jealousy turns the 
girl infant's attention from mother onto father. Moreover, Freud says girls 
must realise that they will have their own baby someday as a substitute for 
the penis. {1977: 673-676) 33 But, given Freud's general view that women do 
not carry the same degree of authority as men, maternity is also a substitute 
for authority. In Freud's view, then, fathers have authority and mothers do 
not. There is no clear explanation about this apart from the fact that "biology 
is destiny." (1977: 665) 
The Oedipus complex is Freud's explanation of the socialization of human 
infants. In Freud's view, giving up the desire for the mother is a necessary 
condition for becoming socialised. In the Oedipus complex, desire is 
repressed in recognition of the incest taboo, marking a shift of focus from the 
mother onto the father. The infant must learn to heed paternal authority 
instead of falling back into the incestuous pleasures of the maternal body. 
The pleasurable sensations are repressed, in Freud's view, through fear of 
harm or death at the hand of the father in the Oedipus complex. Recognition 
33 The basic idea holds irrespective of sexual difference that the mother causes the early 
pleasure of oral gratification. Freud says the oral pleasure of suckling is transferred to the girl's 
focus on the male sex organ. (1977: 199) 
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of paternal authority enables the infant to develop a human consciousness, or 
sense of self, in the ego. 
Clearly, Freud conceives of the father as. a disciplinarian. It is the father's 
role to observe the taboos of civilisation; an observation which requires that 
such basic pleasures are prohibited unless indulged according to social 
standards. Eating, toileting and sex are all thus regulated into the "proper 
place" of civilised humans. Any desire to do otherwise must be repressed, in 
part because uncivilised behaviour is considered more animal than human. 
But Freud claims the repressed drives work upon the civilised consciousness 
by distorting speech, or through dreams, slips of the tongue and jokes. These 
phenomena can direct the ego to repressed memories and the associated 
painful feelings which are not linguistic but are accessed through language. 
Freud refers to "screen memories" as a type of impression in which 
childhood memories are recovered. The content of these memories are 
"impressions and thoughts" including desires "hunger" "love" and a kind of 
mental picturing. {1977: 123) He is careful to suggest that these memories are 
often coloured by the imagination. The imaginary element of screen 
memories leads him to claim they represent the present rather than the past. 
{126) That is, the memory must be reconstructed and is not a true image of a 
past event. Nevertheless, these "screen memories" are in an important sense 
mental impressions of the past. 
Freud's "Interpretation of Dreams" marks the beginning of his work into 
the unconscious. The dreams are often visited as a kind of rebus, or picture 
puzzle. But the pictures on the memory screen can be discerned as things or 
objects and, as such, these can be described. In other words, these images can 
be symbolised, or put into words, making them conscious. So these are not 
properly "unconscious." The screen points towards something else: a desire. 
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The desire for the mother: the incestuous sexual desire which, in Freudian 
terms can just as well be transferred into sexual desire for an old boot! (A 
fetish) For, the object of desire is not important. Understanding the Freudian 
unconscious is just a matter of recognising that the desire wracks the flesh 
and disturbs consciousness somehow. Understanding desire is a matter of 
talking about the images and thoughts represented in the screen memories of 
childhood. 
But it is important to note that, for Freud, the drives, or instincts are not 
played out on an inner screen in the head. These are embodied sensations 
which, in his view, have a sexual nature. In general terms, the pulsations of 
the drives are felt in the so-called erotogenic zones: lips, breasts, genitals. The 
whole surface of skin has this erotic potential in Freud's view, multiplying 
the locations of these sensations throughout the infant's body. 
In Freuu's view, Lhen, inner experience is associated with sexual feelings 
which must be repressed in order to develop human consciousness. These 
sexual sensations are the locus of the unconscious. They are associated with 
the sexual pleasures of the infants sucking the mother's breast. These are the 
forbidden pleasures, more animal than human, which must be repressed in 
the Oedipus complex. 
i.ii Lacan: jouissance, the mirror phase and castration (from sense to 
language) 
Jacques Lacan redescribes inner experience with the French term 
jouissance. The term refers to an orgasmic pleasure:jouir meaning "to 
come." Lacan does not deny that these sensations can be felt by adult humans 
who are sexually active, but he does agree with Freud that these sensations 
have no place in consciousness proper. Lacan argues that consciousness 
proper is linguistic and conventional, based upon the agreement of men 
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described by Freud in Totem and Taboo, a patriarchal agreement which I 
explain below. This linguistic consciousness is nevertheless tempered by 
unconscious desires which structure speech, but which cannot be reduced to 
speech. The repression of desire is made possible by recognition of the self as 
a self in the mirror and the development of imagination in order that each 
person sees her or himself as others her or him. The speaking subject is thus 
divided, in Lacan's view, between repressed desire, an inner screen and 
symbols; a division which takes place during prelinguistic infancy and is 
completed in the Oedipus complex, marking the transition from inner 
experience to speech. 
In Lacan's story, the inner experiences of the infant are inchoate and 
meaningless. These are sensations of a body in a kind of homoeostatic flux, 
with the drives pulsating as a vivid sensory field. But the sensations are 
fragmented because there is not yet any locus of self, or subjectivity which 
Freud describes as the ego. The sensations are, to use a Freudian term, the id -
free floating and unidentified passions of the body. The passions, or 
jouissance are driven by the infant's basic needs. They are visceral, or felt, but 
cannot be identified as such. 
At around the age of six months, however, Lacan argues that the infant's 
consciousness becomes divided between awareness of its inner states and 
awareness of the world. The infant's awareness of the external world 
culminates in a mirror image, in Lacan's view, which becomes a signifier, or 
representation of the self as a self. Through this process of identification with 
itself, the infant sees itself reflected in others, particularly at this stage in the 
mother. She is experienced as someone who can satisfy the basic needs 
experienced in the infants visceral being. But, Lacan argues that the infant's 
recognition of the mother as being the one to fulfil basic needs turns the need 
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into a demand. Among the basic needs of the infant is a need for love, so 
satisfaction is withheld if love is not offered with the breast, bottle or 
whatever. The difference between need and demand, then, is the recognition 
that the mother's love surpasses the particularity of the need. (Lacan 1977:286) 
Hegel is an important reference for understanding Lacan's rendition of the 
mirror phase.34 The phase marks a transition in consciousness from the 
immediacy of sensations to the mediation between self and world. The infant 
begins to see his mother as part of the world, rather than just experiencing 
her as an extension of self. The idea here is that, prior to the image, the infant 
is unable to distinguish anything as separate and experiences need and supply 
in some vague undifferentiated fashion. To put it in the Hegelian terms 
introduced in chapter one, the need is universal and lacks any particularity in 
terms of recognition of objects. The consciousness of need is similar to 
.Hegel's sense-certainty insofar as subject and object are fused and not yet 
distinct. 
But the recognition of difference enables the infant to see the mother as 
separate. The mother is perceived as an object, but the infant as subject is not 
yet a proper subject. The need for the breast is addressed to the mother, or 
demanded by the infant. The mother must mediate between the infant and 
its need by offering the breast (or bottle, food, etc.). In Lacan's view, the 
particular need - sustenance - is transcended by the added requirement for the 
mother's love. The need for the breast is a particular need which is mediated 
through the demand for the mother's love. Through love, the mother 
negates the need by providing sustenance. But, in Lacan's view, the 
34 Zizek makes this point. He shows how the need-demand-desire trilogy is a Hegelian 
"negation of negation." (2001: 121-122). 
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difference between the appetite for food and the demand for love leaves the 
infant in a state of desire. He says "for both partners in the relation, both the 
subject and the Other [mother], it is not enough to be subjects of need, or 
objects of love, but that they must stand for the cause of desire." (287) 
The "subject of need" is the infant under the domination of its visceral 
states. This needy subject is not truly a subject, in Lacan's view, until it goes 
through the process of recognition in the "mirror phase." The mirror phase 
enables the infant to get a grasp on the distinction of subject and object, or self 
and other through desire. Desire comes about, according to Lacan, because the 
subject needs sustenance for its survival and satisfaction, but the need is 
cancelled with the object of the demand. Even though the need is met with 
food, for example, the demand requires more than the object, such as food for 
survival. The object does not fulfil the need because the demand requires 
the added dimension of love. The result, presuming that the demand for 
love is not met, is desire. In Lacanian terms, the desire stands for lack. 
From a Hegelian perspective, we see that the immediate sensations of need 
are sublated. Need is negated in the transformation of demand. This 
negation effectively posits the object of need. That is the infant sees the thing 
it wants and loses consciousness of the need through demanding that thing. 
The infant is no longer a passive recipient of the breast: the infant now 
indicates that it wants the breast. The infant must distinguish itself from the 
breast in the act of demanding what it wants. The breast does not fulfil the 
need, bringing the infant back to notice its own experience of wanting. This 
movement negates the object which was posited and brings the infant back to 
awareness as a subject. That awareness is nevertheless an awareness that 
something is lacking: love. In Lacan's view, the supply of sustenance does 
not fulfil the demand for love and the subject is left desiring. (297) 
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Lacan describes the desire as a "spaltung" or splitting of the subject. The 
need, we remember corresponds to the immediate sensations and inner 
jouissance. The demand, on the other hand, is intentional. The intentional 
act of demanding is a process of signification. The infant signifies what it 
wants: the breast. The infant as a subject is left desiring, the gap being formed 
between the inner sensations, or need, and the intentional act of demand. 
The need is intrasubjective and the demand intersubjective. So the subject is 
divided between its inner sensations and its intersubjective communication 
with others. 
But, still in the Lacanian "mirror phase" the subject does not yet have a 
proper sense of itself in relation to objects or others. He calls this stage 
imaginary because the infant has access to both need (inner sensations) and 
demand (for objects and others that can only be imagined, not perceived). To 
put it another way, the infant remains divided between inner self and self-in-
the-world. The mirror image serves only to identify with the self-in-the-
world, enabling the infant to make demands through the recognition of 
others-in-the-world. The infant begins to develop concepts to signify its 
demands. This is a "thetic" process which I discuss in more detail below. But 
it also has access to the sensuality of its ownjouissance. The process of 
developing proper concepts depends upon a negation of thejouissance, or 
anti-thesis, so that the concepts are abstracted from their sensual content. The 
object is thus symbolised, or put into words. 
But the shift to using symbols requires intervention from the father, in 
Lacan's view. Prior to this intervention, the child is in an imaginary state of 
plenitude because it has access to itself both as subject of need and of demand. 
The mother fulfils the gap between needs and demands. But rather than her 
being the symbolic phallus for her child - this is too paternal - Lacan imagines 
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that the child wants to be the phallus for its mother. That is, the mother 
mirrors the child's desire back to it and the child thinks it fulfils its mothers 
desire. (289) This is a tribute from Lacan to Freud: the child is a penis 
substitute. But the phallus, as Lacan uses the term, is not a penis. Instead it is 
a signifier. For the phallus, as a signifier, or part of a linguistic system must 
fill the gap between need and demand: the gap of desire. To fill this gap, 
though, the child has to learn language. 
Language in Lacan's view is a social construct which is more inclined to 
describe how things ought to be rather than how things are. The ought is 
prescribed by patriarchy, as the law of the fathers. Language begins, Lacan 
offers, in the "primal horde." The father of the horde keeps all the women to 
himself and his brothers seek revenge by killing their greedy father. The 
remorse suffered after the murder leads the brothers to establish a pact, or 
agreement. They eat their father, in Freud's version of the story, the 
cannibalism signifying the internalisation or incorporation of the father.35 
Language takes centre stage in Lacan's reinterpretation of Freud's story 
about the "primal horde."36 He says language enables them to make this pact, 
by which they agree never to kill each other again and, to prevent such an act, 
they agree to share the women between themselves. The story is taken as the 
mark of patriarchy: an agreement between men, for men.37 Within this 
patriarchal order men have authority and women lack authority. Lacan takes 
35 Lingis (1996) reiterates this Freudian point, which is often overlooked. 
36 Mitchell (1974) makes this point, arguing that Lacan draws from Claude Levi-Straus' 
structural anthropology. 
37 As Grosz says, this myth already presupposes patriarchy. The father is dominant and 
already has all the women and the brothers assume a right to have their own women. (1991:69) 
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the phallus to be the symbol of authority: the phallus qua authority is 
something men have and women lack. But, in Lacan's view, this authority is 
given through naming. He claims that the phallus is the "privileged 
signifier" in "the-name-of-the-father." Language in general is this patriarchal 
constr,uct: the symbolic phallus. It is symbolic because it organises women 
and men according to their relationship to authority: men have authority 
and women do not. 
Nevertheless, in the Lacanian rendition of the Oedipus complex we must 
note that the child is the phallus. Given that in Freud's theory, pregnancy is 
a substitute for having a penis, Lacan claims that the pregnant woman is 
phallic. The baby is her phallus because it fulfils her desire - her lack. The 
woman has a privilege of her own in pregnancy. Having a baby enables her 
to revisit the sexual states of jouissance otherwise forbidden to adult humans. 
Iii olher words, Lacan conceives of maternity as being full of the erotic 
pleasures of the infantile drives described by Freud. 
Men on the other hand lack access to this state of embodied pleasures and 
pains. They are cut off from these states in the Oedipus complex. The 
Oedipus complex leaves men in a constant state of desire, in his view, which 
is also a state of lack. They are cut off from the inner states of pleasure and 
pain. Lacan refers to this cut as the "castration" of the Oedipus complex, 
through which every speaking being (both sexes) are divided between inner 
states of feeling and language which is fundamentally "void" of sensuous 
experience. This void of feeling is the "want-to-be" of a subject who must 
find meanings in the world in an attempt to make up for this lack of inner 
experience. 
Desire mediates between the void and the world. Desire is a want for 
something we do not have. In Lacan's view, language is a constant attempt to 
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fulfil desire. He calls language a symbolic "phallus" to make clear that it is a 
patriarchal tool which fills the void of experience. He claims that language 
fills the gap of being. The gap of being is the lack, or desire produced when 
the infant gives up its incestuous desire for mother. Learning language and 
gaining knowledge is thus a constant attempt to make up for the loss of 
pleasurable sensations which, in this story, have no place within language 
and culture. 
i.iii summary 
Let me reiterate the main points from this very broad overview of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis so that I can better situate Kristeva's theory of 
maternal authority. First, the unconscious is not played on an inner screen. 
The unconscious is, rather, the consciousness of feelings in the body. Freud 
conceives of these feelings as infantile and undeveloped. But, most 
emphalically, F1eud co11Leive~ uf feeli11gs as 1.Jei11g sexual i1111alu1e. Laca11 
uses the termjouissance to describe these feelings which, he argues, have no 
function in language. 
Lacan conceives of language as prescriptive, or normative and based on 
naming practices designed by men for men. He claims that having authority 
is only possible in language and is thus "phallic." To have authority is to 
have a symbolic phallus in virtue of linguistic competence. This does not 
mean that women do not have authority in virtue of using language. But it 
does mean that no-one has authority about their feelings, or inner 
experiences. All such feelings are associated with the infantile pains and 
pleasures injouissance. Inner experiences never develop or mature. Instead 
they remain accessible as private episodes which can only be accessed in 
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heterosexual relationships. But these experiences are also associated with 
maternity and anti-social behaviour.38 
Maternity nevertheless has a special place in the social order of the phallus. 
The baby is a substitute for the mother's lost linguistic authority. The mother 
is thus phallic. Lacan distinguishes between having the phallus and being the 
phallus: having the phallus is, as we have seen, a matter of having authority. 
Being the phallus, on the other hand, is a matter of having access to 
jouissance. The mother's privilege is given by the fact that maternity enables 
her to revisit the lost sensations of infantilejouissance. She cannot say 
anything about these experiences, however, because they are not symbolic. In 
Lacan's view, then, mothers do not have authority but they have privileged 
access to their sexual sensations. 
Kristeva's "revolution" in psychoanalysis is to show that these sexual 
experiences can be made conscious in language. She argues that the infantile 
jouissance is not cut off, as Lacan would have it. In Kristeva's view any 
person of either sex can express these sensations in poetic language. She does 
not deny that these sensations are prohibited within a cultural context, 
arguing that it is a matter of breaking the rules of language to express this 
inner sensuality. Kristeva argues that mothers do have authority and that 
they can communicate their maternal experiences. She therefore attempts to 
reinstate maternal authority within the laws of culture rather than as the 
unconscious outside: as nature. 
38 Carolyn Dean presents an interesting account of Lacan's association between experience, 
psychosis and criminal behaviour. My account of perversity in chapter five supports and explains 
the correlation in more detail. 
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ii. Kristeva on maternal authority 
2 .1 The chora - organising embodied experience 
As I mentioned earlier, Kristeva conceives of language as having two 
functions. She does not completely reject Lacan's views about the symbolic 
function of language. Like Lacan, she imagines a division developing during 
infancy, between sexual sensations in the body and imagination in the head, 
so the infant can learn language. She agrees with Lacan that language is 
prescriptive, or normative, based largely on capitalist ideology. Following 
Lacan, she associates language, or the symbolic function, with paternity and 
masculinity. But Kristeva develops a theory about a second linguistic 
function associated with maternity and femininity. This second linguistic 
function serves to express the sexual feelings which Lacan argues must be 
repressed in order to learn language. Unlike Lacan, Kristeva argues that 
irmer exµerie11ces are communicable. It is just that they cannot be 
communicated in ordinary language, depending instead on using poetic 
language to evoke experiences in others. 
Kristeva calls this alternative linguistic function semiotic. She says 
We understand the term "semiotic in its Greek sense: ... distinctive mark, 
trace, index, precursory sign, proof, engraved or written sign, imprint, trace, 
figuration. This etymological reminder would be a mere archaeological 
embellishment (and an unconvincing one at that, since the term ultimately 
encompasses such disparate meanings), were it not for the fact that the 
preponderant etymological use of the word, the one that implies a 
distinctiveness, allows us to connect it to a precise modality in the signifying 
process. (RiPL: 35) 
The precise modality, she says, is described in Freudian psychoanalysis as 
"primary processes, which displace and condense both energies and their 
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inscriptions." I have argued above that these are the sexual sensations of the 
infant, distributed as libido through erotogenic zones. These are the infantile 
drives: "[d]iscrete quantities of energy" moving through the body of the infant 
who, Kristeva says, is not yet a subject. The infant will only become a subject 
in her view, when it is a self-conscious language user. 
Kristeva characterises this pre-linguistic consciousness as though the body 
is a screen. She describes the infant's body as being impressed with "'energy' 
drives and 'psychical' marks." The infant is conscious of the sexual 
sensations as they move through its body, leaving impressions in some 
embodied memory. She says the sensations 
articulate what we call a chora: a non expressive totality formed by the 
drives and their stases in a motility that is as full of movement as it is 
regulated. (35) 
She imagines the infant's body surging with energy charges which stop and 
start. She calls this embodied energy a chora. She says the term is Plato's, 
taken from the Timaeus . In a footnote, Kristeva describes chora as the 
necessary space, or receptacle for reason, being "unnameable, improbable, 
bastard." (RiPL: n12, 62) The chora is "bastard reasoning" because it is borne 
out of maternal space and does not yet require intervention by the father 
who, in the psychoanalytic context, brings language into the field of conscious 
experiences. Kristeva says the consciousness of the chora precedes the 
distinction between self and world, subject and object. The chora is 
amorphous, indistinct "pre syllable, preword." (n.13, 62) As such, the chora is 
conscious experience: but it is not experience of anything as "it is." 
There is a succession of impressions but Kristeva claims that the awareness 
is not organised in time, space or truth. (35, 36) She says the movement of 
these moments through time and space is rhythmic. She describes the 
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infantile drives that operate in relation to stases; starting and stopping as 
contradictory positive and negative forces that are constantly waging war 
against each other. The drives are "charges" which are negated by "stases:" 
these charges and stases being neurophysically produced within the infant's 
sensory and motor nerves. Over time, she argues, there is a basic registering 
of "voice, gesture, colours." (R: 37) 
This early stage of "bastard reasoning" is supposed to describe the 
consciousness of a creature who is purely "natural." In the 
Freudian/Lacanian conception of this very early stage of human life, the 
consciousness is supposed to tell us something about our natural state. They 
say this state is dispersed throughout the body as a sexualised libido. The 
polymorphous jouissance of the infant is innate and natural. In the views of 
Freud and Lacan, then, the consciousness of early infancy is not socialised. 
Kristeva's claims about the chora indicate that even at this early stage 
consciousness is not purely "natural." She claims that the ability to register 
particular types of sounds, movements or images depends on an interaction 
with the mother or primary caregiver. Kristeva emphasises the interface 
between "nature" and "culture" in this early stage. On one hand she 
emphasises the role of the mother in socialising the infant. But on the other 
hand she suggests the abilities to register voice and gesture are innate. Her 
theory of the chora aims to show that the early caregiving is essential for 
preparing the infant for language by encouraging the processes of natural 
development. She says the energy drives are arranged according to the 
various constraints imposed on this body - always already involved in a 
semiotic process - by family and social structures. In this way the drives, 
which are "energy" charges as well as "psychical" marks, articulate what we 
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call a chora: a non-expressive totality formed by the drives and their stases in 
a motility that is as full as movement as it is regulated. (35) 
The chora is thus both an innate force and a regulated force. Kristeva 
describes the innate libidinous energy drives as though they are impressed 
from without, marking consciousness with impressions from the world and 
making basic connections. The word "articulation" is emphasised by Kristeva 
in contrast to "disposition." The infant is not yet able to articulate anything 
in language. She says: 
The chora is not yet a position that represents something for someone (i.e., it is not a 
sign); nor is it a position that represents someone for another position (i.e., it is not 
yet a signifier either); it is however, generated in order to attain to this signifying 
position. Neither model nor copy, the chora precedes and underlies figuration and 
thus specularization, and is analogous only to vocal or kinetic rhythm. We must 
restore this motility's gestural and vocal play (to mention only the aspect relevant 
to language) on the level of the socialized body in order to remove motility from 
ontology and amorphousness. (35-36) 
Nothing is represented in the chora, according to Kristeva, so it is neither 
sign nor signifier; impression or idea. The chora is pure consciousness or 
awareness in which nothing is known as the kind of thing it is, but in which 
the infant is nevertheless conscious and responding vocally to her 
surroundings. Kristeva says these responses are relevant to language, and 
indicates these responses will have an epistemic function. 
In a footnote, Kristeva explains that the chora is only qualitative. She thus 
indicates a felt experience: a basic sense of quality. She emphasises the point 
made above that the qualitative consciousness is not representing anything. 
There is no "this" or "it is" which, I must point out, would be the case if this 
were a version of Hegel's sense-certainty. 
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Kristeva claims the chora is a necessary condition of language and thus of 
knowledge. In her view, however, the chora does not have an other-directed 
epistemic function. She does not think there is any awareness of things as the 
things they are. But she does think there is an awareness of awareness itself.39 
Kristeva's idea that the qualitative consciousness of infancy is not yet 
epistemic, but will become so, is an attempt to break down the psychoanalytic 
distinctions between unconscious/ conscious in relation to the sexes 
mother/father. In Freudian and Lacanian theory, the unconscious 
experiences of infancy are opposed to the conscious discourses of culture. The 
unconscious experiences are supposed to be purely natural and discourse 
purely social, particularly in Lacanian theory. To break down the dichotomy 
between nature and culture, Kristeva argues that the infant is already 
developing in a social context. She attempts to blur the nature/ culture 
distinction operating between qualitative experience and maternity in 
opposition to language and paternity. She does not mean to argue that the 
chora is an ontological essence; nor does she mean to make an 
epistemological claim that the chora is prelinguistic knowing. Instead she 
claims that the infant has innate abilities, both genetic and neurophysical, 
which are developed in a social context. 
Kristeva claims that the mother, or primary caregiver has a kind of social 
authority over her infant. The mother is not a purely natural force engaged 
in some sexualised relationship with her infant, as Freud and Lacan would 
have it. The mother is as much a social creature as any other human, having 
long ago internalised the so called fathers' law. Kristeva refers to the 
prohibitions described in the Lacanian vision of language as an instrument of 
39This paragraph and the next have been edited - eds 
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patriarchy. Kristeva's point is that the first weeks or months of infancy are 
already socially contextualised. There is no pre-social void. The infant is 
already being subjected to social standards right from the beginning of life. 
Kristeva disagrees with Lacan that paternity is authoritative and maternity 
non-authoritative. She aims to show that the mother has an authoritative 
role in these formative stages of infant development. In Kristeva's words: 
Through frustrations and prohibitions, this authority shapes the body into a 
territory having areas, orifices, points and lines, surfaces and hollows, where the 
archaic power of mastery and neglect, of the differentiation of proper-clean and 
improper-dirty, possible and impossible, is impressed and exerted. (1982b: 72) 
Kristeva argues the mother socialises the infant's body according to what is 
permissible, imposing certain cultural standards like cleanliness upon the 
infant. She regulates both the mouth and the orifices of excretion, keeping 
them clean and presentable as prescribed in Western cultures.10 The mother 
cleans her baby's mouth, and wipes the baby's bottom, observing hygiene 
standards and thinking that she will judged by others according to those 
standards. Kristeva says that the mother impresses these prohibitions on her 
infant. In Kristeva's view, these impressions are the mark of maternal 
authority. 
In this section I have argued that Kristeva, through the theory of the chora, 
attempts to break down the idea that the first months of infancy are purely 
natural. She argues that the conscious development of the infant is already 
situated in a social context. Her theory about the chora also aims to show that 
40 Kristeva argues that Lacan's theory is focused upon prohibitions in Western capitalist 
cultures. She acknowledges the Marxian influence on Lacan. Note that Lacan attended Kojeve's 
lectures, presenting a reading of Hegel through Marxian theory. 
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the mother is not just a purely natural force in some sexual experience with 
her infant. Rather, Kristeva offers a theory of maternal authority to show 
that even before language the mother is working within a context of socially 
determined standards and practices. 
2.2 Kristeva 's Thetic Phase: bringing experience in to language 
Kristeva aims to show that experiences are not deeply private and 
incommunicable. Her chora is presented as though the infant has 
consciousness and reads off its environment, registering various kinds of 
responses. The main idea is to show that socialisation begins with the 
mother in the early stages of infancy. Her idea of a thetic phase builds upon 
her earlier claims to counter the clean division between femininity and 
masculinity; nature and culture; experience and knowledge in Lacanian 
theory. In section one I said that Lacan claims that consciousness divides or 
splits in the mirror phase to make way for representations of self and world. 
The self is left desiring because it cannot represent experiences: it can only 
represent objects in the world. Subjective need is negated by objective 
demand, objective demand is negated by want for love. More demands bring 
more objects to satisfy needs with the overall want left unsatisfied. Learning 
language helps to state what is wanted, but using language requires focusing 
outwards, into the world of objects and others. The infant thus loses sight of 
its inner experiences, especially after the father intervenes and prohibits the 
incestuous relationship with the mother. In Lacan's rendition of the Oedipus 
complex, experiences are cut off from language. 
Kristeva disagrees that the infantile experiences are cut off from language. 
Her argument is based on the idea that the sense of self must be developed 
through recognition of objects as distinct from the self. But, she argues, there 
is a phase between the chora and the symbolic use oflanguage which is not 
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just a child's imaginary world of mirror images, need and demand. In 
Kristeva's view, this is also a phase of trying to use language. But this is not 
yet proper language. In this phase, Kristeva claims the language is "semiotic." 
To flesh out Kristeva's rather brief example, the infant may be in the 
presence of a dog that comes up to her and licks her face. The infant responds 
to the dog by saying "woof-woof." The response is semiotic, in Kristeva's 
view, because the child is able to identify and posit a dog as something 
separate from herself. The response is the "nucleus of judgment or 
proposition." She says that this ability "contains the object as well as the 
proposition, and the complicity between them." (40) In a footnote, Kristeva 
indicates that meaning is not possible unless propositional. She suggests 
meaning depends upon expressing the concept of an object. {65n29) So the 
infant's semiotic expression of "woof-woof" has propositional content, in 
Kristeva's view. It is therefore meaningful even though it is not properly 
symbolic. 
Moreover, she says all animals thereafter will carry the same response. 
The cat brushes past the infant and elicits the same response: "woof-woof." 
The response is an attribution of sorts, which is to say that it is a response to 
something noticed as being a member of a broad and furry category. Kristeva 
suggests that this semiotic response to animals is not yet properly epistemic. 
But the infant has learned this response and, even though the response is not 
yet a proper concept, the response shows that the concept is beginning to 
develop in which case the thetic phase has begun. The semiotic utterance is 
an indication that the infant recognises the existence of something separate 
from herself. 
She says the response "woof-woof" attributes a "signifier to an object 
through a "copula" that will function as a signified." (41) The proposition is 
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the thesis of this stage of positing something. But Kristeva suggests that two 
positions must be developed in consciousness. There is the signified object 
and the signifier, or propositional construction. This distinction makes sense 
only if we imagine that there is an object in consciousness and a speaker in 
consciousness. We can further imagine the little voice coming from a place 
opposed to the screen upon which the objects can be seen. 
Kristeva says the thetic phase is that which makes possible any speech 
because, in her view, speech requires a structural division between the object 
in consciousness (signified); the inner experiences/ speech of a subject 
(chora/signifier). The signifier, as the subject or self in this analysis, becomes 
divided between semiotic and symbolic functions. As Kristeva puts it: 
Not only is symbolic, thetic unity divided (into signifier and signified). but this 
division is itself the result of a break that put a heterogeneous functioning in the 
position of signifier. This functioning is the instinctual semiotic, preceding meaning 
and signification, mobile, amorphous, but already regulated, which we have 
attempted to represent through references to child psychoanalysis (particularly at 
the pre-Oedipal stage) and the theory of the drives. 
By showing that language develops through trial and error, with the 
example of "woof-woof," Kristeva claims the subject as a signifier is also 
positioned in relation to inner experiences. These meaningless experiences 
are always heterogeneous to speech because they do not literally fiti:nto the 
system of language. The experiences can nevertheless erupt into speech to 
add texture to the spoken propositions. 
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2.3 Kristeva's negativity: expressing experience in language. 
The thetic phase prepares the way for Kristeva's view that experience is 
expressed in language. Kristeva argues that the "fourth term of the dialectic is 
negativity." (7 4) This negativity, she says, is to be found in the subject who 
operates outside logic. (73} She refers here to the conscious experience of the 
subject in the context of Freud and the infantile libido. The experiences of 
jubilant pleasure, of aggression and of rejection are discussed to highlight her 
point that Hegelian negativity is pre-Oedipal and thus extra-linguistic. _She 
says that "artistic games" can disturb the smoothness of the symbolic system 
by bringing back the repressed element of experience. (76} 
To put "rejection" in its Freudian context, Kristeva refers particularly to 
the anal drive. There is a pleasure associated with the rejection of the faeces, 
bringing about an association between loss and pleasure, says Kristeva. 
Moreover, the experience of separation through expulsion is the infant's first 
experience of pleasure in this very Freudian view. She says that 
psychoanalysts conceive of this pleasure as an attack directed not only towards 
the shit, but also towards all objects including the father and mother. This 
aggression is held in check, she says, by the infant's identification with one of 
its parents. "Rejection is thus a step on the way to the object's becoming sign, 
at which the object will be detached from the body and isolated as a real 
object." (78) In psychoanalytic terms, this rejection enables the development 
of the superego which censors thought and speech. She refers to a repressed 
anal or oral drive, making the subject feel something in his or her 
"sphincters." She relates the repressed oral drive with the mother and the 
repressed anal drive with the brothers. And she argues that avant-garde 
writers split the texts to evoke sensations in others. (79) So, for Kristeva, 
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Freudian rejection is a clue to understanding that which must be repressed in 
the Oedipal complex. 
The mother's body is associated with the Freudian oral stage, and is 
expressed with various vocal emissions to signify the mother's "throat, voice 
and breasts: music, rhythm, prosody, paragrams, and the matrix of the 
prophetic parabola." These are written into some avant-garde texts. She cites 
Mallarme's "glottal spasm" as an example. Other examples integrate '"sweet' 
sounds, 'pleasant' sounds and poetic musicality." {80) These are all contrasted 
with the aggression of the anal stage and the imposition of unity "one logic, 
one ethics, one signified: one but other." {79) The one is the unitary speaking 
voice of the subject, who in the psychoanalytic context is also other because 
the speaking subject always represents things beyond her or himself. As I 
have mentioned earlier, the unitary subject of psychoanalysis cannot 
reµreseul her ur his irnu:!t experiences by following linguistic conventions. 
But the point of all this psychoanalytic theory for Kristeva is to show that 
inner experiences can be expressed through breaking the grammatical or 
syntactical rules. For Kristeva, then, the inner is expressed by transgressing 
the Oedipal taboos. The Oedipus complex brings about the symbolic 
castration through which the inner experiences are supposed to be fully 
repressed. But Kristeva returns to Hegel to show why they are not fully 
repressed. 
In Hegelian terms, Kristeva argues, rejection is conceived as negativity. 
She says "Hegel can only supersede the exteriority of Repulsion that Freud 
has set out." (84) Supersession entails negation of the experience and positing 
a concept. Importantly the Hegelian supersession takes place during the 
thetic phase, in the developing consciousness of unity. Kristeva cites, from 
Hegel's Logic, his exposition of the One as both positive and negative of itself. 
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He says the infinity of objects, or properties, enables the One to "pass beyond 
itself" but that this is made possible through the immediacy of the One. In 
other words, it is only because there is conscious experience - albeit 
immediate - that there can be a concept. Repulsion, in his terms, is the 
shifting of awareness from the felt experience of an object onto the object 
itself. But the repulsion is made possible by having an experience, which is as 
much an experience of self as it is of the object. Kristeva cites Hegel in italics: 
"Repulsion is its self-relation and simple self-identity." (RiPL: 84) 
Kristeva presents the following criticism of Hegel: 
What Hegel does not envisage is the moment the One is shattered in a return of 
Repulsion onto itself, which is to say, a turning against its own potential power for 
positing and multiplying the One. Nor does Hegelian logic see the heterogeneous 
parcelling of the symbolic, which underlies the symbolic's very constitution and 
constantly undermines it even while maintaining it in process; the simultaneous 
existence of the boundary (which is the One) and the a-reasonable, a-relative, a-
mediating, crossing of the boundary;· or the possibility of the constitution-
unconstitution of the One meaning-nonmeaning, passing through categorical 
boundaries ("inside," "one," "multiple," etc.), which is precisely what rejection 
brings about in the "schizoid" process of the text. (RiPL: 84) 
In other words, the unity of the subject is shattered when consciousness is 
turned back onto itself to feel the disunity of its own embodied states. Even 
though Hegelian perception enables the subject to see objects as being in the 
world, Kristeva argues that there is awareness of experience. This is because, 
as discussed above, her version of the thetic phase takes consciousness to be 
divided between inner experience of consciousness and consciousness of 
objects. Her citation of Hegel above suggests that the subject has simple self 
identity. But in her view the self must be contained because of the impulses 
which must be socialised. It is only in virtue of containing the self through 
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repression of impulses that the unitary self is possible, in Kristeva's view. 
The self must be constructed according to what is socially acceptable: 
everything else is not rational, nor relative, nor even mediating. The rest is 
just the experiences of the self which must be repressed, according to 
psychoanalytic theories, and contained within the boundaries of a unitary 
speaking self. But the very fact that the boundaries are constructed, through 
constraint, indicates for Kristeva that they can also be crossed. Just as people 
can bre'!-k the laws of society, so they can break the laws of language. In so 
doing, Kristeva argues, the text becomes "schizoid" because it expresses the 
very meaning which is supposed to be inexpressible. 
In Kristeva's vision, the Hegelian dialectic is constantly expelling 
experience to someplace beyond the unity. Each time a unity is posited, she 
says the negativity leads to a series of "scissions." The scissions indicate that 
consciousness divides and has an unconscious element. She says these "act 
with the regularity of objective laws and recall." (85) 
iii Critique of Kristeva 
It is my view that Kristeva attempts to show that the prelinguistic infant 
has the ability to respond to its environment in a fashion similar to that 
described by Sellars. The infant has an innate but developing ability to 
"register" certain things and respond with sounds. I will say more about this 
in a minute. 
iii.i empirical evidence which does not support Kristeva 
First I must make clear that there is an implicit first person element to 
Kristeva's account. She suggests the infant has a qualitative sense of what it 
is like to be an infant. The first person aspect of Kristeva's chora is implicit, 
and develops in her account of the thetic phase. Alison Gopnik's paper "How 
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we know our own minds" strongly supports the Sellarsian view, that we 
cannot know our own minds until we have a grasp of observational 
knowledge including observation of others' behaviour. Gopnik argues that 
infants are unable to grasp others' intentions until around the age of three 
and a half, when they begin to get a better grasp of their own psychological 
experiences. Kristeva, on the other hand, indicates that we are aware of our 
psychological experiences in early infancy even though we do not know them 
as particular experiences. But, in Kristeva's view, we begin to grasp our own 
experiences as particular experiences between the ages of six to eighteen 
months. Here is a summary of Gopnik's research. 
Alison Gopnik {1993) argues that we do not know our own minds until we 
have a theory about others' minds. She says that many of us are mistaken to 
think of our mental states as "the underlying entities that explain our 
behaviour and experience." (1) She refers lo "psychological experience" as a 
stream of consciousness which is distinct from our experiences of things like 
rocks and trees. The question she raises is whether these experiences are 
given to us as first persons or whether they are derived cognitively as third 
persons. Kristeva and Lacan argue for the first person route for psychological 
experience and for the third person route for language. But Gopnik argues 
that psychological experience is also known through the third person route, 
suggesting that the first person recognition of the mirror phase is false. 
Gopnik cites research showing that infants do not begin to distinguish 
between "physical objects and mental states" until around the age of eighteen 
months. This ability develops through the second year but it is not until the 
age of three that the child can "understand the ontological difference between 
physical states and mental reality." {3) Gopnik correlates this ability to 
recognise the difference between world and self with an ability to "understand 
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differences between their own mental states and the mental states of others." 
(3) Even so, research shows that these children are not yet competent in 
understanding things the way that adults do. 
In one test, children are shown a picture of a green cat superimposed with 
a red filter. Three year old children see that the cat looks black but they are 
unable to understand that it is not really black. (Flavell et al. 1986) Gopnik 
says Flavell and co. performed further tests to check that the error was not 
just a linguistic error. The children continued to demonstrate an inability to 
discern appearance from reality. In "false-belief" tests with lolly-boxes filled 
with pencils the children failed to recognise that others will be fooled by the 
trick. The children, aged three, "consistently say that the other person will 
think there are pencils in the box," even when told that such a belief is false. 
(4) Citing a rartge of similar types of tasks, Gopnik claims that three year olds 
do not yet properly understand that others do not share their beliefs, nor do 
they properly understand that some beliefs are false. Four year olds, she 
argues, develop these competencies lacking in their previous year. 
Gopnik argues that the shift takes place in the third year. Children think 
they understand representation, she says, but they do not so long as they fail 
to understand misrepresentation. Having a correct world view requires a 
representational model of mind. This is to say that the mind develops 
according to an understanding of how we represent. 
Desires, perceptions, beliefs, pretenses, and images all involve the same 
basic structure, one sometimes described in terms of propositional attitudes 
and propositional contents. These mental states all involve representations 
of reality, rather than direct relations to reality itself. Perceiving, desiring, 
believing become perceiving, desiring and believing that. Rather than 
distinguishing different types of mental states with different relations to a real 
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world of objects, the child sees that all mental states involve the same abstract 
representational structure. (1993: 6) 
Gopnik argues that there is no prelinguistic ability to represent anything. 
An infant who sees its image in the mirror at the age of six to eighteen 
months will fail to believe that the image is an image or that it sees itself. 
Language is required to formulate these beliefs in propositional form. 
Gopnik takes empirical research to support the thesis, offered also by Sellars, 
that all representational states are mediated by language. This is not to say 
that there are two - or more - types of mental states: psychological experience 
and psychological concepts. Instead, this suggests that psychological 
experience cannot represent anything, least of all itself, until it has been 
developed in a socio-cultural environment to use shared concepts. 
Put simply, we can no more peer into our own minds to get a sense of the 
sexual sensations that Lacan and Freud associate with infancy than we can 
peer into a mirror at the age of six months and identify the image as one to be 
associated with those infantile sensations. These claims are not based on 
empirical research. Rather, the mirror phase is supposed to tell us how we 
rise above the animal kingdom. 
Second, Kristeva speculates about the timing over which the infant can 
register certain things, including voice. Empirical research shows that the 
infant responds to its caregiver's voices within days and can discern between 
the language of its caregivers and other languages within weeks. Research 
also shows that the infant registers, or responds to human faces within hours 
of birth. Karmiloff-Smith's research shows that these responses are innate, 
but are developed in a social context. 
Karmiloff-Smith argues that the human infant develops an ability to 
communicate with others quite early because, unlike many other species, 
118 
human infants are not able to move around their environment. The 
immobility of the human infant leads to a developing ability to point at 
objects in her environment, initially by directing her gaze at the desired object 
and assuring "joint attention" by securing the gaze of her caretaker. The 
ostensive communication carries two developmental functions, in 
Karmiloff-Smith's view. The pointing, or directed gaze function as "proto-
imperatives" she says, as a non-verbal communication of want. But, she 
argues, 
the proto-imperatives rapidly become proto-declaratives; that is, a point becomes 
the infant's means of making a nonverbal comment about the state of the world 
(something like "Look, that's a nice toy") rather than a request to obtain it. (122) 
So, the initial function of the ostensive communication indicates a child's 
want for something it cannot reach. But the development of this 
communication extends to non-verbal expression about that kind of object 
rather than simply expressing desire for it. {121-122) The idea is that the 
infant learns to build upon her endogenous abilities through interaction with 
others. Karmiloff-Smith shows that infant development depends on certain 
innate abilities which are developed through communication with carers. 
In this section, I have suggested that Kristeva does not fully dispense with 
a first person account of infant development and that this is unwarranted. I 
have also shown that empirical research both supports and discredits 
Kristeva's theory. She is supported in the vision of the infant as developing 
according to both innate and external factors. She is not supported in her 
claims about voice and face recognition "over time" because research shows 
these abilities are innate. 
3.2 Kristeva and Hegel 
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Kristeva's theory about the chora attempts to overcome a Hegelian version 
of immediate knowledge. Unlike Hegel, Kristeva argues that there is no 
knowledge in this early stage of life and that the infant simply responds to its 
environment. But she does not deny first person access of the infant to its 
own experiences. This is a Hegelian account according to which unmediated 
experience becomes immediate knowledge. For Kristeva, as for Hegel, the 
distinction between self and world marks the mediation of concepts. In the 
chora this distinction is not present. 
Kristeva's thetic phase is Hegelian because it marks the division between 
consciousness of objects, as signified in consciousness. Kristeva suggests these 
objects are cast upon the inner screen, and that there is a developing 
homunculus, or subject position presenting commentary on the screen. The 
screen presents the object as anti-thesis or not-self, and the self comments on 
the object in the formulation of a not yet mature proposition: "woof-woof." 
But this semiotic response is not yet properly symbolic. In the thetic phase, 
the subject is also flooded with the sexual experiences of drives. So, the thetic 
phase is effectively a negation of the object (a dog) on the screen (signified) 
with the proposition (signifier) "woof-woof." But this is further negated by 
the semiotic excess: the jubilance, or experience of excitement the child feels 
(signifier) which is expressed by the tone of voice. The screen and viewer 
collapse back into the states of an autoerotic body. 
To put it in Hegel's words: 
The two extremes [of this syllogism], the one, of the pure inner world, the other, 
that of the inner being gazing into this pure inner world, have now coincided, and 
just as they qua extremes, have vanished, so too the middle term, as something 
other than these extremes, has also vanished. This curtain [of appearance] hanging 
before the inner world is therefore drawn away, and we have the inner being [the 
'I'] gazing into the inner world- the vision of the undifferentiated selfsame being, 
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which repels itself from itself, posits itself as an inner being containing different 
moments but for which equally these moments are immediately not different - self-
consciousness. (§165) 
We have, in other words, a conscious being peering into its own mind 
where it coincides with the sensations of its autoerotic body. The objects, as 
middle term, have temporarily disappeared. But, on recognition of the 
sensations of itself, these are repelled to posit itself. The sensations get in the 
way of positing anything so they must be cast out of consciousness to get a 
clearer view of the objects upon the screen. Seeing the self as viewer of these 
objects makes way for self-consciousness. 
This scenario underscores the "castration" of Lacanian theory. The self 
must negate its sensations to make way for concepts. 
Kristeva retains the very inner phenomena that Hegel must expel to show 
how we know anything. Hegel himself has to move beyond this inner 
phenomenon because it is not only immediate experience, in his view, it is 
also immediate knowledge. But as I argued in the previous chapter, 
immediate knowledge is deeply private and, as knowledge it cannot be 
shared. The fact that it cannot be shared suggests that this knowledge is not 
based upon physical facts. The problem with this view, though, is that 
experience is not another physical fact which can be learned. Instead, 
experience can be conceived of as a non-physical fact. Thus Kristeva argues 
that experience can be expressed in language, demonstrating that experience is 
a physical fact. She claims the expression is caused by breaking the laws of 
language. We can therefore learn about others' experiences by listening to the 
semiotic content. The semiotic content adds meaning to propositions, in her 
view, through the expressive qualities of vocal tones, rhythms, pauses and 
gestures. 
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She argues that the semiotic content is repressed in virtue of the Hegelian 
sublation, through which the sensuous content is negated but preserved in 
the unconscious. This unconscious , in psychoanalytic theory , is discovered in 
analysis. The inner experiences of the subject are recovered through the 
talking cure. Their recovery depends upon a bond between the analyst and 
analysand, or the therapist and client/ patient. But whether or not this 
recovery of experience is properly attributed to Hegel is doubtful. 
From Hegel Kristeva takes elements and intersperses these in the Freudian 
and Lacanian contexts of psychoanalysis. Most significantly she presents the 
Hegelian consciousness as divided between an inner screen and inner voice. 
The screen brings the world into focus and the development of concepts to 
posit the world in language leads to the negation of experience. In her view, 
though, negated experience is unconscious and can be recovered. 
3.3 Kristeva meets Zola 
In this section I will compare Kristeva with Sellars. I have suggested that 
Kristeva can be read as suggesting that the infant responds by reading off the 
environment and responding with sounds. This is like Sellars ' vision that 
we are like thermometers when we start out learning to develop 
observational knowledge. But Kristeva's vision is clearly not Sellarsian when 
she endorses Lacan's story about the mirror phase. 
Kristeva takes experience to meaningless outside the context of other 
persons in the linguistic community. By meaningless she does not mean 
unimportant. Instead she means that experience does not have an epistemic 
value in itself, and is not a version of knowing. In Kristeva 's view, conscious 
experiences can only be known through listening to others ' stories about 
experiences. This suggests that Kristeva does not think that experience is a 
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type of private knowledge. But as I will show now, Kristeva is not fully 
committed to a non-epistemic account of experience. 
During the first months of conscious development Kristeva suggests that 
the infant reads off its environment in a similar fashion to Sellars' story.41 
Kristeva argues the infant's sensations cause gestural responses. These 
responses lead, slowly, to uttering "woof-woof" in the presence of dogs and, 
most likely, "this is green" in the presence of green things. Moreover, 
Kristeva argues that language development is an ongoing process that entails 
knowing about standards imposed and practiced by the general linguistic 
community. Like Sellars, then, Kristeva takes experience to be causally 
necessary for developing linguistic abilities. She is also in agreement that 
experiences do not carry any epistemic value and become meaningful only 
within a communitarian context. 
But there is an internal tension within Kristeva's account of infantile 
development suggesting a type of prelinguistic knowing despite her claims 
that experiences are meaningless unless contextualised in language. This 
prelinguistic knowing emerges first, in her claims about the semiotic chora; 
second, in her allegiance with Lacan regarding the mirror phase; and, finally, 
in her claims about the subsequent "thetic" division of consciousness 
between signified and signifier. I will discuss each of these in this order. 
First, there is a tension in Kristeva's notion of the semiotic chora insofar as 
she claims that it is non-conceptual because it is non-representational, on the 
one hand, but that the infant is already making certain cognitive associations, 
on the other hand. Kristeva claims that the infant develops sensory 
41 This is the "thermometer view" suggested in Sellars' account of learning observational 
knowledge. See chapter 2 of this thesis for a more detailed exposition of Sellars. 
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awareness and develops a response to that awareness in relationship with its 
mother. But she says that this is not a cognitive awareness because it is 
semiotic: not symbolic. The infant is nevertheless able to notice various 
characteristics like tone and gesture, and even colour. 
Moreover, the following citation suggests that the semiotic is an epistemic 
rather than causal foundation: 
It may be hypothesized that certain semiotic articulations are transmitted through 
the biological code or physiological "memory" and thus form the inborn bases of the 
symbolic function. Indeed, one branch of generative linguistics asserts the principle 
of innate language universals. (R: 38) 
Kristeva says that the "semiotic articulations" may even be "innate 
language universals" which, she says, are genetically programmed as 
"memory." In her view, then, some information is biologically inscribed, or 
given in a "biological code." Moreover, Kristeva claims that this biologically 
inscribed information forms "the inborn bases of the symbolic function." 
This "biological code" or "memory" suggests a version of sense-data 
indicating that sensations are a type of unmediated knowledge. She thus 
subscribes to "the myth of the given" in her conception of the semiotic chora, 
making prelinguistic consciousness a "meaningless" version of knowing.42 
Suggesting that the chora is both meaningless and a type of knowing is a 
curious contradiction. The chora is meaningless, in Kristeva's view, because 
meaning is always socially sanctioned, or normative. She thus suggests that 
conscious awareness is a non-normative type of knowing because it is 
meaningless. But, as I argued in chapter two, such non-normative knowing 
42The author intended to develop the argument for the sense data analogy. - eds 
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amounts to a private knowledge claim, suggesting in turn the possibility that 
infants are zombies. 
Kristeva's conception of the semiotic chora is supposed to demonstrate 
that, contra Lacan, the speaking subject is not a psycho-zombie. But, given 
that the semiotic chora is meaningless, or non-normative knowledge she 
does not succeed to explain how we know that we have experiences. As a 
type of prelinguistic knowing, experiences are non-physical facts. So long as 
experiences are non-physical, they are causally ihefficacious. Instead of 
overturning the Lacanian psycho-zombie, Kristeva runs the risk of making 
possible the existence of philosophical zombies. She therefore makes possible 
the existence of Zola the pregnant zombie, which is a major hurdle for 
Kristeva, given that her theory sets out to show that mothers have epistemic 
authority. 
Second, being in league with Lacan about the minor stage suggests aHuther 
instance of pre-linguistic knowing. The infant must recognize the image to 
be an image of itself, to formulate the first concept and to establish the 
opposing structures signifier and signified. The infant thus establishes a 
concept of itself as a self before it has any linguistic concepts. But, unless there 
is the prelinguistic knowing mentioned in the above citation by Kristeva viz 
some sort of coding, it is impossible to imagine how the infant could 
recognize anything as the sort of thing that it is - least of all itself. 
Finally, Kristeva's conception of the infant aged between six and eighteen 
months developing a signified and signifier in consciousness is suspicious. It 
occurs to me that she is confusing the infant with a Sellarsian vision of 
mature consciousness. Sellars does not suppose that consciousness is 
structured like a language: such a vision is peculiarly Lacanian. But Sellars 
vision of mature consciousness suggests we have two distinct types of inner 
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awareness: inner speech and impressions. Kristeva apparently calls inner 
speech "signifier" and impressions "signified." 
In Sellars' v_iew inner speech and impressions are two versions of inner 
awareness that exist in competent language users. These "speaking subjects" 
are not only good at making accurate observational reports; they also grasp 
the standards and practices of their community, can make accurate 
associations between the behaviour of others and various types of emotional 
states. These are the necessary conditions that enable anyone to introspect, in 
Sellars' view, and to make claims about their own inner episodes. The 
epistemic foundation, in Sellars' view, is language. Knowing about inner 
episodes, whether they be inner speech or impressions, is a matter of positing 
these as theoretical entities. This is to say that we cannot know about inner 
episodes unless we have the necessary theoretical concepts with which to 
grasp such episodes as the types of awareness that they are. 
For example, after observing anger, sadness, joy, frustration, pain and so on 
in others, given that we have learned the linguistic norms governing the 
concepts, we can learn to observe these states in ourselves. Inner speech is a 
sort of talking to oneself and the impression is our observed state. Moreover, 
we can have impressions of things in the world, and of our own 
behaviourally justified states so Kristeva's distinction between inner 
awareness and perceptions of the world is misleading. Her account of inner 
awareness as distinct from perceptions of the world entails the possibility of 
Zola the pregnant zombie, as I shall now explain. 
iv Kristeva on motherhood: knowing about the inner screen. 
In "Motherhood according to Giovanni Bellini," Kristeva refers to a 
"preconscious screen" that is activated during maternity. She refers to an 
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inner screen of experience: the semiotic chora that was repressed when the 
mother was an infant learning to speak. But, in Kristeva's view, maternity 
enables the speaking subject to access the consciousness associated with her 
experience of her own mother in infancy. This is the experience repressed by 
the Lacanian psycho-zombie for everyone except mothers. But Kristeva's idea 
that this awareness is played on an inner screen leads to the possibility of a 
private knowledge claim. 
She refers to maternity as a "biosocial program" that picks up messages 
from "an empty foundation, as a-subjective lining of our exchanges as 
rational beings." (MGB: 305) The biosocial program suggests that experience 
is coded, as shown earlier. The empty foundation suggests that the coding is 
nevertheless meaningless, or non-normative knowledge as a basis for 
developing linguistic concepts. Moreover, Kristeva says the experience of 
maternity - jouissancc - is "mute." (MGB: 305) This suggests that we cannot 
develop concepts grounded in language about the meaningless knowledge of 
the maternal biosocial program. In short, Kristeva makes a private 
knowledge claim. 
Kristeva argues that we can know about the experiences of maternity 
through the expression of experience in poetic language. In another essay on 
maternity, "Stabat Mater," Kristeva presents a poetic account of her own 
maternal experiences. 
Stabat Mater opens like any other essay written by Kristeva, with some 
introductory remarks about her topic - in this case maternity. The 
introduction is, more or less, a typical example of linguistic discourse within 
the so-called symbolic. But, reading on, the body of text on the page becomes 
split into two columns and the typical academic discourse continues on only 
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the right side of the page.43 On the left side of the page - which is the side of 
the page we usually look to first when reading in English or French - we read 
the following: 
FLASH - instant of time or of dream without time; inordinately swollen atoms of a 
bond, a vision, a shiver, a yet formless, unnameable embryo... Words that are 
always too distant, too abstract for this underground swarming of seconds, folding in 
unimaginable spaces. {1983: 1997: 309) 
Kristeva's poetic prose gives us a sense of pregnancy with words such as 
"flash," "swollen" and "shiver." Her poetic language also conveys an idea 
that these sensations occur outside time and outside language. For Kristeva, 
the semiotic chora is established prior to language (1997: 35) and, importantly, 
she claims that language provides a temporal space in which the chora can 
erupt as heterogeneous to, but part of language. (1980:101. Kristeva's style, 
then, presents a.n example of this semiotic function of la.ngua.ge which is 
heterogeneous to, but coextensive with the symbolic text of her essay. 
But the poetic language is not going to help her when it comes to showing 
that the pregnant woman is not Zola the philosophical zombie. Zola believes 
that she experiences flashes and shivers as her pregnant belly swells to 
accommodate a foetus. But, being a zombie, Zola does not have any 
experiences. 
Knowing about experiences in maternity is not a matter of having access 
to the inner screen of infantile experience. Knowing about experiences in 
maternity is, instead, a matter of making observations like any other. But 
43 This varies to some extent depending upon which edition we are reading. Kelly Oliver's 
(1996) version is more subtle that Toril Moi's. The latter version uses bold type for the 
experiential left hand side whereas Oliver's version uses plain type on both sides. 
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Kristeva does give us insight into the use of poetic language to not only 
describe feelings, but also to evoke these in others. The poetic language she 
uses to describe pregnancy, childbirth and maternity are evocative. They are 
designed to produce a visceral affect. 
Above all, Kristeva claims that maternity is a painful experience. She says 
"one does not give birth in pain, one gives birth to pain: the child represents 
it and henceforth it settles in, it is continuous." (PK: 313) She says that 
mothers can ignore the pain "teach courses, run errands, tidy up the house, 
think about objects, subjects." (PK: 313) But, in her view, thinking about 
objects or subjects makes us shut out our inner life to become zombie-like. 
She aims to show that experience is not cut off from consciousness as Hegel 
and Lacan would have it. In 1993 she republishes Women's Time, an essay in 
which she argues that maternal experience demonstrates the fallibility of such 
theories. She asks what lies behind the "desire to be a mother." (OMS: 219) 
Unable to answer this question, feminist ideology opens the door to a 
return of religion, which may serve to pacify anxiety, suffering and maternal 
expectations. Although we can only offer a partial adherence to Freud's belief 
that the desire to have a child is the desire to have a penis, and is thus a 
replacement for phallic and symbolic power, we must still pay close attention 
to what today's women have· to say about this experience. Pregnancy is a 
dramatic ordeal: a splitting of the body, the division and coexistence of self 
and other, of nature and awareness, of physiology and speech. (219) 
In her view, then, pregnancy is a model for showing that human 
consciousness is not clearly divided between subject and object, self and 
world. The dichotomies inherited from Hegel are not substantiated in 
pregnancy, especially when that domain places women outside the laws of 
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culture, giving them a substituted authority in the silent production of new 
life. She says 
Pregnancy is a sort of institutionalised, socialised and natural psychosis. The 
arrival on the child, on the other hand, guides the mother through a labyrinth of a 
rare experience: the love for another person, as opposed to love for herself, for a 
mirror image, or especially for another person with which the "I" becomes merged 
(through amorous or sexual passion). It is rather a slow, difficult, and delightful 
process of becoming attentive, tender, and self-effacing. If maternity is to be guilt-
free, this journey needs to be undertaken without masochism and without 
annihilating one's affective, intellectual and professional personality either. In 
this way, maternity becomes a true creative act, something that we have not yet 
been able to imagine. (219-220) 
The creative dimensions of maternity, and parenting in general cannot be 
understated. Even though Kristeva stands by a sexual distinction in her 
decisive use of the term "mother" she is gesturing towards a fully human 
potential. She says "the dichotomy between man and women as an 
opposition of two rival entities is a problem for metaphysics." The problem is 
that one term in the dichotomous vision of consciousness is cast out, expelled 
from the ordering of a rational identity. Experience is too chaotic to find its 
place in the ordered world of reason. Experience is thus repressed, or silenced 
as "feminine." That which cannot be accepted as part of civilised culture is 
projected onto identities who are scapegoated as "other." The mother is one 
of these "others." 
The idea that experience is outside the order of language, and can neither 
be expressed nor spoken, is a product of this scapegoating process. Authority 
is given to those who claim to have risen above the swamp of experience, 
whilst those who have experiences are not authoritative. The mistake is to 
think they are not authoritative because they cannot know and communicate 
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their experiences. Kristeva goes some way to show that this view is a 
mistake. 
conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown that psychoanalysis associates inner 
experiences with an infantile sexuality. These experiences are understood to 
be an immature version of consciousness which must be cut off and replaced 
with language. Kristeva does not contest the view that experiences are 
immature in her theory of the chora. She nevertheless contests the idea that 
early childhood is a purely natural consciousness which must become purely 
social. Her vision of maternal authority indicates that the child's experiences 
are socialised from the beginning of life. 
Kristeva's theory of the thetic phase is an attempt to explain her hypothesis 
that experiences can be expressed in language. The theory claims that inner 
experiences are not fully sublated and that the remaining negativity is 
expressed by breaking the rules of language. But, I have argued, Kristeva fails 
to show that we have experiences - just in case we are zombies - because she 
falls back on the conception of an inner screen and homunculus. This 
effectively gives us a private inner space which is not one that easily 
explained as physical. 
I have presented two empirical accounts of infant development to show 
that Kristeva's theory about conscious development is speculative and 
unproven. Gopnik argues that we do not have psychological experience as 
such until we develop a theory of other's psychological experience. 
Moreover, Karmiloff-Smith cites research that shows that infants recognise 
human faces and voices within hours of life. Her suggestion that certain 
conscious abilities are innate is similar to Kristeva's but she does not suggest 
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that the infant has awareness of its own awareness. This, at the end of the 
day, is the fundamental flaw in Kristeva's work. Being able to recognise the 
mothers face and respond to it is one thing, being aware of this awareness is 
another. Kristeva takes the second view, awareness of awareness. But having 
awareness of psychological experience requires a more developed theory of 
mind than is possible at the stages in which she argues the chora develops. 
Kristeva is correct to say that mothers have experiences of which they are 
aware and about which they know. Her claim that poetic language is 
evocative serves to show this is the case. She is correct to give mothers 
epistemic authority, by showing that experiences can be described and 
expressed in language. This is the most productive aspect of her work even 
though the explanation as to how this is possible does not succeed to show 




Julia Kristeva claims that the physical differences between the sexes are not 
also psychological differences. She argues instead that consciousness is 
divided, in every human, between language and inner experiences. Kristeva 
argues that language is based in conventions and prescriptive norms, and that 
experiences are repressed because normative standards and practices deem 
these unproductive for social progress. She draws the psychoanalytic 
association between experience, desire and femininity to show that the 
mother's experiences are not situated in some primordial beyond - outside 
language and conventions. She argues that maternal experiences are 
expressed in non-conventional texts in order to show that experiences are 
part of social life. 
Nancy Hartsock, on the other hand, claims that sexual difference is not 
only physical, but also psychological difference. She argues that women are 
more adept at practical thinking, and at building interpersonal relationships 
whereas men's fundamental individualism prepares them well for 
inferential knowledge. Hartsock adds that men are unable to relate well with 
others and often become violent and abusive towards women and other men. 
Like Kristeva, Hartsock associates normative social conventions with 
masculinity, but unlike Kristeva Hartsock assumes some kind of universal 
essence in the male psyche. Hartsock's claims about motherhood and 
femininity also presuppose a universal essence in the female psyche which is 
opposed to and distinct from men. The essentialism is taken by Hartsock as 
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an "empirical foundation" in her proposal of a "feminist standpoint 
epistemology." 
Hartsock draws upon Marxian theory to claim that women have an 
epistemic privilege. She argues that women's knowledge is "materialist," and 
thus more authentic than men's "dualist" knowledge. But her claims of 
materialism and dualism are not an inquiry into human nature and the 
relationship between self and world, being instead an epistemological 
dualism between appearance and reality. Hartsock claims that, from a 
Marxian standpoint, the concrete experiences which characterize women's 
knowledge make that knowledge more authentic. Men's dualist knowledge, 
she argues, is based in normative agreement about exchange values. So, in 
Hartsock's view, men's knowledge is based in appearance and women have 
the opportunity to see things as they really are. 
Hartsock a.rgues thnt the subordinntion of women to men in the hetero~ 
sexual division of labour gives women a special point of view on social 
relations. The epistemic privilege of women exposes the normative values of 
a heterosexual division of labour as both false and perverse. Women's 
knowledge is more attuned to others because the distinction between self and 
other is not well defined for females. Or, to put it in Hegel's terms, womert 
have intuitive knowledge in which they do not properly identify as particular 
individuals. Either way, this conception of femininity focuses women 
towards others, she argues, rather than themselves, giving them a universal 
perspective on lived reality. What this consciousness lacks, however, is the 
ability to develop complex concepts about the world and their place within it. 
Moreover, this universal consciousness lacks the capacity to explain 
differences between women. 
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The key theorists which inform Hartsock's vision of a specifically feminist 
materialism are Karl Marx and Nancy Chodorow. Marx gives Hartsock's 
theory the framework for epistemic privilege. r ·wm dwell more on Marxian 
theory in chapter five, where I examine Hartsock's vision of masculine 
knowledge. Here I am most concerned with how feminine knowledge is 
cashed out. Hartsock claims that Chodorow provides an "empirical 
foundation" for understanding gender differences as pre-conceptual 
knowledge of themselves in relation to the world. Hartsock accepts 
Chodorow's claim for epistemological differences between the sexes as 
supporting the development of a specifically "feminist" standpoint. The 
standpoint enables women to see that they are oppressed by men and to work 
together to remove male bias from social institutions. Most particularly, 
Hartsock sees that women are oppressed as mothers in the sexual division of 
labour, so the family is a good starting point for change. 
The work of Hartsock and Chodorow might appear outdated. Even though 
Chodorow has contributed immensely to our understanding of gender, and to 
feminist ethics there are also problems with Chodorow's theory which are 
widely addressed.44 The same could be said about Hartsock's theory, even 
though standpoint theories are taken up to challenge sexual bias in scientific 
research.45 Specifically, standpoint theories argue for a version of epistemic 
44 See for instance, See Gilligan (1986). Gilligan's "ethics of care" takes Chodorow's claims 
about gender as a premise for feminist ethics. But Elizabeth Spelman (1988) is among those who 
are critical of the problem of making female experience universal from the perspective of women 
with a white middle class background. For criticism see also Young (1990). 
45 See Donna Haraway (1991) and Sandra Harding (1993). 
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privilege from which feminists can claim epistemic authority.46 I have 
already shown, in chapter two, that epistemic privilege does not confer 
authority. 
In section one I review Hartsock' s claims about the sexual division of 
labour in which maternal work is undervalued. She argues further that 
female experiences, like pregnancy, give women special knowledge. She 
claims that these insights support Chodorow's theory of femininity. In 
section two I will present Hartsock's revision of standpoint theory before 
turning, in section three, to Elizabeth Spelman's critique of Chodorow. 
Spelman shows that universal claims about sexism fail to address differences 
between women, especially those arising in racist or classist contexts. 
Spelman draws our attention to the fact that normative values must be 
contextualized accordingly. Spelman's comments bring to light the role of 
normativity in developing knowledge. This, I argue, supports Sellars' vision 
of epistemic authority. Finally I show that Hegel's vision of intuitive 
knowledge is similar to Hartsock's claims about feminine knowledge. 
46 Janack (1997). Janack warns that arguing for epistemic privilege is not the way to gain 
epistemic authority. "Rather than trying to reconstruct the concept of an epistemically 
advantageous standpoint, those of us who believe the aims of a feminist standpoint theory are 
valuable need to concentrate on demystifying the process by which epistemic authority is 
actually conferred. That means unmasking the Enlightenment claim that epistemic authority 
derives from an epistemically privileged standpoint or position rather than buying into it." 
(1997:135) 
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i. the sexual division of labour 
Nearly two decades have passed since Hartsock published her essay about 
the feminist standpoint. In this time, the sexual division of labour has 
changed to some extent. More men participating in child rearing, for 
instance. Some credit for the change can be offered to Hartsock, Chodorow 
and others who hold similar positions, as feminists. But the economic 
rewards for those who rear children remain substandard as capitalism is 
driving the global economy. Hartsock blames men for capitalism and for 
running gender biased institutions which are oppressive to women. Hartsock 
locates the nuclear family as the foundation of gender bias, claiming that 
"compulsory heterosexuality"47 structures society so that men participate in 
public life and women look after things at home. The fact that women bear 
children is taken as grounds for their extra responsibilities in child rearing. 
Men, ut lcust in her culture and at the time of writing the essay, were almost 
universally not responsible for caring for the kids. Child rearing is not 
necessarily women's work, in the sense that child bearing is necessarily 
women's work. So the very idea that women ought to raise children is a 
"societal choice" in Hartsock's view. 
Still, having no say in public life indicates that men make this choice and 
impose it upon women. This normative vision of sexual difference gives rise 
to opposing work practices whereby males have roles in powerful institutions 
which define social structures whilst women toil at home. Hartsock does not 
deny that women also participate in paid work outside the home, but notes 
47 See Adriennne Rich's "Compulsory Heterosexuality and the Lesbian Continuum" in Rich 
(1986) for a detailed discussion of the heterosexual structure of Western societies. Judith Butler 
(1990) also critically assesses "compulsory heterosexuality". 
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that even if that is the case, women end up working a double day: they work 
both outside the home and come home to more work while their male 
partners take time out. In short, Hartsock argues that women are oppressed 
in the sexual division of labour because their work is a "labour of love." 
Hartsock turns to Marx in the hope of finding a strategy to liberate women. 
She complains that the Marxian account of a division of labour does not 
adequately address the sexual division of labour. She says that even Marx 
wonders how the household economy would run if women joined the 
labour force. Who would care for the children, cook, mend, wash clothes, 
clean the house, and so on? But, perhaps not surprisingly, Marx does not see 
that women's work is oppressive. The influence of Hegel on Marx cannot be 
understated. Hegel, of course, thinks that women are unable to do anything 
but tend to others from birth to death. 
Arguing that women do most of the domestic work, Hartsock draws a 
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parallel between women's work and the manual labour of workers in the 
public sphere. She says that maternal work, like manual labour, "involves a 
unification of mind and body for the purpose of transforming natural 
substances into socially defined goods." (223) She claims that Marx takes the 
unification of mind and body to be an essential feature of the epistemic 
privilege he ascribes to workers. She sets out to show that the burden of 
women's work also involves this unification of mind and body. But, given 
that women are not only involved in production, but also reproduction of 
the species, Hartsock claims that the unification of mind and body will be 
more extreme than it is for those who produce commodities. The repetitious 
nature of work also contributes to unification of mind and body, so Hartsock 
claims repetition has a special place in women's work. (223) The sensuous 
nature of women's work is emphasised by Hartsock because of Marx's view 
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that sensuous activity leads to a materialist standpoint. The idea is that the 
materialism is dialectical, so that the mind and body are integrated in a 
system of equal value. Hartsock is rallying against the type of epistemic 
privilege attributed to purely mental labour as a consequence of Cartesian 
dualism. She says 
the vantage point available to women on the basis of their contribution to 
subsistence represents an intensification and deepening of the materialist world 
view and consciousness available to the producers of commodities in capitalism, an 
intensification of class consciousness. (224) 
Hartsock argues that women's contribution to subsistence, repetitive 
though it is, gives even "non-working-class women" access to the dialectical 
consciousness of the standpoint. The dialectical consciousness takes the focus 
back onto the sensuous experiences of the body, valuing the experiences as 
important for their own sake rather than as important just in terms of what is 
produced. The capitalist system values labour quantitatively, in terms of how 
much is produced and how much money can be made. But the Marxian 
alternative suggests the labour has its own intrinsic value, which ought not 
to be alienated from the labouring body. Labouring for subsistence, producing 
things for one's own use and cherishing the effort going into the labour is 
taken to be a materialist alternative to the abstract values of the capitalist 
labour market. The epistemic standpoint comes through focusing on the 
labouring body and claiming the products for oneself, rather than focusing on 
exchange values. 
Hartsock says producing children, over and above working for subsistence, 
"is far more complex than the instrumental working with others to 
transform objects." Maternal work entails a unity with nature; a special bond 
with other mothers; and a unity of mind and body which men cannot 
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comprehend, in Hartsock's view. Her point is that domestic work and child 
rearing is labour intensive work in which mothers are fully involved in the 
processes of their labour rather than on productive outcomes. Subsistence 
comprises the cooking and general maintenance of domestic work. So 
Hartsock takes it that mothers are even better suited to the materialist 
knowledge of sensuous labour than the workers described by Marx. 
But mothering work is not all that gives women the opportunity to value 
their work for its own sake - which is what they have to do anyway. Mothers 
are not waged, even if they are supported financially and are thus dependent 
on their spouses. So claiming that mothering work is manual labour is really 
only repeating what Marx says about women anyway. But Hartsock adds 
several other threads to her argument. First she claims that the female body 
has some special features which also suggest that they have some version of 
embodied knowledge. The female body makes women more attuned to 
relationships with others, she says, and the experiences of" [m]enstruation, 
coitus, pregnancy, lactation - all represent challenges to bodily boundaries." 
She is not particularly clear about how these bodily boundary challenges are 
epistemologically significant, citing Adrienne Rich's claims about self and 
other blurring in pregnancy.48 (225) The experience of living in a female body 
is another important reason for women's special knowledge, in Hartsock's 
view. The lack of clarity between self and other in the experiences of 
pregnancy supports Hartsock's turn to Chodorow49, who argues that feminine 
knowledge is more relational than masculine knowledge. 
48 See chapter two for my discussion of pregnancy and the indistinct self/ other. 
49 Hartsock also cites Jane Flax's contribution to the "object-relations" theory of gender. 
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The specific class of psychoanalysis to which Chodorow subscribes is called 
"object relations" theory.so Object relations theory presents a pre-oedipal 
account of gender difference. According to this theory, girls take longer to 
separate from their mothers than boys. Chodorow claims this is partly 
explained by the fact that mothers push their sons away earlier than their 
daughters. As a result, she argues girls take longer to get a sense of 
themselves as separate individuals. Both mothers and daughters are bound 
up in a sense of oneness, according to Hartsock's version of the theory. (226) 
Hartsock says that the oedipal crisis is more cleanly resolved for boys than 
for girls, who "retain both parents as love objects." (226) 
The nature of the crisis itself differs by sex: the boy's love for the mother is an 
extension of mother-infant unity and thus essentially threatening to his ego and 
independence. Male ego-formation necessarily requires repressing this first relation 
and negating the mother. (226) 
The incest taboo, discussed in the previous chapter, makes the boy feel 
especially guilty. He must repress any desire for the mother and identify with 
his father. But recognition of his difference from her requires that he 
"negates" her. Boys "must identify with an abstract, cultural stereotype and 
learn abstract behaviours not attached to a well-known person. Masculinity is 
idealized by boys ... " (226) Assuming the father is employed in the work-force, 
away from home, the boy therefore develops a very abstracted vision of him. 
He must learn about an absent figure in order to understand his own place in 
the social order. 
Girls, on the other hand, ease their way out of the maternal bond because 
they are constantly in her presence. Assuming the mother is not also engaged 
50 See her (1978) and (1994). 
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in paid work outside the home, the girls "can identify with a concrete 
example present in daily life." {226) As Hartsock puts it: 
Chodorow concludes that girls' gradual emergence from the oedipal period takes 
place in such a way that empathy is built into their primary definition of self, and 
they have a variety of capacities for experiencing another's needs or feelings as 
their own. Put another way girls, because of female parenting, are less 
differentiated from others than boys, more continuous with and related to the 
external object world. (226) 
According to Chodorow, then, girls have an advantage insofar as they 
learn by experience, rather than having to use abstract concepts to identify 
with an absent role model. The girl must identify with the mother, on the 
basis that they are the same sex, and through this identification, the girl learns 
her role as a would-be mother-housekeeper-cook-etc. Moreover, the presence 
of the mother gives girls a special ability to develop empathy. Hartsock puts it 
like this: 
Girls learn roles from watching their mothers; boys must learn roles from rules 
which structure the life of an absent male figure. Girls can identify with a concrete 
example present in daily life; boys must identify with an abstract set of maxims 
only occasionally present in the form of the father. Thus, not only do girls learn 
roles with more interpersonal and relational skills, but the process of role learning 
itself is embodied in the concrete relation with the mother. The male in contrast, 
must identify with an abstract, cultural stereotype and learn abstract behaviours 
not attached to a well-known person. Masculinity is idealized by boys whereas 
femininity is concrete for girls. (226) 
Girls and boys have different ways of constructing an identity, based on the 
absence or presence of the same sex parent, in Hartsock's view. This amounts 
to two fundamentally different modes of knowing. Girls come to know their 
roles through "watching" while boys come to know theirs by learning "rules" 
and "maxims." Girls learn through interpersonal relations, in contact with 
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others; whereas boys learns by thinking about someone who is absent. The 
mother, in this scenario is ever present and well-known to the children, but 
the boy rejects her through the oedipal complex of psychoanalytic theory. The 
father, on the other hand, is seldom present in the home and thus not well-
known. 
The empirical truth about the presence and absence of children to the 
parents notwithstanding, the real issue here is that there are two 
fundamentally different ways of learning. On one hand there is learning by 
experience through concrete relationships and by just being present. This, 
according to Hartsock, is how girls learn. On the other hand, there is learning 
by abstract maxims, and by rules. This is how boys learn, in her view. These 
different modes of learning, and thus of knowing, are a crucial of Hartsock's 
standpoint epistemology. She claims that each sex acquires a different type of 
knowledge.51 
My concern is to show that Hartsock's feminist epistemology depends 
upon there being different sorts of knowing. Feminist knowledge, as she puts 
it, is grounded in experience through identifying with a female parent and 
learning to be a female through osmosis. Hartsock does not make explicit 
51 Implicit in this argument is the idea that girls and boys know what sex they are before they 
know anything else. For, how else would the girl be able to identify with the mother; or the boy 
be able to reject the mother? Drawing from psychoanalysis, this theory centres around the idea 
that the mother and child are engaged in an "incestuous" relationship. The boy needs to notice 
that he has a penis and that the mother does not. He then must think that the mother is 
castrated and, out of fear that he too will be castrated by the father who wants her for his love 
object, the boy must turn to the father to learn language. The girl on the other hand notices that 
she is already castrated, in which case there is no great rush to move out of the maternal dyad. 
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that the female will not learn anything through experience without also 
having language. But it is crucial to note that her sexual division of labour 
depends on the idea that females and males have fundamentally opposed 
ways of learning: by concrete experience or by abstract maxims. Female 
knowledge is based in sensuous experience and male knowledge is abstract, 
which is precisely what Hegel says. I will turn to Hegel later. First I will set 
out Hartsock's claims for a feminist standpoint. 
ii Hartsock's vision of a standpoint 
Hartsock offers this account of the relevance of standpoint knowledge to 
"allow for a much more profound critique of phallocratic ideologies and 
institutions than has yet been achieved." {221) Relying on Marx's analysis of 
the dehumanisation of the worker in the economy of exchange, Hartsock 
claims that subsistence is devalued. The valuation of subsistence is 
nevertheless normative rather than merely descriptive, suggesting it is a good 
place to start the investigation. Women, she argues, contribute more to 
subsistence than men allowing them a potential materialist epistemology. 
This materialist epistemology is supposed to help women see how capitalist 
values are false and to find ways to challenge these values. Hartsock argues 
that, in the sexual division of labour, the woman is closer to "material 
necessity". Both women and men, she argues, are privy to the real human 
requirements necessarily observed in subsistence. But women's maternal 
duties makes their knowledge more materialist than men's knowledge 
precisely because women's work consumes their whole life. Women are 
responsible for the subsistence of the species. Hence, she argues, women's 
lives are more concerned with quality than quantity. If women were to focus 
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on the qualitative, rather than quantitative, aspects of reproduction, Hartsock 
claims that they would see things as they really are. 
Hartsock says that a standpoint is not just a position, or perspective of one 
group. Instead, a standpoint requires an engagement, or interaction between 
two groups. In Marxian theory, the groups are divided by class. There are the 
members of the bourgeois who own the capital; and there are the members of 
the proletariat who perform manual labour. Each class depends upon the 
other: the bourgeois have the capital and the proletariat have the means of 
production. But each is complicit with a system within which the bourgeois 
benefit more than the proletariat. 
Hartsock begins her discussion of a standpoint with five Marxian criteria. 
First, material life, or class position, both structures and limits understanding. 
We adopt the belief system of the class into which we are born. That belief 
system is nevertheless limited by virtue of its class specificity. Moreover, each 
class position is epistemologically distinct from every other class position. So, 
those who are born into a working class family will develop the belief system 
of that class. The belief system of the working class is ingrained with various 
normative standards and practices which differ from those of the capitalist 
class. The belief systems of the respective groups are limited accordingly so 
that they have differing normative perspectives. This suggests that there are 
some things about being a member of the proletariat that the bourgeois 
cannot understand. And vice versa. 
Second, with respect to a standpoint, Hartsock claims that 
[i]f material life is structured in fundamentally opposing ways for two different 
groups, one can expect that the vision of each will represent an inversion of the 
other, and in systems of domination the vision available to the rulers will be both 
partial and perverse (218). 
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To understand such a claim, we need to think of a fundamental 
opposition. In her view, this opposition exists between genders. As we have 
already seen, she conceives of gender as Chodorow does, whereby girls lack 
the definitive sense of self that boys have. The normative standards learned 
by girls encourages them to learn by experience and to consider other people. 
Girls do not have such a well defined sense of themselves as selves because 
they experience themselves in relation to their mothers. The distinction 
between self and other, or self and mother is less clear for girls than for boys. 
Chodorow argues that the mother's identification with the same sex child is 
reciprocated by the girl. Boys, on the other hand, see themselves as 
fundamentally different from their mothers, partly because their mothers 
treat them differently. Boys, in this story, develop a much clearer sense of 
difference between self and other, or self and mother. But identifying with 
the same sex parent is more difficult for boys, in this story, because fathers are 
largely absent from the home and rarely if ever contribute to child caring 
practices. The boy has to develop inferential, or "abstract" knowledge, so that 
he can imagine the public domain in which his future will develop. The 
standard for boys is quite the opposite: they learn to put themselves first so 
that experience is not important to them. 52 
In Hartsock's view, boys lack the normative resources to learn by 
experiences, on this view, and a sense of superiority is built into their ability 
to abstract themselves from the daily grind. How this sense of superiority is 
implicit in the dominant groups' consciousness will be addressed in the next 
section. But the fact that members of the dominant group are unable to focus 
52 See Doane, J. and Hodges, D. (1992). They argue that Winnicott's account of "good enough" 
mothering assumes the above mentioned sexual division of labour which is taken up by Chodorow. 
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on experiences and interpersonal relationships is taken to render their 
standpoint partial and perverse. I will have much more to say about the 
partiality and perversity of masculinity, as Hartsock puts it, in the following 
chapter. 
Third, Hartsock argues, the dominant group structures "material relations 
in which all parties are forced to participate." The ruling group forces 
everyone to work according to their standards. But the very fact that the 
other group participate by abiding by standards set by the ruling group 
suggests that the standards are not simply wrong. The normative standards 
and practices which inform institutions are accepted by everyone and "cannot 
be dismissed as simply false." (218) The family is one of these institutions, so 
family structure must have something going for it. That oppression exists 
means, for Hartsock, that empirically real relations between men and women 
cannot simply be deemed 11u11-exisLe11L, even Lhuugh Lhe uelails uf Ll1ese 
relations really are contingent. The oppressed group is complicit within the 
overall dynamic relations of domination and subordination. 
This leads to Hartsock's fourth point with respect to a standpoint. The 
oppressed group can gain a broader insight into the overall structure to 
achieve a more accurate vision of social relations. The nature of women's 
work brings them closer to nature and more in contact with reality so, even 
though they are blinded by normative discourse, they have the opportunity to 
see that the standards and practices do not reflect the way things really are. 
Women have grown accustomed to working under conditions which do 
not ultimately suit them. In Hartsock's view, seeing the false standards 
which inform these conditions entails struggle. The dominant men will not 
be keen to change standards which ultimately favour themselves as men 
over women, so it will not be easy to change the standards. Hartsock claims 
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that research, investigation and education are necessary to change the 
situation. (218) 
A fifth and final characteristic of the knowledge gained from the 
standpoint "exposes the real relations among human beings as inhuman, 
points beyond the present and carries a historically libratory role." (218) The 
enlightened women's research and the education of women based in this 
research enables more women to see that women's work is unjust and that 
their relationship with men is inhuman. In other words, this process 
prepares feminists for the work to be undertaken towards making right an 
unjust situation. 
Hartsock raises the idea of a "dual vision" in which both sides of the 
dichotomy can be seen. This would entail seeing things from a perspective 
which integrates experience into abstract knowledge. The fact that women 
have foul Lu leant Llie uurmalive slamlan.ls sel uy meu gives Lltern auvaulage 
of having this dual perspective. Men's vision, on the other hand, is taken to 
be more restricted, disposing of the importance of having experiences. Their 
vision is partial because men focus on abstract values rather than sensuous 
processes. I will explain this in more detail in chapter five. For now, it is 
important to get a handle on Hartsock's vision of feminine knowledge. 
She argues that the complete vision is structured through "both social 
relations and relations to the world of nature." {219) Women must have a 
grasp of the concepts which inform social relations whilst also having their 
special place within those relations which bring them closer to nature. She 
characterises women's knowledge as a dialectical integration of "human and 
natural worlds, mind and body, ideal and material, and the cooperation of self 
and other (community)." (220) Hartsock argues that the feminist standpoint 
gives women the potential to see beyond the normative structures in which 
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they are situated as subordinate. In particular, she is interested in the 
standards by which only the production of goods and knowledge is valued in 
the system of exchange, so that women's reproductive work is taken for 
granted. 
Returning to the characteristics of knowledge determined by standpoint, 
Hartsock identifies a series of "opposed and hierarchical dualities" in which 
knowledge (mind, ideas, society and self-interest) is raised in value over the 
above mentioned terms they oppose in experience (body, material, nature and 
community). She recommends a dialectical integration of these terms rather 
than the duality in which terms associated with experience are given 
secondary status. Hartsock makes it clear that women are not valued as 
subjects in their own right who depend upon properly objective knowledge to 
perform their domestic and parenting labour. 
Hartsock unlers lhe lwu ways uf seeiug iu leuus uf "levels of reality." (210) 
In her analysis, men are biased towards the way things appear, engaging with 
reality through merely normative structures, whereas women are closer to 
seeing things as they are. She cites Marx to support her claim that "reality 
itself consists of 'sensuous human activity, practice."' (218) Hartsock says that 
the real point of life and work is the continuation of the species. Production 
thus stands up as more important than exchange. The perversity of class 
hierarchy is marked in the emphasis on exchange and abstract values of 
commodities. The duality of appearance and reality to which Hartsock refers 
is a duality between a normative, or prescriptive view of society and a 
descriptive view based on experience of reality. Normativity tells us how we 
ought to see things whilst the descriptive vision tells us how things are. The 
normative bias is based upon the prejudices of men who control the social 
institutions of society. Observations of experience outside these normative 
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constraints apparently can show us how things are. So, Hartsock motivates a 
dichotomy between appearance/reality to claim that social conventions are 
only normative and thus based in appearances whereas careful descriptions of 
subsistence are more authentic. Note for now, however, that the distinction 
between appearance and reality, as normative versus descriptive knowledge 
is misleading us into thinking that anything can be described without appeal 
to normativity. I will explain in more detail later. 
The second aspect of Hartsock's standpoint, in which we see the two groups 
as inversions of each other, brings to light the partiality of the dominant 
group. Normative knowledge endorses relations of domination and 
subordination to which even women are blinded. Careful observation and 
description of experiences thus carries the potential to see things as they really 
are: "partial and perverse." 
The third criterion states that lhe facl lhal 1.Jul11 varlies are cumvlidl shuws 
that normativity is not simply false. But normativity is nevertheless partial, 
because men benefit and women do not when it comes to the sexual division 
of labour. It may well be the case that many women do rear children, and that 
some feel that their place is in the home, but their understanding of 
maternity is informed by knowledge that describes how things work 
according to curre!lt prescriptions. The fact that some women believe this is 
really how things ought to be shows how perverse normativity can be. 
Understanding inequality requires knowledge that challenges normativity. 
But how can we tell when something is not merely descriptive, but is also 
fundamentally prescriptive? So, as the fourth criterion states, it will not be 
easy to investigate without struggle. The subordinate group already has access 
to knowledge but the knowledge they have is insufficient. More research and 
education is required. Once developed, the standpoint meets criterion 
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number five by admitting progress beyond the relations of subordination and 
domination. 
One cannot outright dismiss Hartsock's ideal society, in which quality is 
more important than quantity and in which maternal work carries the value 
now given to high ranking executives. Nailing normativity as a cause of 
women's oppression is a good start. But there are some rather large problems 
with the theory. The first I will deal with drives to the heart of gender claims, 
in particular those Hartsock takes from Chodorow. In the last decade or so 
gender is seen to be in trouble.53 The category "women" is now thought to be 
too general and universal to deal the power relations it sets out to explain. To 
show why it is no longer appropriate to make claims on behalf of all women, 
I shall turn to Elizabeth Spelman's account of "Inessential Woman." I will 
deal in more detail with Hartsock's specifically Marxist claims in chapter five 
where I focus on her account of masculinity. 
' 53 Spelman's (1988) is an influential text in this context. Linda Nicholson (1994) says "a 
problem that many commentators have pointed out, is that "a feminism of difference" tends to be 
"a feminism of uniformity." To say that "women are different from men in such and such way" is 
to say that women are "such and such." But inevitably characterizations of women's "nature" or 
"essence" - even if this is described as a socially constructed nature or essence - tend to reflect the 
perspective of those making the characterizations." (1994:94) Most commonly, she argues like 
Spelman, that the perspective from which all women are characterized is white, middle class 
and heterosexual. See also Judith Butler's Gender Trouble. (1990) which destabilizes gender and 
sex. Butler argues that like gender, sex is something which comes into being only when we define 
it as such. She claims that the binary sex system is defined in a framework of "compulsory 
heterosexuality" which denies other sexualities, on the one hand, and "aberrant" biological sexes 
in cases of hermaphroditism. 
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iii Spelman on Chodorow 
Although Spelman does not directly address Hartsock's work, I take her 
claims about Chodorow to apply equally well to feminist standpoint theory. 
In short, Spelman challenges Chodorow's claims about gender identity. First, 
she indicates that Chodorow "takes sexism to be independent of classism and 
racism to be the model for them ... and the cause of them." (85) Sexism, 
classism and racism are all forms of oppression. But Chodorow's story about 
gender claims that a sense of superiority is decidedly male. Male superiority 
is taken as a model for a sense of superiority in cases of racism and classism. 
Spelman shows that this notion of maleness as superiority does not explain 
cases in which white women, for example, take themselves to be superior to 
persons of either sex who are not white. Sexism cannot be taken as a cause for 
other types of oppression, she argues, but nor can sexism be taken as a 
primary oppression upon which other types of oppression are modelled. Do 
we identify primarily as one or another gender, secondly as being from a 
particular race and third a particular class? Part of the problem identified by 
Spelman is that white women are often blind to the fact that we are from a 
particular race. This blindness exemplifies our blindness to racial oppression. 
As Spelman argues, Chodorow's universal claim about the sexual division 
of labour is grounded in the idea that there are two groups of people who are 
fundamentally different on the basis of sex. This claim does not deny that 
biological difference is important for distinguishing between the two groups. 
But Chodorow's claim moves beyond the idea of biological difference as being 
foremost in oppression, to the idea that females and males are subject to 
different social roles. The oppressive factor is social, in Chodorow's analysis, 
but the social factor is the universal. In other words, the universal fact 
Chodorow identifies in the sexual division of labour is the oppression of 
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women as women. Moreover, the oppression of women as women fuels the 
oppression of women as mothers. Therefore, the universal claim is that all 
women are oppressed as both women and as mothers in relation to men. 
Spelman makes clear that Chodorow's universal claims mask other 
differences such as those between class and race. Chodorow's universal claim 
is that all women are oppressed by all men in a sexual division of labour. 
Spelman contests that oppression is more widespread than such an analysis 
permits. Oppression exists in relations between White and Black, for 
instance, or between middle class and working class. Spelman argues that 
Chodorow's claim is "something like this: In all invidious hierarchies, those 
in the more powerful position regard those in the less powerful position as 
Other, as object, as thing." (90) Sexism is thus taken to produce other sorts of 
oppression. But, as Spelman makes clear, claims about sexism do not easily 
map onlo daims about racism or classism. To begin with, white men are the 
oppressors of non-white men, suggesting that "all men are superior as men to 
all women and that some men are superior to other men (and women), not 
as men, but as members of a particular race." (91) But, Spelman says, this is 
further complicated by the fact that some women are like some men, and 
"not so Other after all." The claim that all women are subordinated to men 
systematically is undermined in situations where, for instance, a white 
woman is in a dominant position to a black man. How does one set of 
hierarchical relations (gender) get translated into another (class, race)? Most 
salient is the fact that racism or classism highlights that both women and 
men of an underprivileged group share that oppression. The gender 
relations identified in the sexual division of labour as fundamental to 
oppression thus lose their significance. 
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Spelman charges Chodorow with making two universal claims: "a sexual 
division of labour and, within that division, the assignment of mothering to 
women." (87) Spelman argues that there is no such universal category as 
"woman" and there is no such thing as a generic woman. A generic woman 
does not suffer bad breath, for instance, because she does not have the luxury 
of breathing. {187) Generic woman is a fictional category which glosses over 
the situated differences of real live women. That women are universally 
mothers is equally dubious. It is neither true that all women are mothers, 
nor that all care giving is performed by women. The idea of a generic mother 
is as contentious as the idea of a generic woman. 
The Australian Institute of Family studies found that by 1990, only thirty-
five percent of heterosexual "couples with children" send the father off to 
earn a living while the mother stays at home to care for the kids. 54 Indeed, 
the increasing participation of heterosexual men as ha11ds u11, ur eveu 
"pregnant," fathers leads to new interest in how much housework men really 
do.55 So Chodorow's universal claims are made on very shaky ground.-
When tempted to ask what happens to boys when their father stays at home, 
her theory about abstract masculinity flies in the face of all the evidence. 
A second problem with Chodorow's argument, identified by Spelman, is 
that the gender implications are overshadowed in the attempt to explain 
54 Cited by Gilding (1994). Gilding produces statistical evidence that gender roles have 
changed over the past forty years. He argues that the roles are constituted by ideology. From a 
view of "liberal optimism" Gilding says "the 'new man' or 'new father' is both the cutting edge of 
a growing phenomena and a role model. Similarly, the 'partnership family' represents the 
authentic aspirations of most men and women." {1994: 208-209) 
55 See Baxter, Gibson & Lynch-Blosse {1990); Gilding (1994). 
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racism or classism because it turns out to look as though asymmetric 
parenting relations give everyone the desire to dominate if possible. The 
asymmetry can be viewed as causing everyone: boys and girls, whites and 
Blacks, rich and poor to be "psychologically prepared to treat everybody else as 
Other, and it is simply a historical accident that men happen to dominate 
women, whites happen to dominate Blacks." (Spelman 1988: 93) In other 
words, it is not clear from the recognition that oppression exists that 
asymmetric parenting is the cause of any particular type of oppression; nor 
that it adequately explains who oppresses who. Those who are oppressed in 
one set of relations can just as easily become the oppressor in others. 
Spelman cites the racism and classism of some women towards others as 
the third difficulty of Chodorow's account. The psychological preparation of 
girls described in object-relations theory does not explain how women could 
oppress anyone, let alone other women. The claim that girls' psychological 
development prepares them to be oppressed, not oppressors, does not explain 
how women can take others to be their subordinates. Spelman indicates that 
Chodorow's account of subordination and domination through asymmetric 
parenting arrangements serves only to mask women's superiority in some 
situations. 
Ien Ang sums up the situation of whiteness in Australia as follows: 
Australia is implicated in the global configuration of white/Western hegemony in 
ways which are particular to its history - of European settlement and Aboriginal 
genocide, of the White Australia policy, official multiculturalism, and the current 
'push toward Asia'. Despite this, Australia remains predominantly populated by 
Anglo-Celtic people, who inhabit exnominated whiteness in this country. Its main 
social institutions and basic cultural orientations are identifiably Western, and as a 
nation it is categorised in the international order as a part of 'the West.' (Ang 1995: 
69) 
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Ang argues the hegemonic ordering of Australians is not simply resolved 
by means of "tolerance" because there are some aspects of difference which 
cannot be assimilated. The idea is not favouring one side or the other of a 
binary structure, in Ang's view, nor is it necessarily resolved by "postmodern 
optimism." The Australian situation is sharpened by, as Ang puts it, "non-
dialogue between the postcolonial and the multicultural problematic, the 
serial juxtapositioning of the two conditional entirely upon the distributive 
power of the hegemonic Anglo centre." (1995:71) Ang cites Spelman's insight 
into the problem of a politics of inclusion: the person who invites someone 
to participate already has a privileged status. It is not clear, then, how 
Hartsock's epistemic privilege benefits all women. 
Importantly Spelman shows that the founding epistemological claim in 
Chodorow's theory of masculine identity is holding a belief in male 
superiority. I agree wilh Spelman lhal lhis lJelief is a "a fairly suµhislkaleu 
notion to be packed into a preconscious sense of oneself." (1988:96) As 
Spelman says, learning about gender entails learning about the gender 
hierarchy, not by having some prelinguistic beliefs. Once we learn about the 
gender hierarchy we are left wondering about women's complicity within the 
hierarchy of gender. Chodorow's claims do not emphasise the requirement 
to learn about gender, celebrating instead some putative vision of gender 
identity without conscious content. Moreover, Spelman argues, Chodorow 
uses the idea of consciousness without content to explain the subordination 
and domination of gender relations. (1988:97) 
Clearly, consciousness without content is explanatorily impotent. Or 
worse, conscious experience which entails knowing that one is male; and 
knowing that one is superior begs the question as to how they know unless 
we are prepared to say this is some kind of genetic knowledge. This being the 
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case, the whole argument couched in terms of gender loses its force. What we 
have instead is essential sexual difference by which males and females have 
different kinds of conscious experiences that we know as being of one sex or 
the other. 
Spelman argues that part of Chodorow' s explanation entails that 
femininity has a built in component of relational aptitude (caring for others) 
and masculinity has a built in component of self-sufficiency (separation from 
and therefore superiority over women). 
But - to repeat a point made several times above - if what children learn in 
acquiring gender identity is rich enough to explain how they are so psychically 
ready to assume their place in a hierarchical world, how can it not include an 
understanding of gender identity appropriate for one's race, class, ethnic group? For 
I learn that my place in the established hierarchies of the social world is not 
determined by whether I am male or female but by whether I am white or Black, 
rich or poor. (1988:97) 
Spelman makes clear that universal claims about women as women do 
not stand up. White women are often blind to the fact that we are coloured 
and belong to a particular race. 
As Ang argues, everyone who is not white is labelled "other." The term 
refers to such disparate categories as 'black women,' 'Third World women,' 
Indigenous women,' and 'women of colour.' (1995:66) 
In structural terms, however, they occupy the same space insofar as they are all, 
from a white perspective, relegated to the realm of racialised or ethnicised 
'otherness,' a normalising mechanism which is precisely constitutive of 
white/Western hegemony. As we have seen, feminism in Australia and elsewhere 
is not exempt from such hegemonising processes: in most feminist theory, too, 
whiteness is the unmarked norm against which all 'others' have to be specified in 
order to be represented. (1995: 66) 
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Taking our whiteness as "the unmarked norm," white feminists risk 
positioning ourselves as subjects who do have the status which marks 
privilege and is confused with authority. White feminists risk taking the 
privileged status of a subject in relation to a less privileged "other," who is 
reduced to the position of silence: the object in a text. 
Aileen Moreton Robinson argues that "feminist anthropologists" become 
the source of Aboriginal women's authenticity whilst simultaneously women 
"remain objects marginalised within the text. The literature is written about 
them, not by them, for them or with them." (1998: 279) In Moreton 
Robinson's view, the authentication of Aboriginal women which brings 
about their objectification is made possible by a "White women's movement 
because of the concern with whether or not women's oppression is 
universal." But, she argues, the irony is evident in the very standards 
imposed on the research which suggests that women's oppression is not 
universal. Moreton Robinson claims that the researchers make a distinction, 
within which to couch their research, between "traditional" and 
"contemporary" Aborigines. The object of research loses its singularity as 
such. 
In her own attempt to understand Aboriginal women's subjectivity, 
Moreton-Robinson looks to narratives which define Aboriginal cultures. She 
says 
In each of the narratives Aboriginal people are connected either by descent, country, 
place or shared experiences (1998:131). 
These relations are personal in nature and are intrinsic to Aboriginal 
women's subjectivities in negotiating Aboriginal and White cultural 
domains. In Aboriginal cultural domains relationality is therefore never 
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based upon the tolerance of others but the experience of the self as part of the 
others. (1998:279) 
Stories are a source of knowledge for Aborigines and for anyone who 
wants to know more about them. The idea of privilege, in the guise of 
tolerance, is not a foundation for knowing anything about the lives of 
aborigines. But, by the same token, the authority of the white anthropologist 
women is not undermined just by claiming that the privilege is unfounded. 
Aboriginal narratives carry epistemic authority which does not replace but, in 
a general sense, adds to the authority of the white feminist researchers. 
If Hartsock were correct about epistemic privilege, the Aboriginal 
narratives would carry greater epistemic authority than research. The 
authority shifts from the objective perspective to the subjective perspective. 
But the binary is itself problematic insofar as all knowledge is infected with 
standarqs and practices of the observer. The anthropologist is granted 
expertise by her community because she understands the standards by which 
her research is collated. Similarly the Aboriginal women are granted 
expertise by their communities because they abide by prescribed standards. 
The narratives of Aboriginal women reveal that they are embodied, and 
embedded in a network of social relationships and Aboriginal domains. The 
body for Aboriginal women is the link to people, country, spirits, herstory and 
the future and is a positive site of value and affirmation as well as a site of 
resistance. As keepers of the family, Aboriginal women are the bearers of 
subjugated knowledges. (285) 
Clearly, Aboriginal women have epistemic authority in their community 
which white women, as a group, claim to lack in our own. Moreton 
Robinson reports narrative evidence of widespread "distance, unease, racial 
superiority and often cruelty" from white women. Perhaps those of us who 
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sustain the hegemony could recognise Aboriginal peoples' tolerance towards 
us as indicative of the status which could be afforded to communitarian 
knowledge practices. Each member of that community has authority to speak 
on their own terms. The visibility of differences between women shatters any 
ideological structure which tells us our place in the order of things, and what 
we ought to aspire to. 
Spelman says that in one sense we cannot deny that "all women are 
women." But in another important sense, feminism has invented its own 
category, "gender" which obscures the differences between women. It is false 
to assume all other women are like ourselves. Such an assumption stops 
women from taking differences into consideration, and from asking others 
how their experiences are different from our own, both as groups with which 
we identify and as individuals. 
Fur examµle, Sµelrnau µuiuls uul Lhal Chodo10w characlerises women as 
being intrinsically caring, as though women never experience rage, jealousy 
or other conflictual emotions. This glosses over conflicts between women as 
much as it denies the reality of any person's humanity. The point made by 
Spelman is that Chodorow appears to base all affective relations upon the 
mother/ child relationship, as though that relationship is "free of fear, anger, 
pride or jealousy." (1988:108) One only needs to read Adrienne Rich's Of 
Woman Born to recall that some mothers kill their children. More 
frequently though. parenting raises emotions some people might claim not to 
have previously understood. Equally troubling is Chodorow's denial of male 
emotion. Spelman puts it that "the public world (or sphere) of work is 
teeming with affect - whether it be boredom, pride, anger, jealousy, hope, 
contempt or fear." (1988:108) And, Thomas Lacqueur makes clear that fathers 
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are hardly free from the affective roller coaster of parenting. 56 Chodorow sets 
aside {conveniently) the sorts of affect which do not support her thesis about 
girls' ingrained connectedness to everyone else, and, especially to each other. 
Spelman, on the other hand, makes clear that issues of racism and classism 
highlight that this idea of universal connectedness between women is 
imaginary. 
It is important to emphasise that we learn about gender, race, class and 
other factors of our own identity when we learn a language. These are 
normative facts which comprise the standards by which we learn to make 
observations. If we grow up in a community in which we are oppressed 
racially, for instance, we are more likely to know about oppression than if we 
grow up white in a white community where racial oppression does not touch 
our lives. Learning about oppression is like learning about anything else: we 
need to be taught. Whether that happens because we are treated badly by 
others for no apparent reason, or whether that happens in a classroom where 
we learn about people who live under different circumstances, we still need 
to learn somehow. Learning to respect differences at an early age would be 
preferable in an ideal world. Learning tolerance, on the other hand, is to miss 
the point and to claim superiority. 
In earlier chapters I have argued that Sellars provides an alternative 
framework for showing how reports about experiences can be authoritative. 
Talking about experiences helps us to better understand how they are 
different. He also explains that normativity is built in to making 
observations. Learning about anything requires we acknowledge certain 
56 Thomas Lacqueur "Facts of Fatherhood" and Sara Ruddick "Thinking about Fathers" in 
Hirsch and Fox Keller eds (1990). 
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standards so that we can agree about simple things, like colours. But 
normativity is supposed to be used for descriptive purposes: standard 
conditions under which we can view blue (blue can look green under 
fluorescent lighting for instance); standard observers (people who are not 
colour blind); and so on. When we start to make value judgments such as 
that blue is better than green, we realise that our prescriptions for agreeing 
that something is the case has an added value judgment. 
Moreover, as Moreton-Robinson argues, there are recognised "experts" and 
different ways of claiming authority in different contexts and cultures. The 
standards and conditions for authority in an Aboriginal context is different 
from those of non-Aboriginals and from 'Asians.' As Ang's title ''I'm a 
feminist, but ... " indicates, the feminist context is already limited by certain 
claims about women's universality. (1995: 57) All empirical knowledge is 
iufoded wilh normalivity, whether that be recognition of certain experts, 
which conditions limit the research and whether or not the standards are 
biased.57These value judgments end up informing our knowledge to make us 
sexist, classist or racist. So, whilst normativity is an important component of 
our knowledge because it enables us to set standards for agreement, the 
standards we learn are often steeped in bias for certain types of observers. 
Hartsock overlooks the normative infection of all empirical knowledge. 
Kristeva, on the other hand, recognises this infection. Kristeva says that 
femininity is not only constructed by a social system which is devised by men 
for men, femininity is also the very possibility of upsetting that system. But 
when Kristeva claims that listening to what professional women who are 
mothers have to say about knowledge could help us to envisage a more 
57 The sexual bias of medical research is one such example. See Harding (1996). 
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ethical social system, she does not attempt to privilege either femininity or 
maternity. In Kristeva's view the feminine is in each of us, irrespective of 
our genital or reproductive status. She characterises the feminine as 
consciousness; as experience. Kristeva cites avant-garde poetry written by 
men to show that their femininity perverts the text by bringing experience 
into language. In so doing, Kristeva tries to bring the non-normative into 
empirical knowledge and allies herself with Hartsock. Kristeva's non-
normative chora is the "reality" behind appearances in her aim to 
authenticate empirical knowledge. 
Hartsock claims that women have a special type of experience in maternity, 
which adds to their empirical knowledge. In Kristeva's view, however, men 
have these experiences too. But her non-normative chora reduces all 
experiences to having consciousness. Everybody has consciousness, but 
because of Llie fall1er's law we are uflen loo busy to notice consciousness as 
consciousness. The father's law sets standards against dwelling upon our 
own conscious experience so that the feminine chora is repressed. Maternity 
is the only domain in which conscious experience for its own sake is not 
considered transgressive. But, as Hartsock makes clear, in maternity the 
conscious experience is valued in terms of productivity rather than for its 
own sake. 
It is now time to return to Hegel so that I can show that Hartsock and 
Chodorow fail to release women from his conception of immature 
knowledge. Even though Gilligan, for example, argues that Chodorow's 
conception of relational knowledge is not immature, the fact remains that it 
is not knowledge. Moreover, given the Hegelian picture of women's 
intuitive knowledge, there is no way that we are able to learn about abstract 
concepts like normativity. I will now show why this is the case. 
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iv Hegel and feminine knowledge 
In his section on the family in The Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel says 
that women have well developed intuition. He says that "the feminine, in 
the form of the sister, has the highest intuitive awareness of what is ethical. 
She does not attain consciousness of it, or to the objective existence of it..." 
(§457) I shall interpret this idea by providing an overview of Willem de 
Vries' analysis of what Hegel means by intuition.ss 
As I argued in chapter one, Hegel does not permit women into the domain 
of particular individuality. Note, however, that this does not mean he 
characterises them as non-subjects. Instead, he gives women a subjectivity 
grounded in a material rather than formal language.59 Having intuitive 
knowledge endows women not only with sensations of the world and 
feelings qua bodily states, in Hegel's view, but also with the ability to organise 
lhelr lhuughls al.Juul sellsaliulls. Their malerial cu11sduus11ess is lhus not 
merely passive and determined by genetics and environmental factors, but 
includes a minimal ability to direct their attention on their bodies and 
immediate environment. 
As humans, women must also have subjective spirit which allows them to 
become beings for themselves.60 "Spirit converts nature into an object 
confronting it, reflects upon it, takes back the externality of nature into its 
58 de Vries (1988). 
59 De Vries says Hegel distinguishes between two sorts of language: one for physical nature 
and one for mental facts. These are not to be understood as different natural languages, just 
languages with different explanatory powers. Women, it seems to me, are prohibited from the 
language of the mental, given that sensations and feelings are taken to be a kind of physical fact. 
60 Being-for-self is a component of the for-us of Perception. 
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own inwardness, idealizes nature and thus in the object becomes for-itself. "61 
The difference between women and men is, as I have said already, Hegel's 
denying women access to self-certainty. Self-certainty brings freedom from 
natural constraints and control over nature. This lack of self-certainty for 
women indicates that women's reproductive function disables their ability to 
develop abstract concepts. Similarly, Hartsock argues that women are closer 
to nature than men as a result of their reproductive labour. She also endorses 
Chodorow's claim that women do not have a well defined sense of self. This 
can be construed, in Hegelian terms, as lacking self-certainty. The claim that 
women's knowledge is more relational than men's similarly endorses the 
Hegelian view of women's universal consciousness. 
Hegel distinguishes between inner and outer: between feelings in the body 
and sensations of the world. The distinction is aetiological, or based on 
whelher Lhe seHsaliuu is caused by an internal or external factor. Internal 
embodied factors are facts of being-for-self. These include not only rumblings 
of the stomach, for instance, but also the flush of anger, and the "gut feelings" 
associated with ethicaljudgments. Herein lies women's potential as ethical 
agents: their intuitive awareness of what is ethical is a felt awareness rather 
than a principle based ethics. But intuition, as a particular mode of 
consciousness, is a step higher than immediate sense-certainty and 
immediate feelings'. Feeling is "preconscious mental activity" in which the 
self, or subject, does have a role. Intuition is divided between self and world 
so that there is a sense of self in relation to objects. 
Intuition is connected to sensations and feelings because of its sensual 
nature, but in intuition feeling becomes more abstract. There is a singularity 
61 Cited in de Vries (1988:50). (§384) 
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to the feel of intuition which is denied to former sensations and feelings. In 
intuition the self comes into play because the "spirit" comes into play and 
presents objects which had previously been produced throughout the body in 
the "feeling soul." An internal split takes place in intuition, not unlike the 
split discussed in the previous chapter. The split occurs between the two 
forces: the active subject and the passive object of attention. The active self is 
now able to focus her attention upon things.62 
In intuition, the distinction between self and world emerges. So there is a 
sense of self, as a kind of unitqry consciousness which can actively direct her 
attention onto feelings in her body, which is now distinctly world rather than 
self. She is also able to direct her attention onto objects in her immediate 
environment. But, although she can direct her attention on external objects 
or inner feelings, she is unable to direct her attention onto the sense of self 
w hid1 uil eds. The iual.Jilily Lu focus u11 her self as such µ1 eve11ls Ll1e 
movement into higher levels of consciousness so that her knowledge 
remains perceptive rather than engaging in proper thought. Hegel's tripartite 
schema of mental abilities places intuitions before representations which, in 
turn, must be developed for the higher level of thought. 
Intuitions are explained by considering normative conditions which make 
episodes of intuition possible. These conditions include environmental 
factors, or the external factors in terms of what is present in the world in the 
62 De Vries says "The fact that spirit finds itself in intuition implies an internal split, a 
distinction between that which finds and that which is found. In intuition spirit is self-related, 
which requires that there be two distinguishable (though not necessarily separable) moments. 
Naturally, these two moments are thoroughly correlative: the moment of spiritual activity is 
attention; what is found is a spatiotemporal world." (1988, 111-112) 
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immediate location and time; factors about the perceptual apparatus, or 
whether all sense organs are functioning in the standard way; and the 
functioning of subjective spirit, or the observer as a unitary force. These are 
all causal facts about a standard observer. Although each of these three factors 
are standard in intuition, in representation, subjective spirit comes to play a 
more active role. 
Again we are reminded of Hartsock's claim that women's knowledge is 
more accurate with respect to mapping reality than men's abstract 
representational knowledge. But such a claim denies the progression of 
representation towards proper thought in the Hegelian schema. 63 The first 
concept is the sense of self which accompanies the object of thought. This 
early thought reflects the immediate environment, just as a mirror does. 64 
The development of thought proper is more dynamic. Thought entails a 
synthesis uf lhe ma11if ulu uf se11sual experiences into concepts. Ilut there are 
63 It is difficult to deny that Hegel must have allowed that women develop language, so they 
must also enter the phase of representation. This is in accord with Lloyd's claim that Hegelian 
dialectic brings women into a middle ground (see chapter one appendix). The middle ground must 
be that of representation, beyond intuition and before thought. It is not clear whether Hegel 
claims we must attain self-certainty prior to using language so I am assuming that intuition and 
representation are similar to perception and understanding. 'Intuition' might be another word for 
the Hegelian stage of Perception. de Vries says this, but he also says that intuition is not one of 
the stages of Consciousness in the Phenomenology. He claims that much of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit is updated in later works. My concern here is to understand his claims about women in the 
"ethical order" as described in the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
64 de Vries says intuition is like a mirror, but there is an active ability to reorganize input and 
the images need not relate to immediate environment. (1988, 143) 
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two types of concepts: abstract and concrete. The abstract concepts, or 
universals are stand-alone instances of things, whereas concrete concepts are 
more dynamic in that they integrate linguistic truth with concrete facts about 
the world. Concrete concepts are interrelated in a dynamic network by which 
men are able to think about the world. Self-consciousness evolves through 
men's knowledge of their active ability to constitute the world in thought as 
such. This constitutive ability requires that concepts are not simply 
descriptive but also prescriptive.65 Concepts should thus be thought of as 
active constitutive abilities rather than as passive entities.66 
Learning to think entails learning language and learning to make 
connections. But seeing oneself as making these connections is a move from 
"theoretical spirit" to "practical spirit." In theoretical spirit, we develop ideas 
about the world. In practical spirit, on the other hand, we encounter the 
human wlll aml lhe necessary self-cu11sduus11ess lo acl upon lhe will. 
Women never have this will, insofar as they never develop the necessary self 
consciousness. The will brings the freedom to have control over nature, 
65 de Vries says: "Something's concept offers an ideal pattern that the thing strives to realize 
in the course of its existence, although individual things are never perfect exemplars of their 
essence... Thus what Hegel calls a concept is a prescriptive ideal that is part of a system of such 
ideals that the world is striving to realize and in terms of which we can make sense of what 
happens in the world." {1988: 172-173) 
66 We think the author meant the following: If concepts are required for possession of 
knowledge, and they are 'active constitutive abilities' rather than passive entities, mere passive 
experiential states cannot be knowledge.- ed. See de Vries (1988: 171-17 4) for a more 
comprehensive explanation of concrete concepts. 
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rather than simply to observe what exists.67 Insofar as women are viewed as 
closer to nature, they too are subject to the control of men's will. 
My overview of Hegel indicates several respects in which Hartsock follows 
Hegel. Women's consciousness is closer to nature and so less likely to 
misrepresent the world as it is. Their sensuous activities make them experts 
on feelings and, by association, feeling towards others. But women lack the 
ability to control nature. It remains to be explained how the sensuous nature 
of women could withstand development into the higher realms of spirit 
without losing the important embodied focus Hegel associates with intuition. 
In one sense, it is important for him to keep women at that stage to 
compensate for men's transcendence into the conceptual realm. 
Lloyd sums up Hegel's conception of women's conscious as follows 
Hegel did not intend his descriptions of female consciousness to be dismissive of 
women. He sees the nether world as necessary to the wider life of Society. From 
the male perspective, its existence allows men to flourish as fully self-conscious 
ethical beings without sacrificing natural feeling. And from this perspective 
women can indeed be seen as in some respects morally superior to men; virtuous 
women make of the unpromising material of natural feeling and particular 
relationships something genuinely ethical and universal. (1993:85) 
The Hegelian process of development has compressed men into their own 
minds in such a way that they are no longer able to access feelings as women 
do. The certainty of men as to whether such feelings exist depends upon their 
interactions with women. Women retain the "gut feeling" dimension of 
ethics, well and truly superseded in the spiralling self-consciousness of men. 
Women simply "read off" their environments in the form of feelings and 
sensations without the possible inaccuracies of representational bias. Men 
67 See de Vries (1988: 198-200) 
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thus depend upon women to act as a kind of barometer of the world, 
providing data for their mature thought to interpret. 
Why, we might ask, is this split necessary for Hegel? Why are men unable 
to read off the environment and interpret the data? In Sellars' view, each 
individual starts out with this thermometer like approach to the 
environment. This is a causal story about the environment and about our 
perceptual apparatus. Hegel does not deny this is the case either but he falls 
into the trap of taking his theoretical model of mind as though it were actual. 
To put this in Sellars words: 
Unfortunately, he mislocates the truth of these conceptions, and, with a modesty 
forgivable in any but a philosopher, confuses his own creative enrichment of the 
framework of empirical knowledge, with an analysis of knowledge as it was. He 
construes as data the particulars and arrays of particulars which he has come to be 
able to observe, and believes them to be antecedent objects of knowledge which 
have somehow been in the framework from the beginning. (§62) 
The point is that once we have developed a theoretical framework by 
which we are able to identify certain sorts of inner episodes, it is easy to forget 
the framework as a theoretical construction. In so doing, the inner episodes 
are conceived as having "been there from the beginning." But, if we accept 
that these episodes are there, in our heads as it were, without our constituting 
these, we are back to the dilemma of positing experiences as a foundation for 
our knowledge. We are at a loss to explain, as Hegel tries to do, how these 
experiences fit into our conceptual schema. Hegel fits them in all right, but in 
so doing our experiences are the object of thought rather than being intrinsic 
to the subject. This in turn reopens the gap between subject and object as a 
gap between thought, or knowledge, and experience, which leaves us 
wondering how subject and object, or self and world can be reconciled. 
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Sellars, we recall, has us reading off our environment and making 
utterances. The former is explained causally and the latter is explained as a 
social fact. Sellars bypasses all talk of subjects and objects by claiming that 
learning utterances require also learning standards and practices. Our 
observational knowledge is retroactive: we know something to be the case 
only after we have competently understood and demonstrated the standards 
under which our claims are true. We therefore need to develop a holistic 
network of observational concepts and epistemic norms before we know 
anything. But we do not have access to any mental episodes until we create 
these as theoretical episodes. Doing this requires watching others' behaviour 
with thought before creating our own minds, as it were. The subject is able to 
report about sensations and feelings as she develops a theoretical vocabulary 
of objective facts. Her vocabulary about feelings is not merely subjective, on 
lhis view, 1.Jernuse Sellars 1.Jyµasses ll1e sul.Jjeclive arn..l ul.Jjedive dislinclion. 
He does this by making everything primarily objective insofar as nothing 
holds for one person unless it also holds for others abiding by the same 
standards under similar conditions. 
Hegel does not properly emphasis the social fact. Instead he has sensations 
and feelings combining in intuitions to explain the causal story. This causal 
story is not problematic unless it is also taken to be a kind of knowledge. 
Given that women are the experts in this domain, in Hegel's view, it is 
difficult to suggest otherwise. For if it were not knowledge, women could not 
develop the necessary theoretical episodes by which they can introspect. 
Moreover, the subject and object need to be divided, in Hegel's description of 
mental development to explain the development of subjective spirit. Spirit 
takes hold in intuitions precisely because this phase requires that one at least 
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notices their psychological experience as unitary and is able to thus direct it 
upon the body and beyond. 
The psychological experience of intuition is Cartesian. Here we have a 
unitary sense of self as a self which, in Cartesian terms, is private, immediate 
and given. Even though this is not self-certainty in the Hegelian sense, it is 
self-certainty in the Cartesian sense insofar as that which cannot be doubted 
by Descartes is his sensation of thought. It is this inner feel which cannot be 
reconciled with the material body or, to put it another way, reduced to the 
physical. And it is this inner feel which, at the end of the day, leaves us with 
the possibility that we might be zombies. 
From this discussion of Hegel, it is clear that Nancy Hartsock characterizes 
feminine knowledge as Hegel does. She argues that women are attuned to 
learning about things through sensuous contact with their world. Their 
knowledge is organised lhrough habitual repetition of sensuous tasks. Their 
relationships with each other are forged through the universal experience of 
living in a female body. There is no definitive self-knowledge. A kind of 
universal empathy might thus be said to exist between women. But the 
problems are many. First, allowing the possibility that mothers are zombies 
will never help their epistemic authority. Worse still, there is no way of 
denying that the epistemic privilege of mothers is given by God as maternal 
instinct. Finally, the ability of women to change the normative perspective is 
undermined by the Hegelian vision of concepts as being already prescriptive 
rather than as descriptive. 
Conclusion 
It is not clear that women can develop the sort of standpoint Hartsock 
promotes if their knowledge is thus characterised. Either pregnant women 
172 
and mothers in general are zombies, or their epistemic privilege is given by 
god. In the first case, they have no authority over their experiences because 
they do not have the sensuous experiences they think they have. In the 
second case, they have no authority over their experiences because these are 
determined by god. The universality to which Hartsock aspires could then be 
confirmed as being god's will. But, as Spelman argues, taking women's 
experiences as universal is unsupported because of significant differences 
emerging from women's different social situations. 
In this chapter I have emphasised the importance of normativity to 
knowledge. Normativity is always prescriptive and adds value judgments to 
descriptions. But I have argued that we cannot dispense with normativity 
altogether. Normative standards help us learn a language so that we can 
have any knowledge. The question is whether or not extra values are added 
to our descriptions, as is the case when mothers are viewed as being 
fundamentally different from anyone else in the world. On what basis can we 
found such a prescriptive idealisation of maternity? As Hartsock rightly says, 
the devaluation of women's work as a labour of love has been taken for 
granted for far too long. 
In the following chapter we continue to examine Hartsock's claims about 
sexual difference. There I will focus on her views about masculinity, 
exemplified in her view by none other than Georges Bataille. But, as I argued 
in chapter one, Bataille rightly contests the Hegelian vision of experience as 
immature knowledge, so he is a poor example for her purposes of 
demonstrating the abstract nature of masculine thought. Taking seriously 
her claims about the perverse valuation of abstract concepts over concrete 
experiences, I shall return to Marx's views about alienation and false 
consciousness before I offer the positive attributes of Bataille's theory. But, in 
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chapter five I add a warning that experiences can be over emphasised as a 
positive domain for exploration and that more than a modicum of discipline 
must be taken into consideration. It cannot be emphasised enough that 
knowing about experiences is as much a domain of expertise as any other. 
Therefore the world is filling with experts in the so-called perverse 
knowledge that leads to violence against women; and against others. 
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Chapter Five 
"perverse" masculinity: Hartsock and Bataille 
In this chapter I turn to Nancy Hartsock's claim that all men's knowledge is 
"both partial and fundamentally perverse." Hartsock argues that men's 
knowledge is partial because, unlike feminist knowledge, it is not structured 
by material existence. She takes Nancy Chodorow's object-relations theory to 
support her own idea that all men have the sort of false consciousness Marx 
associates with the ruling class. Chodorow claims that boys have a more 
definite sense of self than girls, making masculine knowledge more 
individualistic and feminine knowledge more relational. 
In this chapter I set out Hartsock's claims about masculine knowledge, 
showing hm1v it relates to Marxian and Lacanian theory. Hartsock presents 
men as though they are the psycho-zombies I introduced in my discussion of 
Lacan in chapter 3.68 Men's knowledge is understood to be "dualist" 
inasmuch as men see themselves in opposition to women. Hartsock's claims 
about dualism are nevertheless confusing because she characterises men as 
idealists, exhibiting pure reason in opposition to the "materialism" of 
women. Men's knowledge is partial, in Hartsock's view, because the ideology 
of masculinity cuts them off from their inner experiences. Like psycho-
zombies, men are alienated from the truth of their being. 
68 I introduced the term psycho-zombies in chapter three. These are different from the 
philosophical zombies who do not have experiences insofar as the psycho-zombie has 
experiences but cannot access these. 
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Hartsock's vision of masculinity also takes from Marx the notion of false 
consciousness. Not only is masculine knowledge partial, in her view, it is 
also fundamentally perverse. Men's perversity, she argues, is based in their 
substitution of life for death. Giving life is women's business whereas men 
engage in conflicts or wars, and give "pride of place to killing." (231) Hartsock 
characterises the falsity of masculinity by turning to Hegel and Bataille. 
Hegel's dualism is apparent in the conflict between the dominant and 
subordinate consciousness but Bataille takes this further by equating sex with 
death, rather than with life. She argues that men are threatened by women, 
who remind them of their mothers, so they seek sexual satisfaction by 
dominating or, in extreme cases, brutalising and killing women. (231) 
Although Hartock argues that Bataille values death over life, she fails to 
explain that he describes the death of the unitary subject in erotic experiences. 
Bataille describes a figurative, rather than literal death in which humans 
experience the continuity of life. Although it is difficult to deny that Bataille 
is "perverse," I will examine his argument about death of the unitary subject 
in which he associates erotic experiences with mystical experiences. Bataille's 
perversity can be more closely associated with femininity and maternity than 
with the abstract masculinity described above. 
In section one I will review Hartsock's claims about masculinity and the 
feminist standpoint before turning to a discussion of Marxian theory in 
section two. Marxian theory prepares the way for a more accurate analysis of 
Bataille's views on perversity in sections three and four. 
i psycho-zombies and perversity 
Hartsock claims that gender differences can be explained by the sexual 
division of labour in child rearing leading to differing psychological 
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experiences for girls and boys respectively. She says these differences, when 
observed in the context of a class society, "leads on the one hand toward a 
feminist standpoint and on the other toward an abstract masculinity." (227) 
The sexual division of labour is responsible for abstract masculinity, not only 
because the boy has to identify with an absent person, but also because the 
boy's identity is threatened by his mother. (227) In this section I will examine 
Hartsock's claim that the threat posed by the mother is a cause of an implicit 
(and sometimes explicit) sexual violence in the male psyche. 
Chodorow' s psychoanalytic theory provides an explanation for gender 
differences as a pre-oedipal phenomenon. Hartsock brings Freud's oedipus 
complex into her own discussion of ego development, saying "the problem 
for the boy is to distinguish himself from the mother and to protect himself 
against the real threat she poses for his identity." The incestual threat, 
through which the boy risks losing any clear tlisllncliuu 1.Jelwetm self aud 
other, "lead[s] to the formation of rigid ego boundaries." (227) But, in 
Hartsock's view, 
the boy's construction of self in opposition to unity with the mother, his construction of 
identity as differentiation from the other, sets a hostile and combative dualism at the heart 
of both the community men construct and the masculinist world view by means of which 
they understand their lives. (227) 
Hostility towards women is implicit in having a well defined ego, in this 
account, because the ego is only possible if one is not the same gender as the 
mother. Girls, we recall, do not ever have these rigid ego boundaries because 
they are the same sex as the mother. Moreover, boys' hostility towards their 
mothers is reflected socially insofar as boys will someday grow up and, as 
men, they will participate in social institutions which are also hostile towards 
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women. So long as men retain this social power, there is little prospect for 
reforming social relations. 
Hartsock's explicit epistemological claim is that boys develop a dualist 
knowledge, rather than the materialist knowledge she associates with 
femininity. Dualist knowledge is "hostile and combative" and "replicates 
itself in both the hierarchical and dualist institutions of class society and in 
the frameworks of thought generated by this experience." {227) One such 
framework is Hegel's Master/Slave duality, she says, in which men fight each 
other to death. (227) The struggle between two self-conscious beings is taken 
to characterise a "duality of concrete versus abstract." Concrete experience is 
not a model for masculinity which depends upon fantasising about public life 
as an escape from the humdrum of home life. She argues that men's 
knowledge is less "natural" than women's knowledge; the former being 
"abstract" or inferential and based in mere appearances rather than properly 
representing reality. 
I argued in chapter four that Hartsock interprets Hegel's immediate 
knowledge, or being-in-itself, as private knowledge, given by experience, 
rather than as non-inferential knowledge. Hartsock characterises experience 
as a kind of knowledge, at least insofar as we know what sex we are from our 
experiences; and that from these experiences we know with which gender we 
must identify.69 Women continue to have this kind of experience-based 
69 Chodorow's characterisation of gender develop in the pre-oedipal phase presupposes 
a lot of prepacked concepts. Spelman makes this point as well, as mentioned in chapter 
four. For example, Chodorow suggests boys know that they have a penis; that they are 
male; that they are like their father and that they are opposed to their mothers; that 
they must identify with their fathers and so on. 
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knowledge; men have inferential, or "abstract" knowledge. Hartsock faces 
Young's problem: she cannot explain how we know we have experiences in 
the first place, leaving us open to scepticism about other minds. Women 
could be zombies on this picture. Ironically, however, Hartsock argues to the 
effect that men are zombie-like; as though men replace their feelings with 
inferential knowledge. I use the term "psychozombies" for this 
characterisation of the relationship between experience and knowledge. 
Hartsock evaluates the knowledge of men, or psychozombies, with 
standpoint epistemology as her ground, arguing that men create a world of 
false appearances: culture. In Hartsock's view, then, women's knowledge is 
more "natural" than men's knowledge: 
According to Hartsock, however, men see the valuation as reversed: 
men's knowledge is "valuable, if abstract and deeply unattainable, the other 
useless and demeaning." Rather than saying that knowledge based in 
experience is only characterised as "useless and demeaning" when couched in 
terms of private ~now ledge (which is useless and has no meaning), as I am 
arguing, Hartsock takes a different route. As we have seen already, she turns 
to Marxian standpoint epistemology to show that subjective knowledge is 
more valuable than objective knowledge. With the appearance/reality 
distinction as her guide, Hartsock argues that men's knowledge is based in 
appearances, but nevertheless determines the lives of women from a false 
perspective of value. She says that men value the abstract over the concrete; 
mind over body, culture over nature, ideal over real, stasis over change. {228) 
According to standpoint epistemology, however, this is a reversal of natural 
values, which tell us how things ought to be. So, in Hartsock's view, the 
reversal of values makes possible relations of domination and subordination 
through sustaining a false consciousness. 
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In the following section I turn to Marx to examine the valuation of 
exchange over production by which we must understand Hartsock's claims 
about dualism. She takes Marx's account of the relations between the ruling 
class and proletariat to explain the subordination of women to men. Marxian 
exchange value is false, in her view, as are associated terms: mind; culture; 
abstract; stasis. 
Women, she argues, produce and sustain life; more so than the Marxian 
proletariat. Women's knowledge is thus more grounded in the body than the 
proletariat: their knowledge is more natural; concrete and elastic. Dualism, 
thus characterised, "marks phallocentric society and social theory." (228) 
Plato, for instance, favours love of knowledge over concrete reality which 
Hartsock takes as evidence of philosophy's masculinity. She says that the 
philosophers' ideas dominate over their personal natures, informing 
Western thought and social relations with an implicit masculine bias. In 
opposition to this ideal of masculinity, she says, women are thought to be 
ruled by their bodies, rather than minds. As I argued in chapter four, 
however, Hartsock's standpoint reinforces this vision of femininity rather 
than denying it. She argues that male experience is an inversion of 
materialist femininity. I turn now to Marx on alienation and standpoint 
epistemology for a clearer picture of his views. 
ii Marx on alienation and standpoint epistemology 
As we have seen, Hartsock describes social relations as masculine and 
authentic human relations as feminine. Hartsock says that "Marxian theory 
needed to go beneath the surface to discover the different levels of 
determination which defined the relation of capitalist and (male) worker." 
{232) For Marx, going beneath the surface is a matter of moving closer to an 
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understanding of nature and the way things really are. The capitalist is thus 
defined by a false consciousness based on the value of exchange over 
production. The worker buys into capitalist values, working hard to survive 
by alienating himself [sic] from his labour and selling that labour to the 
capitalist. But, Marx argues, the worker can reclaim his own labour if, like 
Robinson Crusoe, he were to have the opportunity to produce things for his 
own use. According to Marx, a subsistence lifestyle leads to knowledge of the 
way things really are through an integration of mind and body; culture and 
nature; abstract and concrete; stasis and change. 
Marx argues that humans are different from animals because we have the 
added capacity to think about what we produce. The ability to think about 
production is that which Marx calls the "species-life" for humans. But, he 
warns, our ability to think about production can be detrimental when we lose 
luuch wilh nalure and wilh our own being. By thinking too much about 
production we narrow our focus to the end result and disregard the process. 
When making boots, for instance, the boot-maker will become focused upon 
how many boots he can make for a wage or income, rather than upon the 
smell of the leather, the death of the animals, and the way he uses his body to 
make the boots. 
The capitalist division of labour adds a further complication to the boot-
maker' s dilemma. The boot-maker works in a factory, amongst other boot-
makers who must produce boots for a wage. The boots these people make 
belong not to themselves, but to the person who owns the factory. Marx says 
that the ownership of our labour by others leads to an alienation from our 
true selves by making us into a means who is distinct from the end product of 
our time and efforts. It is no longer the physical complexity of the boot-maker 
as a person which counts, but the ability of this person to work to the owner's 
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specifications. The owner buys the boot-maker's labour, isolating the work 
from the person in a rather obscure manner. 
In Marx's words, alienated labour 
makes the species-being of man, both nature and the intellectual faculties of his species, 
into a being that is alien to him, into a means for his individual existence. It alienates 
man from his own body, nature exterior to him, and his intellectual being, his human 
essence. (Marx, 1977: 282) 
Marx argues that, from the perspective of the ruling class, the worker is 
nothing more than a means of production. The body and intellect of the 
worker are only valued with respect to the participation in the economy of 
exchange. From the capitalist perspective, the worker is a commodity: Her 
body and intellect are only valued according to the value of her participation 
in production. But the consequence of this perspective is the alienation of the 
worker from her own essence. The individual's body and intellect has no 
value in and of itself. The worker must externalise her sense of self from her 
body and intellect in order to have some sense of value or worth. For Marx 
the economy of exchange depends on this process of externalisation; or the 
alienation of the worker from her essential self. 
Hartsock claims that the capitalist perspective is dualist. By this she means 
that there is a system in which ideas are valued over sensuous experiences. 
The knowledge of the person who values herself in terms of production for 
the exchange of goods does so at the expense of valuing the work that goes 
into production and the product itself. In other words, the concrete facts of 
production are of secondary value to the abstract monetary exchange value. 
From the perspective of exchange, the worker is seen not as a human being 
but as a mode of production; or as a means to an end. The worker is alienated 
from her labour to this end: her work is a commodity within the labour 
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market. In Marx's view, this process of commodification leads to a series of 
dualisms by which each person is divided between what they are and what 
they produce. 
Commodification is a process in which someone else's ideas are 
materialised into things. Status is determined by things, how many things 
any person has. The ruling class have self consciousness reason which 
enables them to subject others to objectification. 10 Not only do the ruling 
class have the ideas, they also have the means by which they can pay others to 
materialise their ideas. Slaves, on this account, want to be masters, and thus 
want to have status. But status is not really about ideas at all, in Marx's view, 
status is about commodification. Humans value the qualitative over the 
quantitive so that there can be masters and slaves. The slaves only participate 
because they think that they too can someday have what the masters have. 
70 See Hyppolite (1969) for an interesting discussion of the way Marx reads Hegel's 
objectification as alienation. Hyppolite says "the whole Marxist critique amounts to 
showing, by interpreting every objectification as an alienation, the confusion which 
victimizes Hegel." (1969: 179) He says Marx "does not wonder how this abstraction is 
possible and how nature can reveal itself as sense, abstract itself from itself, and think 
itself." (1969: 179) I take Hyppolite's reading of Hegel to support de Vries' interpretation 
of Hegel with Sellars and "the myth of the given" in mind. This also suggests that Sartre, 
de Beauvoir, Lacan, Bataille and Merleau-Ponty, each of whom attended Kojeve's lectures 
on Hegel, will have a decidedly Marxist reading, perhaps each confusing alienation and 
objectification. This is certainly the case for Young (1984), whose paper is titled "Pregnant 
Embodiment: subjectivity and alienation." Kristeva refuses to accept that alienation must 
be objectification in her dismissal of the psychozombie. 
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Indeed, the alienation of the worker is the crux of the matter for Marx: the 
alienation of the worker is a process of dehumanisation: the labour is 
understood in terms of an object which can be bought and sold. Like slaves to 
their masters, workers sell their labour in the hope that one day they will 
have enough money to sit back and let someone else do all the work. 
Alienation occurs on a number of levels, in Marx's view: the worker is 
alienated from her labour (it is owned by the employer); the worker is 
alienated from her product (it is owned by someone else); the worker is 
alienated from other workers (because they are all competing for work and 
money); and the worker is alienated from her species (because of her 
abstraction from her "animal" nature). Moreover, on the most subtle level, 
the worker loses complete control over precisely what is produced and 
precisely how it is produced. This alienation from control reduces human 
labour to something like a machinaliun. In Lhis sense uf alie11aliu11, Lhe 
worker is reduced to a level that is somewhat parallel to a machine. 
Marx's question, then, is this: why are workers complicit within the 
structure of Western capitalism? In Marx's words: 
The life-process of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not 
strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, and is 
consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan (1867 [1959]: 84). 
Marx claims that there is something mysterious about the process of 
productivity in which men (and women) participate freely irrespective of 
their class. Marx notes that both parties (the ruling and the working classes) 
believe that they are free to participate in the capitalist economy. This idea of 
freedom is nevertheless false. The worker may appear to be free, but the 
worker is not truly free so long as she is alienated in the abovementioned 
ways. Instead of being a free subject, the worker is a commodity and is used by 
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the ruling class. On the surface, the worker may feel free. The worker has a 
use-value, and it is through that use-value that the worker gains a sense of 
importance. The worker sees status as a useful commodity. But, for Marx, 
this status is fetishistic. 
Marx describes the "fetishism" that is associated with commodities; a 
fetishism that leads to an ideology of commodification. The fetishism of 
commodities is revealed in the focus on their associated use-value as opposed 
to their survival value or on the conditions of their production. The use-
value of a commodity is, in turn, determined by the amount of time and 
work entailed in production and some arbitrarily defined status. But this 
status becomes removed from the value associated with subsistence and 
survival. The value is no longer based in communitarian participation for 
quality of life. Instead the status is based in the privilege attributed to those 
who have lots of money, commodities and the means to employ others. 
Therefore, as Marx argues, the fetish associated with products is the 
conversion of products to commodities with a value that is more aligned 
with status than with subsistence. (83) This kind of status gives those who 
have commodities the power which determines how everybody else lives. 
In Marx's view, people who have power in capitalist societies determine 
that everybody else depends upon production, exchange and use of 
commodities. Their privilege is determined by the ideology, rather than by 
thinking about quality of life. Production and use of goods are necessary for 
survival. But the added dimension of exchange distorts the value of goods 
for survival, creating the commodity. Commodification adds the arbitrary 
value of status over and above need. Status is accrued through the 
accumulation of goods over and above basic survival needs. But the 
valuation of status over general welfare generates a false consciousness in 
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Marx's view. We rally for status and it is this need for status that causes a 
false consciousness. 
Marxian analysis is an interrogation of the epistemology of specific class 
relations in which both parties, despite the outright inequity of status, remain 
complicit. Implicit within this view is the concept of alienation, in which the 
workers lose sight of themselves and their basic subsistence needs. Losing 
sight of their full potential as natural beings, the workers chase the possibility 
of status through ownership by viewing all objects, and themselves, as 
commodities. This is dehumanising because the workers are alienated from 
their labour, the product and from each other. The workers, according to 
Marx, are most disadvantaged by the false view that they, too, can have status. 
Even though the proletariat are complicit within the ideology of 
capitalism, Marx claims that workers have the potential to see precisely how 
the capitalist machine renders them disadvantaged. Marx uses Defoe's 
mythical island dwelling character Robinson Crusoe to make the point about 
false consciousness. The difference between Crusoe and any worker in a 
capitalist society is precisely that Crusoe gets to enjoy the fruit of his labour. 
{1867 [1959]: 81) The difference between Crusoe and most workers is this: 
Crusoe is not alienated from his work or his products. On Crusoe's island 
there is no exchange economy because there is nobody with whom to 
exchange goods. Crusoe, then, has the potential to know what true 
productivity is. 
Workers, according to Marx, have the potential to know what true 
productivity like Robinson Crusoe, even though they live in a social group. 
In Marx's words 
All the characteristics of Robinson's labour are here repeated, but with this difference, that 
they are social instead of individual. Everything produced by him was exclusively the 
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result of his own personal labour and therefore simply an object ofuse for himself. (1867 
[1959]: 83) 
Marx argues that living in a social group does not require alienation. He 
says that the individuals within a group could benefit from their own labour 
as does Crusoe, eliminating the false consciousness otherwise faced by those 
complicit in the race for status. In other words, individual workers within 
the group are not necessarily compelled to sell their labour. These 
individuals might make their own clothes, grow their own vegetables and 
make furniture for their own home, gaining satisfaction from the process of 
working at these thirtgs; and from using these things to meet their own needs 
for subsistence. Importantly, those who do work to meet their own 
subsistence gain a different perspective, or standpoint, from those caught up 
in the status qua of exchange. Moreover, having experienced alienation 
themselves, those workers might have a more comprehensive view of the 
social construction of labour than any member of the ruling class, who have 
not themselves experienced alienation, could ever have. So the standpoint 
of those who can see alienation for what it is turns out to be broader than the 
perspective of those who are complicit within the alienating structure of the 
workforce. Those who are complicit in alienation have a false consciousness 
and those who are not complicit have the advantage of a broader vision of 
capitalist values as being distorted beyond the needs of subsistence to create 
the arbitrary need for status. They have a privileged standpoint if, and only if, 
they incorporate their labour into social practices from which each participant 
has the benefits of enjoying the fruits of their collective labour. 
The capitalist is denied this kind of privilege, in Marx's view, being blinded 
by his own greed for power and status. Status is assessed as though it is an 
object. But status is only gained through communal agreement, making it 
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something created by knowledge rather than something which, like an object, 
exists. The commodification of status is only given through false 
consciousness. The ruling class do not have epistemic privilege, however, 
because their status is determined by what they have rather than by how they 
know. This, Marx explains, is how they become blinded. 
But Marx makes a similar error in his revisionary characterisation of the 
proletariat as having an epistemic privilege because their privilege is as much 
about having as it is about knowing. By bringing consciousness back into 
knowledge, as Marx does in the case of the proletariat, the privilege is not so 
much one of having knowledge as it is one of having experiences. The 
epistemic privilege is possible because the alienation as abstraction is 
cancelled, or negated, to produce experience as subjective knowledge. The 
negation of alienation is the negation of abstract knowledge in Marx's view, 
which makes way for subjective knowledge. Subjective knowledge is made 
possible by thinking about activities, or thinking about labour, making such 
knowledge impossible for the essentially lazy capitalists. 
In Hegelian terms, the Marxian move suggests that being-for-itself is not 
related to the being-in-itself when the worker is alienated. This, in turn, 
suggests that the worker develops self-consciousness at the expense of 
consciousness. We have already seen, in chapter three, that Lacan makes a 
similar move by claiming that we are "castrated", meaning that we are 
socialised according to the standards and practices of capitalist societies in 
such a way that our conscious awareness, or sensations, are repressed, 
alienated or "foreclosed" from our speech. The result, I argue, is a psycho-
zombie. But, if consciousness is alienated to the extent that there is no longer 
any conscious experience, how are we to explain subjective knowledge? We 
have already reviewed the alternatives and problems of claiming that 
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subjective knowledge is given by sensations: if it is knowing in-itself, rather 
than simply being-in-itself, experiences are understood as deeply private and 
cannot be communicated. That being the case, we are unable to explain how 
we know we are not zombies in the sense articulated in chapter two. 
Hartsock's claims about feminine knowledge are subject to the same dilemma 
to which Iris Young's account of maternal consciousness is subject. 
Hartsock's claims about masculinity suggest that all men are psycho-
zombies. In Hartsock's view, men are more alienated than women in the 
sexual division of labour. False consciousness produces the sexual division of 
labour because the worker is blinded to his own experiences as he rallies for 
power and status as a man who makes money while his wife stays at home 
and looks after the children. Women are largely caught up in the false 
consciousness, wanting to access status by supporting their husbands and 
being a good wife and a good molher.71 
71 We are reminded of de Beauvoir's concept of "bad faith" discussed in chapter one. But 
the difference between Hartsock and de Beauvoir is that the former argues for an epistemic 
privilege instead of arguing that epistemology is not a matter for consideration when we 
are thinking about the differences between the sexes. "Bad faith" comes about through 
having the knowledge to make choices to improve the conditions of existence but not acting 
upon that knowledge. Epistemic privilege, on the other hand, refers to a private 
knowledge which cannot be shared. The result is a claim by Hartsock for knowledge which 
can only be shared between women who have the same kinds of sexual bodies. And the 
privilege is increased, or so it appears by the argument, when women engage in maternity. 
The mistake is to think that the knowledge is privileged because such a claim leads to the 
possibility that mothers cannot know whether or not they are zombies for the same reasons 
I presented in my discussion of Young in chapter two. 
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But in Hartsock's view, the sexual division of labour is only part of the 
story. She argues that men are perverse. In this section I have presented an 
overview of Marxian alienation and false consciousness to demonstrate why 
Hartsock thinks we are all caught up in the rally for status through 
commodification. The partiality of masculinist consciousness is only part of 
the story for Hartsock, who argues further that the individualism of 
masculine epistemology is fundamentally perverse. 
iii Bataille and the incest taboo: perversion and feeling 
Lacan claims that there are two sorts of consciousness: one articulable and 
one inarticulable. The articulable consciousness is masculine because it is 
based in a false social consciousness which is traced back to the incest taboo. 
The inarticulable consciousness is feminine, in Lacan's view, again on the 
basis of the incest taboo. He claims the inarticulable sensuous consciousness 
is a libidinous drive which must be controlled so that humans can live 
together by agreed communitarian standards. In Lacan's view, however men 
and women have both sorts of consciousness, but their social position is 
determined by whether they have or lack the phallus. In Lacan's theory, one 
would not need to be Robinson Crusoe to see things as they really are: rather 
one needs only to transgress cultural taboos. Bataille follows Lacan in this 
direction. 
The fact that women and men continue to cohabit the world, despite their 
different perspectives suggests that social structures cannot be completely 
divorced from reality. The partiality of males, she claims, is evident in the fact 
they live out the abstract side of dualisms but their "perverseness" is located 
in "the substitution of death for life." Women nourish life in virtue of their 
child rearing labour whereas men seek out death. The reason they do so, in 
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Hartsock's view, stems back to the rigid ego boundaries. Their individuality 
suggests a discontinuity with others - Hartsock expresses this as being like a 
"walled city." So, these men are threatened in their associations with 
women, who do not have such defined individuality. The threatening aspect 
of confronting women leads to male domination, in Hartsock's view, 
gesturing towards "the links between sexual activity, domination and death." 
(230) Death, in this context, is primarily the death of the ego, or rigid identity 
of the individual, but extends to actual death.72 
The context is specific. Hartsock brings Bataille into her analysis of 
perverseness because he claims that death is a consequence of breaking down 
the ego-boundaries. But, she claims that "death emerges as the only possible 
solution to this discontinuity and has followed the logic through to argue that 
reproduction itself must be understood not as the creation of life, but as 
death." (230) She cites Bataille's claims about the shared prohibitions of erotic 
activity and human sacrifice. His colourful prose reads like a rape scene as a 
man penetrates the woman, who is at once stripped of her identity so that she 
loses the ability to distinguish between self and other. I will return to 
Bataille's claims about sacrifice and eroticism in this passage later. Hartsock 
takes this characterisation of Bataille's conception of violence to support her 
claims about male sexuality. She argues that "the links between violence, 
death and sexual fusion with another ... are not simply theoretical" if we take 
into account the actual incidence of rape, pornography and, even, "snuff" 
72Gwen thought there was an inconsistency in Hartsock's position: The contradiction between 
seeing male perversity in the isolatedness of mascul~nity and in the drive to break down this 
isolation. Gwen never got to developing this point, but intended it as a type of reductio on 
Hartsock's position. - eds. 
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movies. She says that Bataille's analysis of the links between sacrifice and 
eroticism help us to understand why men are turned on by snuff films. The 
woman who is killed in these films "is a sacrificial victim whose 
discontinuous existence has been succeeded by her death." {231) 
Bataille's claim to a link between reproduction and death fascinates 
Hartsock, but as I shall argue later, she misrepresents his theory. Moreover, it 
is not clear that she fully comprehends the significance of the epistemological 
death to which Bataille refers. The discontinuity is a shattering of self-
certainty. There is an association between the shattering of self-certainty, or 
death of the ego, and reproduction. As Hartsock says, the sperm and ovum 
unite to form a unity: two separate entities die in the making of a new life. 
Thus, as she says, Bataille claims that "love is an urge towards death." But 
here the context has shifted back to eroticism in which the ego boundaries are 
shattered when two {or more) people engaged in sexual activities stop 
thinking and are lost to experience. 
In the context of reproduction, again, Hartsock charges Bataille with 
dismissing growth "as being only 'impersonal"' which is not the female 
experience. Hartsock says for females pregnancy is neither impersonal, nor 
experienced as death. This, she writes, 
bespeaks a profound lack of empathy and refusal to recognize the very being of another. 
It is a manifestation of the chasm which separates every man from every other being and 
from the natural world, the chasm which both marks and defines the problem of 
community. (231) 
The exegesis of Bataille is confused and confusing. Hartsock presents to us, 
on one hand, Bataille's idea that death is a solution to the discontinuity of 
individualism; on the other hand he suggests a continuity in the personal 
experiences of those Hartsock herself claims have some universal 
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consciousness: mothers. Bataille's conception of pregnancy as impersonal 
leads her to claim that the Bataillean man cannot recognise another's 
existence as such. The individual, who is discontinuous with others, is both a 
sign of a lack of properly communitarian values; and of the establishment of 
values as such. Bataille's denial of individual women's experiences is 
sufficient ground to suppose that insofar as there are communities they are 
constructed though men as individual agents and woman as being's who are 
recognized as having no individuality at all. 
To summarise, Hartsock presents Bataille as exemplar of perverse 
masculinity. She takes his ideas about "discontinuity" to support her vision 
of rigid ego boundaries between men. He claims that the only way to 
overcome individuality is in "death." Citing a passage about religious 
sacrifice from his book Erotism she suggests he takes women to be selfless 
beings. Moreover, she says, he proves that all men are violent in love, 
because they fear the possibility that women can undo their individuality. 
This fear stems from the oedipus complex, but nonetheless manifests time 
and time again through men's erotic experiences, their interest in 
pornography and, most incredibly, the fact that men both make and watch 
films in which women are killed as sex objects. To be sure, this is an extreme 
manifestation of the association between sex and death. Men's rigid ego 
boundaries are thus taken to explain rape and other forms of violence 
towards women. 
Not only does she charge Bataille with sexual violence against women, 
Hartsock also argues that his vision of reproductive continuity undermines 
women's particular experiences in pregnancy. She claims that Bataille's 
"dismissal of the experience of another bespeaks a profound lack of empathy 
and refusal to recognize the very being of another." {231) Indeed, if Bataille 
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endorsed gratuitous violence, as Hartsock represents him, she would have a 
point. But she misrepresents his position rather seriously. Rather than 
present violence as a way of returning to some pre-oedipal state of nature 
which is violent and threatening, as Hartsock suggests, Bataille argues that 
violence is a product of culture. In his view, nature is not violent because 
there are no natural laws which can be violated. In his view, violence is only 
possible because humans construct laws which can be violated, so he defines 
violence as the violation of a culturally prescribed taboo. 
Breaking rules leads to experiences which are otherwise supposed to be 
impossible for speaking subjects. Bataille claims that transgressing taboos does 
not set us back into some primordial state which is fundamentally violent, 
but that the transgression itself is violent in such a way that we lose a sense of 
ourselves as subjects because these experiences bring about a kind of empathy, 
or feeling with another. He argues that the discontinuous individuality of 
the subject shatters in situations where each person feels with each other, 
bringing about a kind of continuity between two individuals.73 In Bataille's 
view, the empathy is produced by transgression of taboos; particularly those 
taboos which are supposed to stop humans from regressing into a state 
thought to be closer to animal existence than to the progressive conditions of 
human subjects. 
Bataille's account of discontinuity is at odds with that of a Hegelian or 
Marxian psychoanalytic interpretation. Bataille agrees that, as subjects, we are 
discontinuous with others. But in Bataille's view, the discontinuity is not 
marked by the moment we use language in virtue of some putative incest 
73 Richardson sets out some passages to sum up Bataille's perspective of death. See 
Bataille (1988), (1986) and (1988b). 
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taboo. Rather, he claims that we are discontinuous beings from birth and that 
we seek out ways to communicate our continuity thereafter. Although he 
argues that this communication ultimately takes place in language, Bataille 
argues that we can also experience continuity as adults at times, in eroticism, 
for example. These experiences shatter the delusion of the unitary subject, in 
Bataille's view, because the Hegelian subject is supposed to grow out of these 
non-conceptual visceral episodes. But, like Sellars, Bataille is clear that 
having experiences is not the same as knowing them. Making sense of our 
experiences, and knowing them as such, requires that we can communicate 
about them in language. 
Bataille's novels depict gruesome scenarios, including rape and murder, to 
show that he can write about experiences which are thought to lie outside the 
Law, to use Lacan's terminology, proving that such experiences are not 
iua1 lkulal.Jle. Eiulicisrn is oue lype of e.x..pedence Balaille characterises to 
make us feel something, so I will present a passage from his well known Story 
of the Eye: {1982) to demonstrate: 
I grew up very much alone, and as far back as I recall I was frightened of anything sexual. 
I was nearly sixteen when I met Simone, a girl my own age, at the beach in X. Our 
families being distantly related, we quickly grew intimate. Three days after our first 
meeting, Simone and I were alone in her villa. She was wearing a black pinafore with a 
starched white collar. I began to realise that she shared my anxiety at seeing her, and I 
felt even more anxious that day because I hoped she would be stark naked under the 
pinafore. She had black silk stockings on covering her knees, but I was unable to see as 
far up as the cunt (this name .. .is I think, by far the loveliest of the names for the vagina). 
It merely struck me that by slightly lifting the pinafore, I might see her private parts 
unveiled. (1982: 9-10) 
In the opening page of Story of the Eye, Bataille depicts an instance of 
prohibited sexual desire through the instance of incest. The narrator of the 
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Story of the Eye and Simone are "distantly related." Despite this, they are 
about to embark on a sexual relationship. 
Bataille's account of the sexual forays both between the two distantly related 
characters in Story of the Eye, and of these two with others, is not a gratuitous 
account of incestuous sexuality. His story is founded upon their incestuous 
desire to mirror the assumptions of Levi-Strauss and Freud, each of whom 
claim that prohibition of incest differentiates between humans and animals. 
He mentions Freud, and the story of incest in the "primal horde," but is more 
interested in what Levi-Strauss has to say on the topic. In Bataille's words: 
Levi-Strass contrasts the state of nature with that of culture, roughly as animals are 
generally contrasted with man. This prompts him to say that the prohibition of incest 
(and of course he also has in mind the complementary rules of exogamy) "is the primary 
step thanks to which, through which, and especially in which, the transition from Nature 
to Culture is made." 
(1986: 198) 
The consequence of claiming that incest marks this transition from 
nature to culture is that humans are humans precisely because of "our 
decision to eschew the loose freedom of sexual conduct and the natural 
and unformulated life of the animals." In other words, the incest taboo is 
understood by Levi-Strauss as the distinguishing factor between humans 
and animals. But, Bataille argues, this "formula may well imply the final 
ambition that links with knowledge the desire to reveal man to himself 
and thus to take over the potentialities of the whole universe." (1986: 198) 
The link between knowledge and desire to which Bataille refers tells us 
that the ability to think about forbidden experiences produces a 
particularly human desire. The Story of the Eye makes the reader think 
about what it is like to transgress the incest taboo: the book produces erotic 
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feelings in (at least some) readers. But it is not incest itself which is erotic 
here, it is that the erotic feelings are produced by doing something that we 
are not, as civilised humans, supposed to do. 
Bataille is critical of the very sort of "abstract" subjectivity I have labelled 
the psycho-zombie, numbed out of its feeling states by growing up in a 
capitalist/patriarchal society. The psycho-zombie is alienated from the truth of 
her /his species being or "animal consciousness". This species being, or animal 
consciousness, associated with the Hegelian in-itself or sense-certainty, is cut 
off by all of those prohibitions which tell us not to focus on our feelings. As 
Bataille puts it 
It must also be agreed that there is a connection between man's denial of the world as he 
finds it and his denial of the animal element in himself... There is therefore an aspect of 
the transition from animal to human so radically negative that no one talks about it. 
(1986: 215) 
He says that humans deny our feelings to the point that we do not even 
realise that we are doing so. We are able to do so because of our 
"elementary" abilities the very same silencing Hegel, from Bataille's point 
of view, "himself obeying with his silence the perdurable taboos we all 
abide by." (1986: 215) Or, to put it another way, Hegel's own blindness to 
human feelings is produced by an enduring result of the social effort to 
normalise taboos. 
The conventions regarding our bodily waste products are not given any conscious 
consideration... On this point the denial is so absolute that we think it beside the point 
to notice and to assert that here is something worthy of comment." (Bataille, 1986: 215) 
The psycho-zombie is thus produced in Hegel's vision of the human 
animal. But, this non-feeling human construction has the very type of 
dualist consciousness Hartsock claims that Bataille has. He does not disagree 
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that it is perverse, but he would disagree that all rational humans are psycho-
zombies. There is, in Bataille's view, a way to conceive rational humans 
other than as the individuals described by Hegel. 
Bataille's alternative conception is communitarian, based in practices 
described by anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1954). Bataille notes that Levi-
Strauss' discussion of incest is also inspired by Mauss. But he argues that 
Levi-Strauss' conception of women as the ultimate gift between men is short-
sighted. (1986: 197-220) The practices of gift-giving and generosity of spirit 
identified by Mauss does not describe a simple act of exchanging commodities, 
or objects. Bataille uses the example of champagne, arguing that it is a gift in 
which everyone present partakes with the person who gives. As Bataille 
puts it: 
More precisely, festivities entail an outward-goingness, a refusal to turn in upon oneself, 
and so the calculations of the miser, logical though they may be, are denied the highest 
value. The sexual relationship is itself a communication and a movement, it is like a 
celebration by nature, because it is essentially a communication it provokes an outward 
movement in the first place. 
When the violent movement of the senses has been accomplished, a retraction and a 
renunciation are called for. But the recoil also requires a rule to organise the merry-go-
round and ensure the return of the forward movement. (1986: 207) 
He claims that the individualism of the miser is not highly valued because 
he refuses to really engage with others. Similarly, in Bataille's view, the 
exchange of women described by Levi-Strauss leaves out the importance of 
engagement. As he says, the woman's father "gives" his daughter, but the 
generosity of gift-giving Bataille is interested in cannot be located in any 
exchange as such. The engagement is based in sharing the carnality of being 
human: a carnality, he claims, that is often obscured by the ritual of marriage. 
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In Bataille's view, gift-giving in general is more appropriately described 
when we think about the way each partner feels in the sexual engagement. 
There is a violent eruption of experience in which the exuberant sensuality 
stills the linguistic thoughts in a silent communication. The merry-go-round 
of linguistic thoughts later returns to enable the "retraction and 
renunciation" of moving back from the other/sand thinking about the 
experience so that it can be renounced. But, according to Bataille, Levi-Straus 
supposes that the gift is the renunciation: the rational ability qua "the refusal 
of an immediate animal satisfaction with no strings attached." (218) The two 
views are thus opposed: Bataille takes the feelings to be essential to the gift 
whereas Levi Strauss understands the gift to be the rationality with which we 
are able to deny those very feelings. 
In this section I have briefly outlined the differences between Bataille and 
Levi-Strauss' conceptions of gift-giving. Bataille claims that the generosity is 
carnal insofar as the gift is identified with sharing sensuous experiences. 
Levi-Strauss, on the other hand, takes the Hegelian perspective of human 
progress, seeing rationality and the ability to make taboos as the gift. But, in 
Bataille's view, taking rationality as the gift which makes us human leads us 
towards the miserly values of individualism. Such miserly values are based 
in commodities, taking even women as objects or things which can be given 
away in order to deny the feeling dimension of the speaking being. "The 
taboo does not alter the violence of sexual activity, but for disciplined 
mankind it opens a door closed to animal nature, namely, transgression of 
the law." (219) 
So, the psycho-zombie is never really cut off from his abilities to feel so 
long as there are laws to be transgressed. The laws draw our attention to 
situations which enable us to get in touch with the otherwise repressed 
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feelings. Bataille argues that these feelings are possible for every man who is 
socially-constructed in the vision of masculinity proposed by Hegel. This 
version of masculinity is precisely that proposed by Hartsock. Bataille does 
not agree with Hegel's distinction between nature and culture, or woman and 
man, inner experience and abstract knowledge. Moreover, he argues that 
human sensuality is not a foundation for abstract thought: to the contrary, 
the concepts are necessary so that we can know about our experiences. 
iv Bataille, death and self discipline 
"Dying to oneself" is a Christian doctrine which Bataille associates with 
sensuality. "What it condemns is the dragging weight of attachment to the 
self, in the guise of pride and mediocrity and self-satisfaction." (1986: 230) But, 
within the Christian religion, Bataille notes, there is a distinction between 
mystical experience and genital sexuality. The mystics who deny their genital 
sexuality set themselves against life, and are "seduced by a form that spells 
death." (231) These mystics deny life, because they deny their corporeal 
existence which is a kind of death. The denial of this life is rewarded, they 
suppose, with eternal life. The figurative death of the individual who does 
not live for the experiences of this life is a peculiar human trait.74 
Turning to the animal kingdom, Bataille says "Nature ties up life and 
death in genital matters." He presents the example of animals which die 
when giving birth, as though that were "nature's intentions." He notes the 
amount of energy invested in the birth, claiming it is easy to describe such a 
death as a waste of energy which is nonetheless productive. There is at once a 
14 The influence of Nietzsche on Bataille is evident in his views about Christianity. 
See Nietzsche (1973). 
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loss, through death, and an increase, through birth: but the contradiction is 
explained away (Bataille cites Schopenhauer) as "Nature's purpose." In 
Bataille's words: "No one bothered to reflect that "Nature" behaved in a 
ridiculous way." (232) The contradiction of having life at the moment of 
death, or death at the moment of life is crucial to Bataille's theory of 
experience as a figurative death. 
The animal who dies giving birth can be "subordinated to the result" in 
Bataille's view. Looking at outcomes leads us to believe that the animal's 
death is in some way important to survival of the species. Bataille is more 
concerned with the moment of death, however, using the example of a drone 
flying towards a bee as though the creature could know that its death is near. 
Unlike humans, bees live for the moment. Human's on the other hand, tend 
to live for the future. As Bataille says, "divine life requires that the seeker 
after it shall die." (233) Aspiring to the divine requires putting to death the 
experiences of the flesh and living in the hope of an eternal after-life. 
In Bataille's view, dying to oneself is denial of the instincts to survive. The 
drone flies blindly towards the queen bee, not stopping to think that its end is 
near. Humans are not so blinded by passion: we do think about consequences 
and know what to expect. Bataille cites the "holy man" who breaks his vow of 
chastity through temptation, suggesting that the sexual engagement brings 
about a death, but that death is "contrary of the one which is the condition of 
eternal life." The condition for eternal life is death of the body, or of the 
"creature organized for duration and growth." Preparing the body for eternal 
life is nonetheless a kind of death of this creature. Living out the sensuality of 
the human creature, on the other hand, leads to a figurative death of the 
human subject. Too much self control thus leads to death of sensual 
experience. 
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As Bataille says, "The orgasm is popularly termed 'the little death'." The 
sensuous explosion of the orgasm is a figurative death because it is a loss of 
control. Love is similarly endowed with "a sense of loss within us." (239) "It 
is the desire to live while ceasing to live, or to die without ceasing to live, the 
desire of an extreme state" similar to mystical experience. (239-240) But, says 
Bataille, this death is also "the ultimate stage of life; if I die because I cannot 
die it is on condition that I live on; because of the death I feel though still 
alive and still live on." {240) The death of conscious thought, or the silencing 
of inner speech is the moment of feeling alive. The figurative death is the 
death of the figurative because it is a loss of self control. In Bataille's view this 
is a moment of focussing upon what it feels like to live. 
Nevertheless, Bataille warns, problems emerge when we attempt to cling to 
the life of feeling. On one hand we establish institutions like marriage 
through fear of losing our beloved and the life brought about by sexual union. 
Marriage is institutionalised as a mystical union, he offers, but not without its 
problems. He notes the tendency towards violence that takes place in 
marriage without condoning it. We confuse love with material organisation, 
in Bataille's view, alluding to the idea that a man owns his wife. On the other 
hand, he claims, men turn towards prostitutes, often leading to a life of crime 
and laziness. He is wary of the two extremes: too much discipline or too 
little. 
The life of the underworld is not to be envied. It has lost a certain vital resilience without 
which humanity could sink too low. All it does is exploit a complete loss of self-
control, unimaginatively and in a way that minimises apprehension for the future. 
Having submitted umestrainedly to the pleasure of losing self-control it has made lack of 
control into a constant state with neither savour nor interest." (244) 
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This passage demonstrates that Bataille is not proposing that humans 
ought to attempt a life outside the law. But neither does he propose we abide 
by all the taboos set in place so that we can live a morally superior existence by 
transcending our carnality. He proposes a kind of middle way between 
mysticism and eroticism; good and evil; word and flesh; life and death. 
If my reasoning has been followed it will be apparent that with intentions and key images 
analogous in both spheres, a mystical impulse of thought may always set off 
involuntarily the same reflex that an erotic image would. If this is so the converse must 
also be true. (247-248) 
In Bataille's view the mystical and the erotic are both felt in the genitals: 
they are both embodied experiences. Images, objects or people can set off a 
chain of unexpected feelings in both domains, suggesting that erotic 
experience and mystical experience are the same type of experience. Each is 
deeply sensual, but one is supposed to be spiritual, and thus mental, whereas 
the other is corporeal, but nonetheless a type of conscious awareness. I will 
now examine Bataille's claims that experience can not be reduced to a type of 
knowledge. 
Bataille turns to a discussion of eroticism and its lack of place in 
philosophy. 
My starting point is that eroticism is a solitary activity. At the least it is a matter 
difficult to discuss. For not only conventional reasons, eroticism is defined by secrecy. 
It cannot be public. I might instance some exceptions but somehow eroticism is outside 
ordinary life. In our experience taken as a whole it is cut off from the normal 
communication of emotions. There is a taboo in force... The philosopher can speak of 
everything he feels. Erotic experience will commit us to silence. (252) 
I have shown above that Bataille conceives of eroticism as a particularly 
human version of sexuality in which there is a death of self-consciousness 
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and a sense of vitality. It is particularly human because we have self-
knowledge and, with that knowledge we learn how to control our impulses 
and desires. Unlike bees, we know when we take risks and we can think 
through the consequences. Philosophy is the discipline through which we 
understand these processes. But, in Bataille's view, there is something about 
the intensity of erotic experience which defies philosophical analysis. 
He says, philosophers can speak of everything we feel, whereas erotic 
experience commits us to silence. "I mean that it is difficult to live and to 
philosophise simultaneously." In Bataille's view, philosophising is one 
experience among many others: "philosophy is the sum of the possibles in the 
sense of a synthesis, or nothing." (254) With Hegel in mind, Bataille claims 
that "Eroticism can only be envisaged dialectically, and conversely the 
dialectician, if he does not confine himself to formalism, necessarily has his 
eyes fixed on his own sexual experience." (254) Seeing eroticism dialectically, 
as Hegel does, leads to a denial of experience because of a valuation of 
formalism, or abstract ideas over immediate experiences. The experiences 
need to be sublated into a higher form. Seeing eroticism dialectically, as 
Bataille does, leads to the silence of having experiences when there is nothing 
left to say about them. In Bataille's view, Hegel's approach values experiences 
negatively in relation to positive concepts. Hegel promotes having lots of 
ideas as though having experiences were a bad thing. 
According to Bataille, Hegel's vision of the dial~ctic is drawn from 
theology. His theological influences promote a vision of life through the 
word, at the expense of the flesh. Hegel's system thus overemphasises 
discipline in order to diminish the reality of lived experiences. 
But Hegel's practically impenetrable system, even if it were the ultimate in philosophy, 
certainly has this quality of specialised discipline. It assembles ideas, but at the same 
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time cuts those assembled ideas off from experience. That no doubt was his ambition, for 
in Hegel's mind the immediate is bad, and Hegel would certainly have identified what I 
call experience with the immediate. (255) 
In Bataille's view, Hegel is a master of abstraction who promotes a life in 
which experience is shunned. The synthesis of the dialectic is "a speech 
delivered in successive phases" at the expense of the experiences of each 
moment. Experience is subordinated to speech in Hegel's dialectic. 
Bataille draws a distinction between "working time" and "sacred time." 
Philosophy is work, in his view. 
That is to say that it excludes without even deigning to notice them the moments of 
intense emotion I referred to earlier. Hence it is not that sum of the possibles seen as a 
synthesising operation that I take to be of cardinal value. It is not the sum of the 
possibles, the sum of possible experiences, but only the sum of certain well-defined 
experiences aimed at knowledge. It is only the sum of knowledge. With a clear 
conscience, even with a feeling of getting rid of a foreign body, getting rid of some muck, 
or at least of a source of error, it leaves out the intense emotion bound up with birth, 
with the creation oflife as with death. (258-259) 
Philosophy is work because it is another kind of productive enterprise. 
Part of the productivity entails getting rid of that which is deemed 
unnecessary. Everything aims towards knowledge, to the extent that Hegel 
says that everything can be known. But, Hegel leaves out the compossibility 
of having knowledge and having intense experiences surrounding life and 
death. (We have seen already what Hegel does: he delegates women to be 
bearers of all experience so that men can get on with the progressive tasks 
associated with philosophy and with knowledge.) Knowledge as such is a 
putting to death, in Bataille's view, with the sum of knowledge only ever 
accounting for "certain well-defined experiences" in the face of denial of the 
"muck" of human existence from which we only think we can escape. 
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Bataille suggests that the reduction of all experience to the status of 
knowledge is a kind of category mistake. 
All the time the mind, the brain of man is reduced to the state of a container overflowing 
with, burst by its contents - like a suitcase into which objects keep being put which 
stops being a suitcase in the end, since it ceases to enclose the objects entrusted to it. 
And above all, extreme states bring an element that cannot be subjected to calm reflection 
into the sum of the possibles. (259-260) 
In Bataille's view, the mind is not a thing to be filled and thoughts are not 
things to put somewhere. Nor are experiences simply the "objects" in 
opposition to the knowing subject, as though these objects can be somehow 
preserved in immature stages of conceptual development. In experience, he 
argues, we are in a process of being "beside ourselves" which is not "working 
time," but "sacred time." He continues: 
The fact ofremaining open to possibilities bordering on madness (which is what happens 
with any possibilities concerned with eroticism, with the threat, or more often the 
presence, of death, or with sanctity) keeps the work of reflection continually subordinate 
to something else, and just here reflection comes to an end. (260) 
Reflection is subordinate to ideas about experiences, not to the experiences 
themselves. Being open to the experiences of life and death requires that we 
feel these experiences to the core, as they produce a sharp ache throughout 
our body. The pain stops us from being able to focus on abstract reflections, 
instead planting us in a moment of worldly existence. But such "sacred time" 
blocks our headspace so that we are unable to work: no longer productive. 
Having experiences of such an intense nature gets in the way of philosophy 
because we are unable to concentrate on the ideas which help us to discipline 
our work. Moreover, moving into the experience causes all reflection to 
cease while we are immersed in the vitality of the moment. Reflection 
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returns, of course, after the experience, but Bataille warns that over-
indulgence in experiences can lead to some kind of madness because the self-
control is lost and with that goes inner speech.75 
"More often than not we forget that philosophy is as competitive as any 
game" says Bataille, lamenting the fact that experiences make us silent. 
Thinking about experiences is not the same as having them and his point is 
that he needs to take time away from philosophy to have experiences. But 
the competitive nature of the game leaves him disadvantaged if he has not 
also produced ideas. 
In agreeing to compete I have personally found it necessary to accept the difficulties of 
both paths, the path of transgression as well as the path of work. The limit occurs when 
it is plainly impossible to respond in both directions at the same time. (261) 
The limit of philosophy, in Bataille's view, is that we can chatter about 
experiences as much as we like, but to do so is not the same as feeling them. 
And we cannot do both at once: we cannot congeal experiences into thoughts 
because experiences of the intensity Bataille is writing about leave us silent. 
The dialectical synthesis in Hegel's philosophy nevertheless suggests that the 
experiences are the objects of thought which sit somewhere in our minds in 
opposition to ourselves as subjects. Bataille disagrees. Experiences are not 
75Bataille proposes a transgression of philosophy. An erotic transgression of the canon? 
Perhaps having a stripper at a philosophy paper, as Patricia Petersen did at the 
Australasian Association of Philosophers conference. (1998) As a member of the audience I 
noticed a certain silence which struck the audience: particularly among some of the men 
who were solicited to remove pieces of the stripper's clothing, their chattering minds 
stilled, momentarily, by the silent but nonetheless evident sensations stirring their bodies. 
I wondered at the time whether this is the kind of transgression Bataille is suggesting. 
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objects: they are experiences of the subject "beside ourselves;" the felt 
impressions which cannot be reduced to inner speech. 
"Eroticism is silence, I have said; it is solitude. But not for people whose 
very presence in the world is a pure denial of silence, a chattering, a neglect of 
potential solitude." (264) The solitary body delimits the experience as one's 
own. The experiences of eroticism are not a form of knowledge because they 
are part of that body. They can only be experienced in solitude, even though 
they can be known by anyone. There is nothing more to say through having 
the experience, leaving Bataille silent. 
It could be said that Bataille is arguing from a privileged standpoint - the 
standpoint of having erotic experiences - without claiming to have special 
knowledge. All he knows is that experience silences him; is sacred. He does 
not claim special authority, suggesting instead that philosophers take time 
out to have a few such experiences. The privilege is not epistemic and does 
not grant him epistemic authority. 
Bataille's standpoint on experience is both similar to and different from 
Hartsock's. The similarities lie in the Marxian theme: reflecting on situated 
experiences gives a different perspective. The experiences of subsistence; of 
life; of species being remind us about what it is like to have a body, among 
other things. Eroticism, manual labour, pregnancy, birthing, menstruation, 
illness, nursing, childcare, laughter, anguish, travelling in a foreign country -
or somehow else being launched into a moment of experience - gives us the 
opportunity to see things differently. But there are not just two points of 
view: masculine/feminine; ruling class/working class; white/"other;" 
straight/gay; man/woman. Nor is there any special knowledge to be gained 
by claiming to be a particular kind of person having a particular kind of 
experience. Experience shatters the coagulated categories of identity and 
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multiplies each according to the particularity of a single body, in a specific 
place at a specific time, among others who together embody a host of 
standards and practices by which they abide. The knowledge is to be found in 
their agreement about what counts as true in a general sense, and anyone can 
have that. The similarities between Hartsock and Bataille are already lost in 
her claim that women have a privileged standpoint just because they are 
women. 76 
Bataille makes possible the idea that intensity of experience is potentially 
universal. It is possible that the woman giving birth shares something of the 
intensity of her experience with someone experiencing severe pain from 
another cause. She may also share something with someone engaged in 
erotic practices, as well as with those who have religious experiences. The 
shared fact is not a matter of locating the experience as a particular experience 
uecause lltal is lo move batk. iulo inne1 speech and lo start chattering - to lose 
the moment in a shift from experience. From Bataille's perspective 
experience is silent precisely because there is death of the chatter. 
Hartsock commits a fascinating error in her claims about masculine 
perversity. The curious fact emerges in Bataille's discussion of the parallel 
between erotic experience and mysticism. The silence of experience is usually 
associated with femininity, especially maternity, and is an important theme 
in this thesis. ]ouissance, as Lacan and Kristeva put it; private knowledge in 
76When it is knowledge about experience, how it feels for an individual, we are 
inquiring about a particular biochemical system. Hormones may play a role, but when it 
comes to feeling, the essential elements are going to be proportions of various transmitters. 
Serotonin and other such endorphins play a role in experience and it is more likely these 
will produce the final effect than any hormones. 
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Young's view; immanence, for de Beauvoir. Self and world merge; subject 
and object are indistinct: there can be no knowledge. This is the self 
experiencing her body in its intensity, in birth for instance. In intense 
experiences, Bataille argues, we do not experience our bodies as "object," or as 
"subject." Instead, we are divided between experience (which takes over the 
whole body and mind; not just the torso) and knowledge (which is located by 
the chattering in the head; not by the eyes). The whole idea of experiences as 
objects in opposition to knowing subjects is like the idea of stuffing the mind 
as though it were a suitcase; misguided. For, in experience, the feeling of 
corporeality is less a mode of thought than a mode of existence. Being present 
to a mode of existence requires taking time out from thinking. Perversity is 
not a mode of abstract consciousness at all: perversity is outside the law 
precisely because it does not entail thinking; and thought is always guided by 
speech. 
Experience will not necessarily add new ideas to a philosophy bent on 
numbers, but will add different perspectives on ideas. Bataille claims that 
language tends to take us out of the world of practice: too much thinking 
makes us numb, like the psycho-zombies described earlier. 
Humans are not zombies, in Bataille's view, indicating that anyone who 
experiences the intensity of life and death will know. Bataille's 
characterisation of experience as non-knowledge draws our attention to the 
relationship between philosophy and that which Hegel associates with 
femininity. Hegel claims that ministering to the intensely experienced 
moments of life and death is women's duty. Bataille draws the association 
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between experience and mysticism, which is also associated with femininity 
and maternity.77 
The problem with gendered knowledge is that women are understood only 
to have one "kind" of knowledge, whereas men are understood only to have 
another "kind." The two kinds are divided, by the psychological 
phenomenologist who peers into her or his own mind to "see" what is going 
on. Women claim to see more experiences than men; men claim to see 
more ideas than women. But when women start arguing that our 
experiences give us special knowledge we bark up the wrong tree. For, as 
Bataille says, experiences are not knowledge and we do need to take time out 
from philosophising about them so we can have them. 
We have no more to say about our experiences except that we have had 
one, so it is not having new experiences that counts. But we can bring in a 
new perspective on an old topic. The topic of zombies is old enough, but the 
maternal perspective is new. Mothers know that we are not zombies because 
we have these experiences and, even though we may not add to the "suitcase 
of ideas," we have a kind of silent authority. Experience is not knowledge, 
77 Kristeva argues that maternity is represented by the figure of Virgin Mary: silent, 
head bowed, martyr, mother of God. (1983: 234-263) The self in this discourse is "an 
impossible elsewhere, a sacred beyond, a vessel of divinity, a spiritual tie with the 
ineffable godhead." (1980:301) This is the subject who has conscious awareness but whose 
awareness is not linguistic. Maternity is like the mystical fusion of the self with one's 
experience. Awareness of the experience engulfs speech, rendering the experience ineffable 
because the experiences silence the mother. The mystical mother cannot tell us what it is 
like to be pregnant, in other words, because the experience is a special sort of private 
knowledge. 
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and zombies are impossible. Hartsock does not show how we know we have 
experiences. 
Hartsock's theory merely reinforces the gender stereotypes as though men 
are better at talking and abstracting whereas women have lots of experiences 
without having much to say about abstract entities. Men are stereotyped as 
disciplinarians, taking on the paternal role, and giving license to paternalism. 
Women are stereotyped as silent martyrs, kissing grazed knees without 
warning about the next accident. In psychoanalytic theory discipline is 
masculinized whereas silence is femininized. 
Bataille's characterisation of self-discipline suggests that each parent teach 
her or his child how to live, not by too rigid, nor too lax, self-control. The 
same lesson applies to everyone, including parents, in the ongoing learning 
process of life, balancing work and sacred time. Experience is solitary, in 
Bataille's view. Each person brings a new perspective on experience, from 
different contexts or situations. The quality of knowledge can change with a 
shift of focus from quantity of knowledge. 
conclusion 
I have presented the details of Bataille's argument here to show that it is 
misleading to take a passage from his book on Eroticism, Death and 
Sensuality to support an argument that Bataille epitomises the false 
consciousness of masculinity. I have shown that he shares Hartsock's disdain 
for abstract thought at the expense of valuing experience for its own sake. He 
implicitly agrees with Hartsock about the nature of philosophy insofar as each 
claims that philosophers' ideas dominate over their individual experiences. 
(Hartsock, 228) Hartsock claims that such ideology is essentially masculine. 
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Bataille, on the other hand, claims that such ideology is based in a 
fundamental distrust in the human capacity for self-discipline. 
Taboos are constructed, in Bataille's view, because of the human valuation 
of productivity, or "working time" over stillness, or "sacred time." He argues 
that the human animal seeks to control the world, and is able to exact control 
through thinking about what is possible. Philosophy is valued for the 
production of ideas to this end: namely, transcending what we are given 
through bringing to light new ways to live and new things to have. But, in 
Bataille's view, the very requirement to produce ideas limits our abilities to 
see that which is given. The discipline which is applied to focussing upon 
and developing ideas is simultaneously a means of controlling the mind so 
that there is no time to focus upon experiences. Moreover, as Bataille says, 
the intense experiences of life, eroticism and death make it very difficult to 
think clearly about abstract ideas. 
Bataille draws our attention to the Hegelian synthesis as a mode of 
explaining away the silent solitude of our corporeality. The assembly of ideas 
in dialectical synthesis requires focussing on ideas as much to discipline 
oneself as to gather together the threads of a coherent explanation. The 
discipline of staying with ideas requires that the thinker does not dwell upon 
experiences. "It assembles ideas, but at the same time cuts those assembled 
ideas off from experience ... for in Hegel's mind the immediate is bad, and 
Hegel would certainly have identified what I call experience with the 
immediate." (Bataille, 255) Experiences are evaluated as "bad" and ideas are 
evaluated as "good." The evaluations are drawn, in turn, from theological 
dialecticians: flesh is "bad" and the word is "good." Experiences of the flesh 
must be disciplined according to the word of god. Taboos are invented, and 
transgressions of these taboos punished with nothing short than death. But 
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death, in this religious context, is the recognition of the finitude of this life 
without promise of an afterlife. Moreover, the figurative death - the death of 
inner speech and thus self control - gives life precisely because experiences 
drive to the core of our felt existence. 
So it is ironic that Hartsock paints a picture of Bataille as the perverse 
individual who goes around in a discontinuous void of self-certainty, 
nonetheless threatened by the women he violates and kills so easily. I do not 
see Bataille in this light. 78 He does not recommend that anyone violate 
another person and shows disdain towards those who give "free rein to a 
huge and squalid derision." (243) He does not condone laziness, stealing or 
killing to stay alive, seeing such as "basically a question of a revolting 
lowering of standards, of a vulgar abortiveness." (244) Such a way of living 
lacks a certain vitality, he says, "without which humanity could sink too low. 
All it does is exploit a complete loss of self-control, unimaginatively and in a 
way that minimises apprehension for the future." (244) Lack of self-control is 
unsavoury and uninteresting, in Bataille's view. Self control, on the other 
hand, is brought about through balancing "working time" with "sacred time." 
78 To be sure, it is well known that he was involved in a secret society acephale 
(headless). The group wanted to perform a public sacrifice, it is said, but no one was 
prepared to kill, even though there were plenty who offered to be the sacrificial victim. 
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Chapter Six: 
subjective authority and childbirth 
In the course of this thesis I have spelled out the issues arising from the 
Cartesian and Hegelian conceptions of first person authority in pregnancy. 
For both Descartes or Hegel, and for their many contemporary successors, 
having an experience counts as having knowledge, albeit ineffable 
knowledge. From both Cartesian and Hegelian perspectives, subjective 
knowledge is cognitive but immature in relation to objective knowledge. 
The pregnant woman's authority is private, deeply subjective and open to 
scepticism, suggesting that there are more objective ways to know about 
pregnancy than from the woman's point of view. So, according to both 
Cartesian and Hegelian philosophy, the pregnant woman has first person 
authority, but this kind of authority carries less epistemic weight than the 
more objective scientific knowledge about pregnancy. 
I have presented four distinct feminist conceptions of the pregnant 
woman's knowledge. Iris Marion Young and Nancy Hartsock, I have argued, 
repeat the Cartesian and Hegelian error of making sensory awareness a 
cognitive foundation for all other knowledge. This raises insuperable 
epistemic problems inherited from Cartesian metaphysics of mind-body 
interaction in which these views are ultimately grounded. Simone de 
Beauvoir and Julia Kristeva each challenge the cognitive status of that kind of 
primitive experience in Hegel's phenomenology. I have shown that their 
distinction between the cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions of 
experience provides a much more promising framework for theorizing this 
kind of first-person experience and the knowledge to which it gives rise. 
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In chapter two I introduced Wilfrid Sellars' myth of the given as a way of 
spelling out the distinction between non-cognitive awareness in experience 
and cognitive awareness of experiences as the kinds of experiences that they 
are. Experience does not stand as authoritative, in Sellars' view, unless we 
can accurately describe both the experience and the standards and practices 
that make the description justified or unjustified. Sellars' myth of Jones 
explains why first person knowledge is epistemically of a piece with any other 
knowledge. Sellars does not deny that we have experiences; he denies instead 
that we can know anything about these without also having a conceptual 
framework through which to understand our experiences. Developing such a 
conceptual framework requires shared observations of behavioural evidence 
in correlation with different kinds of experiences. 
In this chapter I will argue that the pregnant woman is in a better 
position to develop such a conceplual fia111~wu1k. Lluuugli wliid1 Lu 
understand the subjective experiences of pregnancy and birthing than 
male obstetricians. In order to do so I will tum my attention to the 
experiences of birthing as demonstrat_ed in some surveys by Italian 
feminist philosopher of language Marina Sbisa. Her surveys show that 
authority over birthing sits squarely within the medical domain, to the 
detriment of a birthing woman's perspective on the experience. Her 
interviews with the birthing woman suggest that those who take seriously 
this medical authority tend to accept the stereotypes of femininity implicit 
within medical discourse, sometimes making the experience more 
devastating than it is for the woman who is more active in her birthing 
experiences. These generalisations are made with care, in the recognition 
that there are unique aspects for every woman in her experiences of 
pregnancy and birthing. 
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In section two I review some problems associated with self knowledge in 
Hilary Kornblith's account of what it is like to be me. Some people, he argues, 
are not good at making first person observations because they do not realise 
these are learnt in the same manner that we learn about anything. This line 
of argument reinforces the need for an intersubjective conceptual framework 
in order even for self-knowledge to develop. But, I will argue, we can 
recover some useful insights from Hegel and Hartsock, viz., that (some) 
women are more competent (in the western world) in learning to observe 
their own experiences than (many) men. To be sure, these competencies rest 
upon intersubjective achievements, but because of their close association 
with embodied women's experience, are more available to women than to 
male medical practitioners. While those women who are not already 
competent at making first person observations are not going to be much help 
in creating a new theory about what it is like to give birth, these more 
competent women might well be. 
In section three I will discuss Bataille's account of sovereignty. Sovereign 
experience is non-cognitive and can be brought into cognition later with the 
use of the indexical. I shall also draw some conclusions based in Bataille 's 
account of non-productive expenditure (chapter five). The domain of 
childbirth is clearly situated in the institutions of the family and of medicine. 
As Bataille argues, standard accounts of these institutions leave out some 
important aspects of experience on the understanding that these are 
unproductive, uncivilised and deleterious to productivity and accumulation. 
Moreover, as Kristeva argues, the denial of embodied experience leads to 
major depression and violence within western capitalist societies. Utilising 
Bataille's and Kristeva's insights we can reconceptualise the family, medicine, 
pregnancy and the status of women's knowledge of pregnancy and childbirth. 
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i Knowing about childbirth 
In a paper published in The European Journal of Women's Studies, 
Marina Sbisa discusses her survey of medical textbooks about pregnancy and 
childbirth.(1996) Sbisa recommends that a feminine point of view on 
birthing be developed to counter the rhetoric of the medical discourse on the 
subject. She argues that the pregnant woman is directed to change her 
behaviour to fit the feminine stereotype and to prepare her for maternity. So, 
the medical domain of birthing is important, not only for safe birthing, but 
also in preparing the woman for her role as a mother in the institution of the 
family. 
Sbisa is a professional philosopher of language whose interest in childbirth 
develops through personal experience in both birthing and the women's 
movement. (1996:363) Her interest in the "cognitive and communicative 
aspects" of childbirth, leads to the examination of 34 books on childbirth, 
published between 1960 and 1995. Sbisa examines the manner in which each 
text addresses the reader as a pregnant woman and finds that the pregnant 
woman is frequently described as passive in relation to her birthing body, as 
though she has no control over that body. Sbisa aims to present a more 
constructive vision of birthing, as I will explain shortly. 
In her survey, Sbisa finds that the pregnant woman is overwhelmingly 
addressed in "exercitive speech acts." She defines these as commanding 
control of the situation, not only because these speech acts include "advice, 
commands, recommendations, exhortations, prohibitions, permissions;" but 
because they further "presuppose a speaker who is 'one-up', thus assigning 
some kind of obligation to the addressee in order to channel her behaviour." 
{366) These kinds of speech acts are interesting insofar as they have a role in 
prescribing how women ought to behave during their pregnancy and birthing 
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experiences: the subsequent behaviour being demonstrably observed as 
feminine. The use of this kind of speech act is supposed to help the pregnant 
woman understand the processes of her own body, but in so doing compels 
the woman to listen to the voice of the experts. Moreover, there is 
expectation that the woman aligns herself with the goals of the speaker, 
perhaps at the expense of her own goals. 
Sbisa outlines two kinds of "persuasive strategies" in medical textbooks, 
noting a difference between more orthodox samples and those which 
encourage active involvement from the birthing woman. The more 
orthodox samples de-legitimise any prior knowledge the woman has, 
expecting the pregnant woman to accept the promise that the textbook will 
make her competent. The pregnant woman must erase any unsuitable 
information from other sources and recreate herself according to higher 
cummaml. (367) 
The less orthodox authors persuade the woman to focus on psychological 
states with provisional suggestions about how they might be feeling. In 
Sbisa's view, however, this psychological approach "implies that [the 
pregnant woman] must be anxious or worried and that the author (as well as 
professionals taking care of the reader) is capable of eliminating the causes of 
her anxiety." (367) The focus on psychology is normative because it tells the 
pregnant woman what she ought to be feeling. 79 
19 Her sample includes writers like Janet Balaskas, Sheila Kitzinger and Frederick Leboyer, 
each of whom is critical of the orthodox medical model of childbirth, but does not include books 
about homebirths, because of its marginal status in Italy. The availability of homebirth in 
Australia is also marginalised, representing around one percent of births. 
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But there is more than a theory about speech acts informing 
Sbisa's interpretation of the normative function of medical texts 
in childbirth. Sbisa draws her readers' attention to the feminist 
conclusions that can be drawn. 
As for the representations of the object under consideration (the woman through 
pregnancy and childbirth), the books convey to varying degrees some to the classic 
stereotypes of femininity: weakness, fragility, unreliability, passivity, self-
sacrificing motherly love. Such stereotypes are transmitted to the reader by means 
of a seemingly descriptive notion of nature which is actually normative. (367) 
In other words, the texts appeal to the woman's sense of herself as 
feminine, encouraging her to adopt a passive stance in relation to her doctor. 
Descriptions of the woman's attitudes and behaviour in pregnancy and 
birthing spell out specific natural responses, making clear that anything 
different is deviant and abnormal. In wanting to be safe, the birthing woman 
is compelled to conduct herself as properly feminine. She must, in order to 
placate the medical authorities in whose hands she is placed, defer to them, 
and subordinate her own views. So long as the stereotypes are implicit in 
these texts, she argues, it is clear that "all this is not enough to guarantee that 
during pregnancy and childbirth women can constitute themselves and be 
socially recognized as subjects." (370) In Sbisa's view, the use of stereotypes 
and exercitive speech acts prevents the pregnant woman from actively 
constituting an important experience in her life for herself. Instead, medical 
discourse on pregnancy and birthing reproduce the stereotypes of feminine 
consciousness which suggest that a mother cannot have any proper self 
knowledge, ever. The role of these medical texts in creating the woman-as-
mother is insightful; particularly when we identify the metaphysics which 
informs the medical approach to the woman's subjectivity. 
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Sbisa claims that: 
Three of the stereotypes conveyed are weakness, fragility and unreliability. The 
female body is weak, its energy is barely sufficient for the task of childbearing. It 
has to be helped. The woman's mind is weak too, so she tends to influenced by pre-
scientific and superstitious discourse and become discouraged in the face of difficult 
situations. During pregnancy, she is in a state of psychological regression: more 
like a child than an adult. (367) [My emphasis.] 
The idea that the body is weak and needs to be helped reflects a Cartesian 
view that the body is both distinct from and subordinate to the mind. The 
weakness of the woman's mind, especially as psychologically immature, 
indicates the clouded confusion of sensual states as though these prevent the 
woman from making competent judgments. The maternal body must thus be 
controlled through the woman's mind, but that mind itself is in turn 
subordinate to that of the male authority. In Hegelian terms, the woman has 
regressed to sense-certainty. The Hegelian family in which the husband 
supplies reason to his juvenile wife is replicated in the context of modern 
childbirth. 
Ideas about the forces of nature acting on the machine are also implicit in 
childbirth discourse. Sbisa claims, agreeing with Carolyn Merchant's analysis 
of the death of nature,so that the mechanistic view "reveals itself as a product 
BOMerchant (1980) argues that the scientific revolution sets the precedent for viewing the body 
as a machine, and fails to account for the subjective aspects of life. She promotes vitalism as a 
viable alternative to the mechanistic view, drawing from the ideas of Leibniz, van Belmont and 
Ann Conway. I do not agree that vitalism explains anything and think that Sell~rs provides a 
better alternative for understanding how the body can be viewed mechanistically without 
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of male-dominated modern Western culture." (368-369) The implicit 
Cartesian dualism against which both Merchant and Sbisa react concedes that 
there may be a vital spirit, or ghost in the machine; but as mediated through 
Hegel, is committed to the view the embodied processes of childbirth make 
the spirit temporarily unavailable, or at any rate, degrade its rationality. This 
distinction between mind and body serves the institution of medicine well, 
even if it does a serious disservice to women. 
Sbisa's interviews with twenty pregnant women demonstrate that medical 
discourse does not necessarily help the woman deal with the subjective 
experiences of birthing.BI Those who take seriously the medical advice are 
more likely to cope with birthing by withdrawing from the body and moving 
"on to a more mental or spiritual level from which the labour can, hopefully, 
be controlled." Their expectations of the experience are low, being "keen to 
forget childbirth soon." They are not always successful in trying to forget the 
violent nature of their experience, perhaps feeling humiliated as a result. A 
quarter of the interviewees adopted a second, more demanding coping 
strategy "aimed at 'living' childbirth rather than merely 'surviving' it." The 
women adopting this strategy were more active in the process, seeing self and 
body as united. These women felt they had more power in their experiences, 
giving more positive and realistic evaluations than those adopting the 
passive strategy. According to Sbisa, then, the majority of women 
dispensing of the important element of subjective experience. For discussions of the problems with 
vitalism see Tim Crane (1998), and Crawford Elder (1981). 
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interviewed followed doctors orders to survive the ordeal. I will argue in my 
conclusion that this attitude supports an ideology of childbirth as a mode of 
production rather than as a valuable life experience from which we have the 
potential to learn more about ourselves as individuals and more about 
humanity in general. 
Sbisa indicates that each woman has the ability to learn about herself as a 
subject by reflecting upon her experiences in childbirth. She concludes that 
there is no special "woman's point of view" on childbirth. 
The feminine point of view on childbirth turns out to be something which cannot be 
discovered, but is constructed by each individual woman in her effort to approach 
childbirth as a subject situated within the labouring body. {372} 
The different responses from the participants in the same socio-cultural 
context demonstrates, as Spelman has also argued, that there is no 
distinctively feminine viewpoint, no standpoint shared by all females. (372) 
Sbisa recommends that such a perspective could be developed to counter the 
medical discourse. She argues (373) that the preverbal awareness of such 
phenomena as pregnancy and childbirth could inform a feminine 
perspective, and that this needs to be explored in more detail to show that 
medical discourse effectively prevents the pregnant woman from creating her 
own point of view. Suggesting that females have "preverbal awareness" of 
our bodies which is different from males' awareness certainly runs the risk of 
essentialising women. But Sbisa argues that this risk is avoided through 
acknowledgment that social recognition completes the process of constructing 
Bl Each woman is interviewed in the final term of pregnancy and a month after the birth; with , 
thirteen of these women attending a third interview over one year later. Each story is quite 
different, indicating the deeply personal nature of birthing. 
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any particular feminine point of view and so that a multiplicity of such views 
is inevitable despite a common core of experience. The other edge of this 
sword, however, is the fact that inasmuch as the creation of a female 
perspective on birthing is inadequate until medicine and other social 
institutions recognise the subjective authority of the pregnant woman a great 
deal of female identity is still mis-constructed, and women are denied agency 
in their own self-definition. Medicine is central in this disenfranchisement. 
Sbisa suggests this kind of social recognition is some way off. (37 4) 
Although I agree with most of Sbisa's claims, I reject any possibility of 
taking the experience of birthing as the basis for a "feminine point of view." 
Constructing a new ideology as a reverse of the existing ideology does not 
fully redress the problem of authority. I think it is dangerous to make any 
universal claims about the nature of women's feminine experiences for risk 
of establishing relationships based in privilege. Those of us who have 
mastered the required epistemic skills adopt a position of power in relation to 
those who have not. The idea of liberating women as a group, as Spelman 
has argued persuasively, goes out the window when we smooth over the 
differences between women by creating a universal feminine perspective on 
anything. 82 
The important issue here is not who counts as the makers of feminine 
knowledge, but who counts as the makers of any self-knowledge. The answer 
is not "anyone who has the experience," but rather "anyone who has both the 
experience and the requisite understanding of subjectivity." The experience 
of about childbirth will not enter into knowledge or be in any sense 
authoritative until we develop a conceptual framework through which to 
82 See my discussion of Spelman's claims about Inessential Woman in chapter four. 
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take up non-cognitive experience and represent it in cognitive episodes. 
There is no guarantee that there is any uniquely adequate framework, and so 
guarantee that there is any single female standpoint, even if any such 
standpoint is grounded in uniquely female events of childbirth and 
pregnancy. On the other hand, it is clear from Sbisa's research and analysis of 
the educational texts available to the pregnant woman that obstetricians do 
not take seriously any of the knowledge of the pregnant and birthing woman, 
and it is high time that this knowledge is recognised. 
A possible reply to this line of reasoning is that, according to the Sellarsian 
view that has grounded my analysis, there is no principled epistemic 
difference between first and third person claims about experience. Therefore 
the male obstetrician can well be in a position of authority over both the 
objective a,nd experiential facts of birthing. After all, he may have much 
greater experience of this process than any single pregnant or birthing 
woman. This reply, however, is plausible only if we fail to acknowledge the 
important distinction between the non-cognitive and cognitive dimensions 
of experience. 
The problem is not that obstetricians fail entirely to take seriously women's 
subjective states. When the birthing woman makes the subjective claim that 
she feels pain the obstetrician takes seriously this claim, and recognises the 
woman's authority by administering pain relief. But the recognition of the 
reality of her pain through administration of analgesia fails to endorse fully 
the pregnant woman's epistemic authority. For the pain report can itself be 
seen as a mere symptom, or an expression of pain, much as a cry, or a sweat 
might be interpreted. The woman expresses her pain; the physician knows it. 
The physician makes the final determination regarding whether analgesia is 
appropriate, and if so, how much. 
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Savage (19xx) reports a situation in which a birthing woman tried to refuse 
analgesia, and to which Savage responds "I've seen more labours than you." 
Later the woman complained that the administration of pain relief had 
interfered with the rhythm of labour, which she had thought was progressing 
quite well. In discussing this case, Savage also notes that male obstetricians 
have difficulty identifying their own emotional responses to painful 
situations, and that decisions regarding pain management are often made 
more in their own best interest than in the interest of the birthing woman. 
Part of the moral of the myth of Jones is that knowledge of our own inner 
episodes requires both experience and conceptualization and that this 
knowledge is of a piece with our knowledge of other's inner states. But the 
other side of this moral is that our claims about the inner states of others 
must give way to others' claims about their own inner states where their 
conceptual abilities are intact and where their observational proximity to 
their own states is better than ours. If there are inner episodes to which male 
obstetricians can never be privy, they would do well to defer to thoughtful 
women. 
The advantage of Sellars' view lies in the recognition that while the 
pregnant woman's experiences are non-cognitive and can only be known if 
she already has a vocabulary with which to describe her experiences as 
theoretical episodes, experiencing them may nonetheless be necessary 
conditions of observational knowledge of states of that kind. Sellars' view 
leaves open a space for the woman to create new knowledge in agreement 
with others who have experiences in the domain of pregnancy and birthing. 
Sellars thus opens up a space for first person authority based in public 
agreement between those in a position to have first person knowledge about 
the domain of pregnancy and birthing. 
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In summary, then, the medical discourse about childbirth fails to recognise 
that feelings, sensations and emotions are conceptual episodes, and that 
women have access to the relevant conceptual space and fails as well to 
recognize that they are observables, and that they themselves may be 
precluded from the perspective from which they can be observed. There is 
hence no acknowledgement in medical discourse of the authority of women 
over their own maternal experience. Sbisa is dead right to think we each 
make our own self knowledge, with qualifications as I show in the next 
section. 
ii. First person authority: some problems 
In this section I turn to Hilary Kornblith's warning that sometimes we do 
not know ourselves as well as we think that we do. Kornblith emphasises the 
importance of learning about our own states in the same way that we learn 
about external objects: via the third person route of shared observations. 
Kornblith clears the terrain for my argument that the pregnant and birthing 
woman has closer proximity to the non-cognitive states of that domain, 
making her more qualified to make the kinds of observations I am 
recommending, if and only if she is already competent in observing non-
cognitive states. 
In "What is it like to be Me?"" Kornblith {1998) argues against the 
Cartesian vision of a "conceptual tie between being in a [mental or 
psychological] state and believing that one is in it" in favour of a "realistic 
claim ... that mental states are radically independent of beliefs about them." 
(49) Kornblith thus agrees with Sellars that psychological states are non-
cognitive in relation to the cognitive content of our beliefs about these states. 
This, I contend, is an important step towards recognising that the pregnant 
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woman's experiences are not immature or regressive, nor are they a version 
of feminine knowledge. 
Kornblith makes his point about subjective knowledge by comparing two 
(imaginary) persons, Jack and Mary. "Jack is very defensive. He is quite 
insecure, and he believes, incorrectly that people are talking down to him." 
(50} But Jack, falsely, does not believe himself to display these character traits. 
He has a distorted view of both himself and of the world. (51) His beliefs are 
distorted to such an extent that Jack does not have authority about his mental 
life even though he does have "a perspective on his mental life which others 
lack." So, although Jack has the advantage of being closer to his non-
cognitive states than any other person, he lacks the cognitive tools which are 
necessary to interpret these states. Jack's first person knowledge is not 
authoritative. 
Kornblith's point is that Jack's self-knowledge is produced less by his 
special relationship to his own mind (as Descartes assumes) than by his prior 
knowledge (as Sellars argues}. "Jack's understanding of himself, at every 
level, must be just as mediate, corrigible, and theory laden as our 
understanding of Jack." (52) Jack does not have any privileged self knowledge 
so "[t]here is not even the smallest grain of truth to be found in Descartes' 
claim of deep epistemological asymmetry between our understanding of our 
own mental lives and our understanding of other things." (52} Kornblith's 
vision of Jack supports Sellars' view that we each need to learn how to read 
off the world, including reading off our bodies and the people around us.83 
As I have already stated, this view requires making the distinction between 
having non-cognitive states, and having the cognitive skills by which we 
83 For a more detailed discussion of the Sellarsian vision of epistemic authority see chapter two. 
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learn how to interpret these states. Jack does not have the requisite cognitive 
skills, preventing him from accurately interpreting his own states. 
Mary, on the other hand, is "the kind of character to get Cartesian 
intuitions flowing." (53) (Kornblith's Mary is not Jackson's Mary). She is not 
defensive, insecure, or paranoid that others are talking about her; nor does 
she "systematically misperceive others' intentions." Kornblith makes clear 
that Mary's access to her own states is phenomenologically similar to her 
access to non-inferential observations of things in the world. "Mary doesn't 
seem to infer that there is a book on the table," for example, but this is because 
she "had to learn what a book typically looks like, in order to gain the 
discriminatory capacity to recognize books." (54) In other words, Mary 
appears to know immediately that there is a book on the table without having 
to ponder the inferences by which she draws this conclusion. 
Kornblith says that "Mary's judgments about the world around her are 
quite accurate, unlike Jack's, and her level of self-understanding is quite high 
as well. She sees herself, to a very large degree, for what she is." (53) The 
reason for Mary's competence in interpreting her non-cognitive states is 
traced to her childhood education about self-knowledge. 
She was, as a child, taught to understand the difference between anger and fear and 
other unpleasant emotions. Now, as an adult, the process of recognizing her mental 
states is so internalized that it too has become phenomenologically simple. And 
like her ability to recognize various states of the external world, Mary is quite 
reliable on a wide range of such discriminatory tasks. Her judgments about many of 
her mental states, like her judgments about many states of the external world, tend 
to be correct. (54) 
Moreover, Mary's self-understanding "seems direct" because Mary has had 
plenty of time to get to know herself. "Mary doesn't have to think about what 
is going on in her own mind; she can just tell." (53) Her interpretation of 
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feelings, moods and other non-cognitive states appears simple and 
immediate because of her competent training to observe both inner and outer 
objects when she was young. 
Others do not have the same degree of access to Mary's mind as Mary has 
to her own, suggesting her authority about her own mental states is 
warranted. But Mary's access to her mental states is not immediate in the 
Cartesian sense, in which having a state gives her the knowledge about the 
state as the kind of state it is. Rather, her knowledge is immediate in the 
Sellarsian sense: she has learnt to identify her states as the kind of states they 
are and over time the process has become simple. Jack, on the other hand, 
does not recognise his own states because he has not learnt to identify these 
on the assumption that he does not need to. The access to the states as the 
kinds of states they are is impossible without the required education. Both 
Jack and Mary have a first person perspective on their mental lives, but 
unlike Jack's perspective, Mary's is usually accurate precisely because she 
knows how to interpret her non-cognitive states and he does not. 
The accuracy of Mary's judgments about her own states in relation to the 
inaccuracy ofJack's gives her an epistemological advantage which cannot be 
explained by the causal proximity each has to their states: both Mary and Jack 
have the same degree of causal proximity to their states but only Mary is 
epistemically reliable. (55) Kornblith says 
Because the difference between a first-person perspective <1!1d a third-person 
perspective is a matter of causal proximity, it is comparable to the difference 
between looking at a person from across a table and from across a street: closer is, 
frequently, better. Moreover, once we recognize that the advantages of the first-
person perspective, when it does constitute an advantage, come from the causal 
proximity of a person to her own mental states, it becomes clear that this is not an 
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advantage which tracks the distinction between mental and physical even in the 
typical case. (55) 
Kornblith points out that any non-cognitive states of perception are 
insufficient to explain the mind as distinct from the body and world precisely 
because these states are uninformative without interaction with other 
persons in the world. "The mental qua mental thus does not offer us any 
special epistemic advantages." So, without a theory about the mental states 
encountered in childbirth, the pregnant and birthing woman is none the 
wiser. 
Mary is in a better position to observe the birthing woman and to describe 
the subjective states experienced in the process. If she were to give birth 
herself, Mary's epistemic competence makes her more authoritative than 
someone less competent. It is also worth noting that our contemporary 
culture constructs masculinity and femininity very differently, and that the 
norms governing those gender constructions make it the case-contingently, 
to be sure, but nonetheless actually-that men and women develop different 
degrees of emotional and relational knowledge. In developed Western 
cultures women generally have better developed emotional and relational 
knowledge than men. Despite this fact, and despite the fact that this kind of 
knowledge is important in understanding pregnancy and birthing, medical 
discourse dismisses the advantage of having this kind of subjective 
competence in birthing. 
Jack, on the other hand, is not the sort of person we would want to enter 
the obstetric profession. His judgments about his own temperament indicate 
the flaws in his judgments about others. Again, given the construction of 
masculinity in many contemporary Western cultures, men are less likely to 
develop the kind of introspective self-knowledge I am discussing here. This 
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kind of knowledge must be learnt, and the encouragement necessary to 
learning about our inner states and about those of others is often not afforded 
to men, including male medical practitioners. 
The fact that the mere act of introspection does not automatically grant 
self-knowledge leads me to two conclusions about the birthing woman's 
subjective knowledge. First the birthing woman is not in a position to create 
a new vocabulary on birthing just because she has closest causal proximity to 
the psychological states of birthing. Second, her creation of a new vocabulary 
on birthing depends on her already having reliable knowledge about her 
subjective states. Having this knowledge may be influenced by gender 
stereotypes, but I suggest that all self-knowledge is in principle not gender 
specific. This indicates that anyone can, at least in principle, know what it is 
like to give birth. But the authority for which I am searching must guarantee 
something over and beyond the purely cognitive dimensions of knowledge. I 
will explain further below. 
iii. a reconception of first person authority in pregnancy and birthing 
I must admit to having conducted a few interviews about birth on my 
own.84 The sample is too narrow to prove anything except to say more about 
the kinds of subjective states women claim to have during birthing; states 
not generally mentioned or explained in the medical literature. One woman, 
a professional midwife, said birthing was the most religious experience she 
84 These were broadcast on community radio station 2RSR (Sydney) in 1992-1993. In 1992 I 
attended a conference and interviewed birthing experts Janet Balaskas, Ina May Gaskin, Sheila 
Kitzinger and Marsden Wagner. These interviews were broadcast on community radio station 
2SER (Sydney). 
232 
ever had. This intrigued me so I asked others more specifically about the 
mystical nature of the experience. Another woman said it was like tripping 
because she was experiencing a kind of altered state. And I guess my own 
experience was similarly that which we loosely call an altered state of 
consciousness. 
In chapter five I introduced Bataille's analysis of the similarities between 
mystical and erotic experience. Each produce the same sensuous reflexes; 
each places us alongside ourselves rather than outside ourselves; neither can 
be reduced to description unless we make the category error of thinking our 
mind is like a suitcase stuffed full of ideas; in the experience we cease to 
think and are immersed in the sensations. Although there is no doubt that 
the experiences can be described, any attempt to do so takes us out of the non-
cognitive state in which we are immersed, and the descriptions always seem 
inadequate. We are alone in the experience, and we do not speak, for to do so 
is to lose the intensity of the moment in which we are immersed. The limit 
identified by Bataille is not some putative ineffability, but the impossibility of 
being immersed in an intense experience and articulating that experience at 
the same time. There is always time later to think back and describe the 
experience, but often the words seem inadequate to express the intensity 
precisely because the non-cognitive dimension of experience is lost to 
cognition. The limit between the non-cognitive and cognitive states of mind 
cannot be dissolved: the non-cognitive is silent in this respect. 
I think there is room to suggest that the mystical dimension of birthing is a 
result of the erotic or sexual nature of the experience. In my own survey of 
birthing I discovered that some women are encouraged to engage sexually in 
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the early stages of labour; to use nipple stimulationss and clitoral stimulation 
to help dilate the cervix; and to have the midwife or partner give her a 
perineal massage with warm oil while the baby's head crowns the vagina. 
The very intimate nature of birthing brings in this erotic dimension given 
that the woman must reveal her private parts, often to a bunch of near-
strangers. There is an added transgressive dimension to birthing given that it 
does involve nudity, genital exposure, violent expulsions, blood, shit, piss, 
and muck in front of a group of near-strangers. As Ina May Gaskin86 told me, 
some women claim that birthing is like defecating in public. Of course, given 
the cuddly images of newborn infants, this can be an unanticipated 
dimension of the birthing experience: some women are horrified by their loss 
of control. 
The erotic aspects of the experience are often denied, however, and it is no 
wonder given the escalating litigation rate for obstetric medicine. 87 There is 
an unequal power relation between the doctor and the birthing woman and a 
perverse dimension to the domination of obstetrical knowledge by males, the 
85 Naomi Wolf (2001) mentions her experience of being pushed into a bathroom for "nipple 
stim" prior to birthing. I think the way she describes the event tells us as much about the denial 
of the erotic dimension of birth as it reminds us of the empirical evidence that erotic stimulation 
works. The denial of eroticism is suggested by the fact Wolf is pushed into the bathroom, away 
from the comfort of the bed and her partner, to perform this stimulation with a nurse. The fact 
that there is any such stimulation recognises the would-be erotic dimension of the domain. 
86 In a private interview. 
87 This has become an issue in Australia because the insurance premiums have become 
prohibitive for independent midwives. This, of course, limits the currently limited choices 
available for pregnant and birthing women. 
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justification for which is ideological. Even when our obstetrician has the best 
intentions, she or he is blinded by the ideological framework of medicine. 
Their technical skills are not at issue here, for it is clear women benefit from 
these, but the instrumental means of controlling birthing does erase the 
woman's subjectivity. 
The erotic dimensions of birthing might actually make the experience 
more bearable for the birthing woman under the right circumstances. (I asked 
a very broad minded birthing educator about orgasms in birth: she said 
they're rare, but she's encountered one. On the other hand, I asked a friend 
who is a midwife and she says that women never seemed turned on by 
birthing. She adds that the men in the next room sometimes masturbate 
because they find the sounds erotic. One woman I interviewed said that 
clitoral stimulation made her experience more comfortable.) Clearly the 
current obstetric situation is not appropriate for incorporating the erotic 
dimension of birthing experiences because of the power relations I have 
identified within that domain. 
Explaining the birthing experience does not require constructing an 
unequal power relation on the basis of whether or not one is the kind of 
person who gets lost in their embodied states. Most people get lost in their 
embodied states from time to time. There are no claims that the subject 
withdraws from her body to some putative mental or spiritual plane so that 
someone else can control the experience. (Sbisa, p. 372) To the contrary, it is 
recognised that the apparently mystical nature of the experience is a non-
cognitive awareness of embodiment. The awareness is "sovereign," to use 
Bataille's terminology, because there are times during the birth that the 
woman is not engaging in any cognitive processes. During these sovereign 
interludes there is no awareness of either the self as a self or the experience as 
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any particular kind of experience. The subject and object are fused as the 
cognitive processes temporarily shut down and the woman is lost in the non-
cognitive awareness of embodiment. The woman is vulnerable when she is 
in this state and needs help from people she can trust to guide her through 
the process. 
From Kornblith's analysis of self knowledge it is clear that the birthing 
woman will learn more about herself if she already is competent in 
identifying sensations, feelings and emotions as the kinds these are. But this 
discussion of sovereignty suggests that a woman can be better prepared for the 
mystical dimension of birthing by cultivating the relevant dimensions of self-
knowledge. Her attitude towards sex and eroticism will determine the nature 
of her experience of birthing. A woman who has a history of sexual abuse, for 
example, may find that this history has a negative impact on an experience in 
which she is laid open for birthing. Without acknowledgement of this 
history, the birthing experience may be more traumatic than it is for the 
woman who does not suffer from past sexual abuse. The woman who has 
such a history needs to be carefully informed about how the abuse can affect 
her birthing experience. 
On the other hand, the woman without this history may nevertheless find 
birthing to be a situation of sexual abuse if her caregivers abuse their position 
of power when she is out of control in a sovereign state. The woman's 
emotional strengths and weaknesses will play a part in her birthing process 
and her self-knowledge about these will help her and her caregivers know 
how to respond at times when the experience is sovereign and the woman is 
not in control. 
Jane's birth story helps us understand what it is like to be sovereign in 
childbirth. 
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I found myself slumped at the bottom of a deep well. Slumped over, close to death, 
defeated, unable to take more pain, I could go no further. When I tried to get up I 
felt the frantic desperation of a freshly caged wild animal mixed with a knowing 
that time was running out. I felt the presence of my fellow chosen travellers, but I 
couldn't speak to them. (Hardwicke-Collings, 1993) 
Clearly, Jane has thought about her experiences after the birth and has used 
the metaphor of an animal to convey the non-cognitive awareness of her 
experience. The non-cognitive awareness is further conveyed by her claim to 
have awareness of those around her and her inability to speak to them. 
Moreover, some of us may be able to identify with this description of 
experience, either in birthing, or in some other domain. It is not clear to me 
that this is a distinctly feminine characterisation of experience, suggesting that 
the domain of birthing shares some characteristics of other intense 
experiences. 
In this section I have argued that the birthing experience is like erotic or 
mystical experience insofar as it entails a loss of cognitive awareness. I have 
suggested that the erotic dimension of birthing is often denied, but that the 
current power relations between the doctor and the woman opens the erotic 
aspects to abuse. Nevertheless, I think that the silent aspect of birthing 
experience is important and needs to be taken seriously. I now explain why 
claims about the mystical nature of birthing are authoritative despite the 
silent nature of these experiences. 
A birthing woman is potentially qualified to report her experiences in a 
way that others cannot. Her authority is constituted by her particularity as the 
unique person in this situation and by her epistemological competence, to the 
degree that she has developed it: her authority increases proportionately 
according to her ability to identify her non-cognitive states as the kind of 
states they are. 
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In the least informative manner of authority, anyone who has given birth 
and has remained conscious throughout the ordeal - and I maintain that the 
abovementioned sovereign states are conscious; whereas general anaesthesia 
renders someone unconscious - can at least say authoritatively "I know what 
it is like to give birth" even though they may not say much else about their 
experience. The experience is among those to which her use of the first 
person pronoun refers: her saying "I" thereafter refers to a person who has 
experienced childbirth. The use of the first person pronoun is related to 
sovereignty in Bataille's sense, and sovereignty, I will argue, in turn to 
birthing. 
I begin with a general picture of minds occupied with linguistic thoughts. 
Most of us spend most of our waking time chattering to ourselves or to 
others, thinking intentional thoughts: what to cook for dinner, what to wear 
tomorrow, how to plan the next holiday, how to get home from work, 
picking up children from school; or interpreting information from the media, 
work and interactions with others. Some of these thoughts might produce 
experiences intimately related to my self-identification. For example, 
planning the skiing holiday causes a frisson as I imagine the sense of my 
stomach lurching as my legs work over those bumps at high speed. Or I 
might contemplate the feeling of salty sun stretching my skin as I lie on a 
deserted beach someplace. Or my stomach jumps as I think of the smell in 
the butcher, in a different way from the sensations I feel when I think about 
how to dress to attract some sexy person's attention. And so on. Thinking 
about these things causes the self awareness which is fundamental to self-
knowledge by noticing what produces the embodied presence and when I am 
unaware of myself as such. I can think about more abstract issues and facts for 
long periods, not even noticing myself to satiate hunger thirst or other such 
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needs on the basis that I eat, drink, walk, talk, sleep and pee as though on 
automatic pilot. 
The difference between self-reference and sovereignty is that the former 
involves an "I" thought while the latter, though central to first-person 
embodied experience, does not. Self-awareness is not sovereignty whenever 
there is cognition involved. Sovereignty is awareness in the absence of 
cognition. The distinction between self and world necessary in thought is lost 
to the state described in the "I" thoughts of the situation in question. 
But though a woman may lapse at times into sovereign experience in 
Bataille's sense during childbirth, this is not the essential character of her 
mind, and these moments do not undermine her epistemic or human 
authority over her own experience. Her mind is no weaker than anyone 
else's simply in virtue of the fact that she is giving birth, although I have 
specified that there are times in which she is sovereign and silent. Her non-
cognitive states and behaviour are not immature versions of cognition, being 
instead the embodied states described above. Her authority about these states 
is determined by her general competence with regard to self-knowledge. 
The Cartesian conception of self-knowledge, dressed by Hegel as either 
feminine commonsense and abstract masculine concepts clearly influences 
the medical discourse on birthing. The pregnant woman is a body-machine, 
an automaton or a child, whose embodied process are not understood in 
relation to her sense of herself as a human person. The pregnant and 
birthing woman has closer proximity to the non-cognitive states of that 
domain. But the medical discourse suggests she has no expertise, only mute 
experience, and the pregnant woman is then advised forget anything another 
woman tells her which is not included in the medical explanation of process. 
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Birthing is an intimate, scary and threatening domain for many of us. Our 
concern for a healthy normal baby leads us to allow ourselves to be treated as 
an object known by another; as a birthing body-machine about which we 
know nothing at all. It might seem to many to be perfectly unnatural to have 
one's legs hooked up in stirrups to give birth, for instance. But when you are 
a woman in a contemporary Western culture, you grow accustomed to 
having people inspect your vagina, so the stirrups are commonplace. We do 
not question these practices. 
Or, if we do question medical practices there are certain social structures in 
place to make it more difficult than it is for those who do not. Freedom to 
speak one's mind is a small reward for the birthing woman. The structures in 
which her birthing is situated and observed are capable of restraining the 
woman who in another context is free to fly alongside any man. The 
Hegelian family is reinstantiated in medicine and violates a woman's 
autonomy insofar as her knowledge is disregarded in the birthing process. 
And all this is made possible by endorsing a false view of first person 
authority. 
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Postscript: mothering in a general economyss 
In chapter one I introduced Hegel's theory of psychological differences 
between the sexes. I want here to show that his production of femininity is 
essential for helping him to explain the difference between natural living 
mechanistic systems and humanly created social systems on one hand and 
between organic and inorganic bodies on the other hand. The feminine mind 
must be an uninterrupted organic mechanistic system, determined solely by 
the causal laws of nature (at least until man is able to produce life in a 
laboratory). The feminine mind is fully realised as a human mind in Hegel' s 
ethical order: Everybody needs to have their natural organic needs met, so for 
Hegel the woman's role is to meet the needs of those who are too busy doing 
the important work of creating a rational social system to look after 
themselves. The fact that there is an ethical order provides the evidence for 
his behavioural explanation of the natural living mechanism as distinct from 
a non-living mechanism. 
Hegel thus characterises a social order in which there exist two kinds of 
behaviour: natural behaviour and self-constructed behaviour. Our capability 
to engage in two kinds of behaviour - caring behaviour and rational 
behaviour - according to Hegel's account of the ethical order explains how 
there can be two kinds of human subject: the natural subject and the socially 
created subject. The existence of natural subjects, or mothers, is essential to 
show that some sensory knowledge is innate and given by the mechanism 
and for Hegel the concept of having life marks the beginning of subjective 
B8This chapter, incomplete, was intended as a conclusion, and is included here because it brings 
together some of the themes of the thesis. -eds. 
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knowledge, and this subjective knowledge is necessary for sustaining life. 
Having the concept of self, on the other hand, marks the beginning of 
objective knowledge, or rational development, and retaining this concept is 
necessary for a final attainment of the non-cognitive Absolute.89 The 
woman's purpose is defined by persons whose social status is determined by 
Hegel's mastery of all the major concepts presented in the history of 
mankind. 
But, as I have argued, Hegel's own mastery of the concepts of human 
history entails taking the concept of life as given in the first step in the 
development of subjective psychology. This means that he uses a 
psychological predicate as the foundation for his epistemological telos. He 
effectively reverses the telos by taking experiences as necessary but not 
sufficient for epistemic development, on the basis of his recognition that we 
are born into a history which makes our roles socially and politically 
meaningful. Hegel does not doubt that our roles are socially and politically 
determined. But he is not so clear about the relationship between the natural 
body as an organic mechanism and man made mechanisms. In the end, man 
can only know that he is different from a robot by separating out the life 
giving function of females. The life giving functions of females are thus 
brought under the rubric "nature;" a term already used to define the social 
contract, and to draw attention to those whose lives are "nasty, brutish and 
short. "90 But, the social contract, after Kristeva and Bataille are taken 
seriously, is not already free from bias about who can have power, about what 
89 This view is held by Hippolite, in his discussion of ineffability in chapter one. The idea 
that sense-certainty is already cognitive is evident in this discussion. 
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we can know and about how we should live. Nor is the term "nature" in its 
most organic sense, properly understood. Once Hegel has finished with it, the 
term describes anything whose explanation can be reduced to strictly scientific 
explanations of role or function. The female of the human species is thus 
described as having the role of giving and sustaining life and of meeting the 
requirements of human bodies from the beginning of life through until the 
body is disposed of according to social rituals and practices. 
The only others who are authorities on the body in western civilisations in 
the time frame between Aristotle and Descartes are the Christian fathers, or 
the mystics. The woman's function included tending to basic health needs, 
using herbal remedies as medicines and employing midwives to help with 
birth, death and serious illness. Historically speaking, the domain of 
medicine was shared between the brotherhood of a Christian faith and the 
people, or the general public who held commonsense knowledge about signs 
of health and about the practical use of plants, foods and discipline.91 Hegel 
concedes that the source of all knowledge is empirically founded in 
commonsense discourse, but he does not fully explain the relationship 
between life and meaning. He says that both life and meaning are given in 
the mechanism, but he is unable to show how life is meaningful without 
God, at the end of the phenomenology giving the individual an Absolute 
knowledge which is at once non-cognitive and ineffable. That which is both 
cognitive and ineffable is represented by Hegel as sense-certainty so that 
having a concept of life is cognitive. But the idea that sense-certainty is 
cognitive suggests that human purpose is determined by our biology. 
90 See Rachels (1993) for a discussion of the merits and problems with social contract theory. 
91 See Inglis (1965), for instance, for a discussion of the history of medicine. 
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Hegel's Absolute vindicates the authority of mystical experience: it is just 
that, as Bataille argues, for Hegel there are no non-cognitive states of mind 
until the subject has mastered all the concepts of history with which we are 
each endowed, but above which only the male can rise to embody the fully 
human creation: the social system.92 Hegel's construction of sexual 
difference enables a recognition that the human mechanism is organic, for 
the woman brings some human bodies in alignment with nature rather than 
culture, serving to explain the organic nature of the human mechanism. 
Her embodiment is conventionally moulded into the roles Hegel makes 
women's business: caring for others. The natural roles of the woman require 
that her knowledge is commonsensical, but as such remains in the realm of 
mere opinion (doxa) rather than as properly acquired knowledge (episteme). 
Hegel divides people into two groups according to sex, associating the 
woman with her sensuous body. The mind is a metaphor of male 
advancement and human progress and civilisation whereas the body is a 
metaphor for the female reproduction of life. Men's knowledge is potentially 
rational, having superceded the particularities of embodied knowledge to 
develop reason which is untainted by passion, turning civilised beings into 
psychozombies. The psychozombie is a person whose epistemic authority is 
granted in virtue of cutting off feelings, and constructing the self as an 
individual member of the social order. But, in Hegel's account of sexual 
difference, read through the feminists discussed in this thesis, it remains 
possible that the maternal body is a zombie. He fails to show how the mother 
knows she is not a zombie, raising the possibility that Hegel's empirical 
92 Sir Richard Attenborough' s documentaries about natural systems of life are enough to start 
us wondering about the force of the opposition between nature and culture. 
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knowledge is grounded by sense data rather than by commonsense. The 
interaction between men and women is important, I think, for Hegel to show 
that men are not zombies. In their private lives, men have access to the 
feelings of embodiment, reflected to them by their wives and mothers. But 
Hegel's conflation of perceptual knowledge with commonsense does not 
permit authority for women on the basis that all commonsense knowledge is 
given. As I have shown, particularly in my discussion of Young's account of 
pregnant embodiment any sensual knowledge which is given as the kind of 
knowledge it is leaves room for scepticism about the reality of embodied 
experiences. 
More serious is the idea that subjective commonsense knowledge must be 
superseded by stoic rationalism so that someone can have a position of social 
status. Hegel supports a kind of individualist epistemology in which those 
who have the most power and status create themselves as powerful and 
important in the eyes of others. The price these men pay for their power is 
the loss of subjective experiences their stoic rationality demands. But the 
price is high for the women who are taken into relationships with men in the 
slave position: the vulnerability of women on the basis that they have not 
superseded embodied knowledge makes us slaves to those whose bodies are 
unimportant in relation to their ideas. Men become masters only by 
alienating themselves from embodiment; but the same alienation is thought 
to be impossible for women as mothers. 
Hegel's characterisation of sexual difference embodies the false assumption 
that there is a universal experience of being female; and a different universal 
characteristic of males. The universal female experience is determined by the 
ability to create life. In the hope of understanding what kinds of psychological 
states are involved in the creation of life, I have ventured to show that even 
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the most mystical states are shared between us, irrespective of our genital 
status. In other words, maternal psychology is not especially distinctive: 
there are no special states that are not encountered in other domains. So, in 
conclusion I shall agree with Kristeva that sexual difference has no essential 
bearing on our states of mind. 
I shall repeat Kristeva's call for a heretical ethics, calling us to recognise 
within ourselves a combination of three essentials: language, flesh and 
jouissance. Recognising jouissance calls for introspection on the silent 
darkness of our most sovereign states; but we need language to shed light on 
the darkness and to help us talk about our diverse perspectives; and we need 
to focus on the feelings in our flesh with language so that we can describe 
these as the kinds of feelings they are. The social revision I am imagining 
demands more value for subjective knowledge within the institutions that 
define women and men, to concentrate on our shared needs rather than 
creating differences. In saying this, however, I must emphasise that this is 
not an attempt to smooth over differences. Rather, I think more inclusion of 
subjectivity in institutional knowledge leads to recognition of the undeniable 
diversity of perspectives. 
Adrienne Rich sums up the American birthing scene until the second half 
of the twentieth century: 
We were, above all in the hands of male medical technology. The hierarchical atmosphere 
of the hospital, the definition of childbirth as a medical emergency, the fragmentation of 
body from mind, were the environment in which we gave birth, with or without 
analgesia. The only female presences were nurses, whose training and schedules precluded 
much female tenderness. {I remember the gratitude and amazement I felt waking in the 
"recovery room" after my third delivery to find a young student nurse holc;ling my hand ) 
The experience oflying half-awake in a barred rib, in a labor room with other women 
moaning in a drugged condition, where "no one comes" except to do a pelvic examination 
or give an injection, is a classic experience of alienated childbirth. The loneliness, the 
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sense of abandonment, of being imprisoned, powerless, and depersonalised is the chief 
collective memory of women who have given birth in American hospitals. (OWB: 176) 
The situation in Australia was no doubt similar, but is improving to create 
birthing suites for labouring couples, indicating that the institutions are 
beginning to integrate subjective knowledge into their practices. Medicine is 
addressing the definition of birthing from the women's perspective to this 
extent, but as I argue in chapter six, the changes need to go further towards 
dismantling the stereotypical woman and mother. I also raised the possibility 
that birthing is more erotic than we generally think it to be, and that 
embracing the eroticism of the domain could be a problem for birthing in 
hospitals. So long as most obstetricians are male, the idea of eroticising 
birthing is not such a good idea. But taking out the sexual dimension of 
birthing and creating the imaginary blankness of the mystics supports the 
theological dialectical vision which makes the woman more like a zombie, or 
birthing machine than an autonomous human person. Why is the obstetric 
profession so male dominated? 
I have to admit to having a homebirth because I figured that was the 
option which gave me most control in the process. Obviously the midwife 
was second to none and my partner's participation was never questioned as 
important backup. He did all the helping work and caring work that nurses 
do in hospitals, and he continues to share the care of the child. My own 
experiences of birthing and parenting have not been mainstream, making 
clear the limitations of the institutions which punish us in subtle ways for 
not abiding by entrenched standards and practices of maternity. I therefore 
suggest that we need to look carefully at the norms of western democratic 
societies to see how much has changed at the level of institutions. 
Kristeva writes 
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One does not give birth in pain, one gives birth to pain: the child represents it and 
henceforth it settles in, it is continuous. Obviously you may close your eyes, cover up 
your ears, teach courses, run errands, tidy up the house, think about objects, subjects. 
But a mother is always branded by pain, she yields to it. "And a sword will pierce 
your own soul too ... " (TOL, 41) 
Kristeva claims that the pain of motherhood begins with childbirth and is 
not limited to childbirth. The experience of childbirth, as a situation in which 
we are both in and out of control, gives us insight into the falsity of human 
nature as being either essentially innate (feminine) or constructed 
(masculine). So the pain we bear as mothers is as much the suffering from 
the limitations of prevailing standards and the resulting self-sacrifice that 
makes a good mother. 
In the body of Kristeva's essay on maternity, arranged around the bold 
poetic outbursts on the left hand side of the page, she argues that the maternal 
stereotype is based on the cult of the virgin. Maternity is represented in 
images and representations of Christ's virgin mother, who mediates between 
god and man. The pain of this sacrificial mother, whose flesh has no bearing 
upon her predicament as a mother, is suffered in silence: nor are there words 
to describe her subjective bliss. The lack of words naturalises the silence, no 
longer painful so long as philosophers and theologians imagine that there is 
no flesh to feel. The mother is represented as having some mystical 
knowledge: neither subject, nor object, but mystical nonetheless. 
But reading Kristeva with Bataille, we can see that the mother is sovereign: 
her silence is only an imagined silence with religious undertones to explain 
the gift of life. Kristeva contends that the silence associated with maternity 
sustains a false vision of man against nature. Nature is characterised in this 
false vision as being outside, or beyond the socio-symbolic contract of human 
laws and languages. She suggests there is something about maternal 
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experience that helps us to see that we have misrepresented human 
subjectivity by suggesting that we supersede nature. 
If Kristeva is correct, the self-sacrificing mother models herself on an icon 
of fleshless being (the virgin mother). But doing this leads to living in that 
which de Beauvoir calls "bad faith." These days the stay-at-home-mum, who 
exits her profession to care for children, admits a sense of others' disapproval; 
as though she is living in "bad faith." To say these women live in "bad faith" 
is nevertheless to obscure the problem. The implicit assumption that these 
women ought to join the workforce and have a professional life like any 
other misses the importance of parenting as skill, dedication and 
knowledge.93 
The real problem of women's conditions is produced by a sexual division 
of labour, and will continue to affect our lives until somebody who counts as 
somebody recognises that our current vision of a public/private split is 
harmful to people as persons. The change needs to take place in the 
institutions and in the homes, but will only do so as the individuals 
recognise their epistemic and ethical responsibility to change current practices 
of work and leisure. 
I keep hearing whispers that feminism has done her stuff and now the job 
is done as though the western world gives women equal opportunity. 
Indeed, I might have agreed with the view when I was younger, but not since 
having a child. Even though single motherhood is reasonably well accepted 
these days, and the myths of getting pregnant for the sake of getting a 
government subsidy are recognisably false, the situation for single parents 
93 Sara Ruddick's Maternal Thinking (1989) gives us good insight into the epistemic work of 
parenting. 
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raises the spectre of family values. It is clear from the ideas presented in this 
thesis that the mother is the person who is supposed to have a more intimate 
bond with her child. But what is this special bond? I have shown that the 
deeply feminine side of consciousness is best characterised as the non-
cognitive sense of something which turns out to be a sense of self for a better 
way of putting it. But, in the experience, this so called feminine 
consciousness is silently felt by the person having the experience: there is no 
distinction between subject and object; self and world. The body is a feeling 
thing in the world; this is the non-cognitive self; feminine consciousness is 
dumbed by silence. This kind of consciousness is not especially related to 
maternity, unless we think her birthing experience is mystical in a religious 
sense. But if we agree with the religious view of maternity, we must accept 
the sexual division of labour which is so clearly oppressive for women. 
Remember, Hegel's dialectic is too theological, according to Bataille, taking 
reproduction for granted and making all expenditure of energy useful to a 
productive and accumulative end. So, the non-cognitive consciousness is 
shared by all and, if Bataille is correct, understanding the value of the non-
cognitive consciousness will help us see how to revise the social without this 
binary value system attributed on the basis of sex. 
Why call this consciousness feminine? In Hegelian terms, the feminine 
consciousness is natural and is repressed by the self-construction of men as 
particular types: like philosophers, historians, workers. In the family, the 
man falls back into a universal as a father and the woman finds her 
individuality in her mothering, but only because she is the wife of a 
particular man. Hegel makes the woman's body a living metaphor for the 
states of mind he thinks are most natural; and stands himself as a man 
against these kinds of conscious states, making his own rational and 
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constructed. The natural states include all knowledge of the immediate 
environment including, I imagine, folk psychological states. The constructed 
states include knowledge of abstract entities and logical arguments. 
But the problems with this distinction are clear. First the natural states and 
language must be given. Hegel does not question the source of meaning as 
being in Spirit, however, suggesting that all knowledge is innate: given in 
sense data. So, for him the woman will have instinctual knowledge, or 
maternal instinct, from which they know how to mother. I think it is very 
dangerous to appeal to maternal instinct as a kind of knowledge because it 
circulates widely enough that women continue to be surprised that they have 
to teach an infant to suck her breast; or from preventing women calling for 
help when they feel that they want to kill the baby; or from admitting that 
they need time away from the baby to maintain their own sanity. 
The view I am proposing makes clear that the sexual division of labour is 
an ideology which harms people. There is nothing about being a female, or a 
mother that makes a woman any more or less responsible for her child than 
anyone else. The psychological states of maternity are as rich and diverse as 
psychological states can be. But recognising that this is true calls for a revision 
of parenting: what do parents need to do to prevent the crisis unfolding 
around us: with children taking guns to school; with widespread depression 
and use of antidepressants; with high unemployment and youth suicide 
rates; with increasing gang violence and anti-globalisation activism; with 
planes bombing and killing in the United States; and with the war against 
terror well underway? 
This is where I warm to Kristeva, and I think her role as a psychoanalyst 
helps her to see the deep-seated pain of many people. She warns us of a 
global crisis in New Maladies of the Soul: with drugs, violence, anti-
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depressants, media-zapping and commodity fetishism all attempts to fill the 
void of castration. Insofar as castration is a metaphor for cutting ourselves off 
from ourselves so that we become someone we think everyone else wants us 
to be, the crisis is a result of ignoring certain kinds of sensuality. The incest 
taboo is an important reminder of the institution of marriage as an exchange 
of women between men. 
Women have been, and still are to varying degrees, the property of men. 
Throughout most of our documented history, women have had no rights, 
and often no money of their own so they needed a husband to survive. 
Women's liberation has made some changes, but it is false to think that all 
battles are won and that women do have equal rights with men. Simply 
changing the workforce to accommodate women is not enough to change the 
situation for women; particularly not for women as mothers. There is a 
widespread belief that women should do rnusl uf Lhe carlug l.Jecause Ll1al feels 
more natural. I think it is important to realise that it is not natural just 
because it feels natural. The problem is that we have learnt to think about 
some of our feelings and to ignore others by adopting the stereotypical role of 
a mother. Worse, women who do not fit the stereotype are in grave danger of 
becoming institutionally dependent. 
But there are new role models appearing for mothers which help to make 
way for social change. Kristeva and Chodorow are amongst those whose 
success can be detected by looking at the changes in parenting practices. The 
practical importance of academic theory cannot be denied in the recognition 
that some mothers and fathers have worked hard to allow both their 
daughters and their sons both a stronger sense of self and a softer sensuality. 
Our younger generations become more vulnerable when they integrate this 
change because they are not so castrated. Kristeva and Chodorow build upon 
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de Beauvoir's recognition that woman is created by man's stories about her, 
rather than given by nature, that being the empirical world, or by God. Seeing 
that women are whatever we _think we are opens the way for change, and so 
changing practices evolve as a result of theory. 
My hope is that persons from the younger generations are less scarred by 
castration than the generation of men and women who take power in the 
current global climate. As a result of changed parenting practices we 
recognise that not everyone is intent on breeding ladies and gentlemen; but 
that those institutions which are so interested are intent on reproducing the 
power symbolised by masculinity. Lacan's idea of the order of the phallus is 
thus enlightening: the socio-symbolic order is the ordering of objects in 
relation to subjects. Every speaker is like a penis, according to the metaphor, 
because the subject of modernity is so intent upon himself being seen as an 
upstanding figure in society. Fashioning the penis upon man is like 
fashioning man on god and the metaphor fails to account for experience. For, 
when we see ourselves in the mirror as having flesh and when we use 
language to describe that flesh, what can we do to represent the feelings which 
are lacking in the mirror image? The mirror image is a shadow, it is 
explained physically, but it is not physical substance. 
In Lacan's theory, the mirror image takes us out of experience and into 
speech. Inside each of us there is empty space filled with silent feelings that 
we have to learn to ignore and pretend does not exist: the silent pleasures 
and pains of experience are always obscured from public view. But these can 
be expressed at home, in the heterosexual marriage which constrains all 
sexual experience as though it ought to be only between one man and his 
wife. When a man and his wife reproduce, they reproduce the biological and 
the social; the given and the constructed. Like Hegel, Lacan associates the 
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mother with the given and the father with the constructed. But, whereas in 
Hegel's view the body is given with its sensuality and the rational mind is 
constructed; in Lacan's view experience is given and sensuality is repressed so 
that we become rational. The mother, and the polymorphous perversity of 
infancy with which she is associated is cast out of view and hidden in the 
private domestic sphere while the father still goes out to work. 
We can see how Chodorow and Hartsock draw upon this story. Boys 
recognise that men have power and women do not and are threatened that 
they lose their power by remaining too close to their mothers. Boys identify 
instead with their absent all-powerful fathers who are away working in an 
important job earning money to keep the household running. Girls identify 
with mothers who work at home as unpaid mothers and learn by watching 
and trying. More mothers involve their sons in domestic work, and/ or 
entered the workforce; fathers are becoming more involved with childcare 
and domestic work, and the situation begins to change. The fact that the 
situation does change demonstrates the pliability of gender: we no longer 
become the sorts of girls and boys, women and men, or mothers and father 
we are told we should be. But we do remain dependent on theories to guide 
our actions so that no one is hurt too badly by our actions as non-normative 
parents. The warning is clear, once we open ourselves to finding our own 
way through the maze of life, we risk temptation towards anti-social 
behaviour if we are not careful to plan our way. 
The mother is a metaphor for silence in Lacan's theory. (See chapter 3). 
Any expression of sexual deviance, criminal or otherwise anti-social 
behaviour is also associated with the mother; as is psychosis and 
schizophrenia. But the theoretical mother who is called upon in these 
theories is not a person, female and otherwise maternally related; the 
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theoretical mother is silence: it is the silence of having an experience that no-
one else can see. Bataille warns that it is not open slather on the other side, as 
those who believe in the law maintain. Instead it is a matter of carefully 
negotiating a path in life in which we care for both ourselves and for others. 
(See chapter 5) 
The idea shared by not only Young and Hartsock, but also Lacan, is that 
only mothers know what it is like to be a mother and that they cannot tell 
anyone else what it is like because their experience is deeply private and other 
worldly. Kristeva follows Lacan in his erroneous view that experience is 
incommunicable and is somehow outside language. Kristeva agrees with 
Bataille that experience is communicable even though it is meaningless in 
itself. She agrees with Bataille that the concepts are not given by the 
experience, and that shared experience is a kind of communication which is 
non-linguistic. This implies that the human body, as a physical mechanism, 
is sensitive to other bodies and responds accordingly, changing the nature of 
experience. Even describing states of the human body, in poetry or in novels, 
causes others to become involved and for their states to change accordingly. 
We look, read, think, imagine sounds, tastes, smells and sensations; and we 
feel. The interface between mind and world is broken down in art, poetry and 
literature, Kristeva argues, because these disciplines recognise the effect social 
institutions have on individuals: art, poetry and literature serve to show the 
mainstream that there are alternatives to the capitalist world view; and that 
these alternatives are no longer based in theories used to create identities, but 
in theories which help us understand how to live and how to make changes 
so that our grandchildren and generations after them can also be sustained. 
All experiences are deeply private and otherworldly when causally explained 
by the complex organic processes of the human body, but by giving our 
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experiences a description and by redescribing representations accordingly 
thereafter we engage in a process of coming to know ourselves and our 
particular responses to different situations. Our knowledge about ourselves is 
always in principle public, so Lacan's account of the mother is a dud. 
I agree with Lacan that there are two kinds of mental states, cognitive and 
non-cognitive. I also agree that cognitive states are linguistic and that non-
cognitive states are non-linguistic. But I disagree that the non-cognitive states 
are inexpressible. The presence in the body described by the termjouissance is 
feminine, according to Lacan, who uses this term to describe infantile 
experience that is fundamentally erotic and perverse, and to suggest that 
mothers relive this erotic infantile consciousness in maternity. I have 
already suggested that childbirth could be erotic, but I am sure that this is not 
the case for most birthing women. I agree with Kristeva, Bataille and Sellars 
that the silent states are non-cognitive, but that they can be described 
retrospectively; with Kristeva and Bataille adding that poetic language and 
erotic literature evokes non-cognitive states in us. We may become aware of 
the way we respond physically to different kinds of language and 
representations. 
Those of us who want the best of both worlds, both professionally and as 
parents, might take heed of Kristeva's views about the subject, or nature of 
self as neither feminine or masculine, female or male. Kristeva argues that 
the self is an integration of experiences into a process of linguistic 
interpretation and understanding, despite her misleading image of self and 
inner screen. But inner speech and impressions intact, we can see the self 
emerging as that which Kristeva calls the signifying space of a third 
generation of feminism. (NMS: 222) The body of writing of those who 
inhabit both worlds, professional and parenting, creates a theoretical space for 
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those of us who see the important interface between theory and practice. We 
learn from our mistakes and we can warn others about the observed effects of 
various practices. 
The third signifying space for feminism sits in relation to its predecessors, 
again theoretical spaces, but spaces often filled in discussions of first and 
second wave feminism. The equality feminists like de Beauvoir were 
superseded by feminists of difference like Hartsock and Young. Kristeva does 
not fit in either position. She says 
For this third generation, which I strongly support (which I am imagining?), the 
dichotomy between man and women as an opposition of two rival entities is a problem 
for metaphysics. What does "identity" and even "sexual identity" mean in a theoretical 
and scientific space in which the notion of"identity" itself is challenged? I am not 
simply alluding to bisexuality, which most often reveals a desire for totality, a desire for 
the eradication of difference. I am thinking more specifically of subduing the "fight to the 
finish" between rival groups, not in hopes of reconciliation - since at the very least, 
feminism can be lauded for bringing to light that which is irreducible and even lethal in 
the social contract - but in the hopes that the violence occurs with the utmost mobility 
within individual and sexual identity, and not through a rejection of the other. (NMS, 
222) 
Kristeva suggests that the sovereign, non-cognitive states associated with 
maternity and eroticism are irreducible to the social contract. Reproduction 
sits outside the productive economy. But, in Kristeva's view, childbirth gives 
the woman an opportunity to see her own sovereignty: to give herself over 
to experience, and to appear to lose control of her thoughts. In those 
instances she glimpses the depths of her humanity as an embodied creature. 
These depths are vulnerable and pliable, and her denial of these makes her 
both defensive and aggressive. But Kristeva does not recommend association 
between vulnerability and a passive feminine consciousness in opposition to 
an aggressive and active masculine consciousness. To do so, she says, is a 
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problem for metaphysics because the reduction to one side or the other of this 
dichotomy cuts off the importance of either a rational mind or a sensuous 
body. The self is divided in each of us, between that of which we are 
conscious and our unconscious states: but our states need not be unconscious 
so that we can think rationally; feelings and passions are not mutually 
excluded by reason. 
To think that feelings and reason are mutually exclusive is to neglect the 
body in a metaphysical dualism. The metaphysical dualism reduces the self 
to mind and the mind to spirit without explaining the function of inner 
experience as having anything to do with the body. But spirit is valued as 
reason, rather than as the less human, more natural feelings. When types of 
consciousness are differentially valued, the natural is lost in favour of the 
advanced and constructed. The error, of course, is to think that the 
constructed is not also natural. The metaphysical distinction between the 
social and the natural is a false distinction. Instead, the distinction between 
social and natural is produced by us in our theories. The attempt to reduce 
ourselves to explanation as either social or natural is unhelpful to improve 
the social situation. 
We can read de Beauvoir, for example, as saying that woman is socially 
constructed and take this to mean she is not also natural because the two are 
mutually exclusive. Or we can read Hartsock as saying that woman's 
psychology is naturally sensual and caring; and that men are trained to fit 
certain masculine stereotypes modelled on the cold unemotional responses 
that some males exhibit (as though no one else can). But I think that the 
Sellarsian story identifies the first metaphysical problem: this kind of 
distinction between the subjective and the objective smacks of the myth of 
the given. The myth suggests that meaning is not given by experience after 
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all: for if it were, there would be no way to show that we are not zombies. 
Our bodies read off the world, we learn to make observations by redescribing 
what we see, hear or otherwise sense in the context we learn about them. 
There is no split between mind and world, or nature and culture. The body is 
endowed with sensations and we need to learn to concentrate on some and 
not on others according to what is permissible. And here Kristeva and 
Bataille, with Lacan and Marx in the background, help us to see how 
important the issue of prohibition is in creating our identities. But the 
creation of a singular identity as a man or as a woman smothers an important 
repression of experience as necessary for understanding value. The 
repression of experience is already taking on the values of the man who 
needs a wife to sustain him and to give him children. 
So metaphysical dualism, when recast as a distinction between inner 
experience and linguistic concepts, subordinates the former to the latter in the 
creation of specifically human values. These values divide, at the juncture 
between men and women, to warrant justification by both experience and by 
principle. But, in the end, principle is the only means of justification, making 
the production of singular objective human value farcical. Physical value is 
placed in objects rather than in beings, and women, blacks and variations on 
the theme of others are treated like animals, while those who keep the law 
are treated as persons. 
The neglect of the body is not permitted for women, whose bodies are 
naturally productive, and where the subject just is the self created rational 
man. But this ideal of what humans ought to be is not shared by everyone. 
Moreover, this ideal is an ideal of mankind in which the man figures as 
someone whose very creation requires someone else to look after him 
because his is too busy and too important to do basic manual labour. His 
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status is accorded by an interpretation of human reason as replacing the 
quagmire of natural sensations. The self-made man is a problem for 
metaphysics because he creates a world of dependency, creating violence and 
despair for those who do not follow the rules according to predetermined 
status as some kind of identity. The woman's identity has no status unless 
she is a mother, on Hegel's view, because the woman's natural consciousness 
make her aware of her body, and being aware of the body is a sign of 
immaturity. 
Kristeva does not appeal to bisexuality as though each of us are both 
feminine and masculine. The metaphor of a bisexual does not work because 
gender obscures the importance of individuality to change the social 
situation. The social order that we have is established, on her view, by setting 
up rival groups in which there are always victims and executioners. But 
Kristeva claims that we are each both victim and executioner irrespective of 
our sex: our vulnerability makes us a victim in some circumstances and 
standing up for ourselves makes us executioners. Kristeva's subject in 
process is both strong and vulnerable: she is free from any singular identity, 
redefining herself through her experiences of a lifetime. Maternity is an 
experience that potentially affects our identity because of our children's 
dependence on us; but the same holds for paternity when we recognise that 
fathers are subjects in process as well. 
Kristeva attempts to show that the fundamental separation of Lacan's 
subject between inner experience and language is healed among those who 
learn to engage in the incessant process of self-analysis. (NMS, 223) " 
From that point on, the other is neither an evil being foreign to me nor a scapegoat from 
the outside, that is, of another sex, class, race, or nation. I am at once the attacker and 
the victim, the same andthe other, identical and foreign. (NMS, 223) 
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When we are attacked by bears, or we get lost, or we are late for a meeting 
we encounter the alterity within ourselves and shared between us all. The 
shared fact is that we respond by feeling and behaving in characteristically 
human ways. But we also know that we tailor our responses according to 
standards of acceptability. So the individual is analysing herself and others 
according to these standards, and feeling the way we are supposed to, or not, 
depending on who we are. But recognising any of this entails identifying as 
someone who knows the rules, and knows which ones can be broken in order 
to make way for a new ethics "herethics." (223-224) 
The imaginary helps to outline an ethics that remains invisible, as the outbreak of the 
imposture and of hatred wreaks havoc on societies freed from dogmas and laws. As 
restriction and as play, the imaginary enables us to envision an ethics aware of its own 
sacrificial order and that thus retains part of the burden for each of its adherents, whom the 
imaginary pronounces guilty and responsible, though it offers them the direct possibility 
of j ouissance, of various aesthetic productions, of having a life filled with trials and 
differences. This would be a utopian ethics, but is any other kind possible? 
The outbreak of imposture and hatred is worsening as people feel less safe 
in western societies. The freedom so cherished in the west was never 
women's liberation. To be sure, women have entered the professions, and 
changed the face of predominant institutions. But only to some extent. 
Leaving women or men at home alone with babies is not the easy answer 
because of the effective lack of community in the suburbs. Childcare facilities 
are wonderful, but the participation of both parents in full time work leaves 
everyone tired and irritable without time for the kids. The utopian ethics 
might therefore start by reducing working hours and dividing up all positions 
into job-share. With more people entering professions this might serve to 
open more positions to fresh faces and ideas. But to do this would be a great 
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act of social generosity which those who live to take will find untenable. And 
as I have shown, those are the persons who have the power, albeit perversely. 
Man as rational human and woman as proof of the worldly nature of 
embodiment helps Hegel to overcome the sceptical questions arising from his 
externalist explanation of the world. Hegel sees the connection between 
cognition and language, 
Pregnancy, birthing, and maternity are the ultimate experiences, necessary 
for ongoing species survival. The domain has assumed some status as 
distinct from other human domains. But the status accorded to mothers is 
the status removed when technology booms: the privilege of having 
expertise on matters of life and death is superseded by the creative power of 
man. The accursed share is explained out of existence through our focus on 
productivity rather than expenditure. 
Even though femininity is a descriptive term, it is used by Hegel to describe 
sensuous knowledge; by de Beauvoir to describe certain kinds of behaviour; 
by Young to describe private knowledge; by Kristeva to describe a painfully 
pleasurable consciousness; by Hartsock after Chodorow to describe relational 
consciousness; and by Bataille to describe the death of self-consciousness. 
There is no evidence that any of these descriptions apply to females. 
Hegel describes the interaction between two different kinds of 
psychological states: one given by nature and the other created by man. The 
natural states are produced by the human body, irrespective of the sexual 
anatomy and physiology of that body. But anatomy and physiology do not 
bear on psychology, in the course of human development, to explain the 
process of rising above the animal kingdom and standing against nature to 
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take control of the planet and the universe. Hegel tells a story about 
mankind: each moment in the unfolding of his phenomenology represents 
not only the individual's personal history, but also the historical 
development of life on earth. 
The most primordial psychological state Hegel describes is sense-certainty. 
This sentient awareness is shared by all living things. The wheels of 
cognition begin to turn in the next step of advancement, explaining 
perception; and leading to a common sense understanding shared within the 
species. For the human female, according to Hegel, this common sense 
understanding is as good as it gets, leaving her psychology limited to all 
which is given naturally by the senses; but in the case of human males the 
common-sensual psychology is superseded, or made redundant, making way 
for the personal and historical development of intentional thought and 
civilisation. Human progress begins with self-consciousness and the 
recognition by man that he can control his own destiny. This recognition 
enables man to create himself anew as the kind of being that he wants to be. 
But as we have seen, the history of mankind leaves woman behind 
because her natural mode of production is valuable. Female psychology is 
deeply sensual, on this view, developing an understanding grounded in her 
immediate environment. Her intuitive awareness is highly developed and 
her natural duty is to deal with matters of life and death to maintain survival 
of the species. It is quite natural for humans to speak, so there is no question 
as to whether the woman uses language; it is just that her language is limited 
to concepts based in perception: the woman cannot make inferences, 
however, because to do so requires having self consciousness and this, in 
turn, requires ignoring the sensual and focussing on abstract concepts. 
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Simone de Beauvoir argues that Hegel's understanding of woman's 
psychology is based on the assumption that her reproductive function makes 
her more animal than human. de Beauvoir here describes two kinds of 
psychological states, immanence and transcendence, which she sees as 
necessary to all members of the species. But, if de Beauvoir's immanence fits 
anywhere in Hegel's phenomenology, I take it to be another term for sense-
certainty. Unlike Hegel, however, de Beauvoir does not characterise sense-
certainty as immediate knowledge, suggesting instead that immanence is 
non-cognitive. Transcendence, on the other hand, describes the knowing 
subject whose knowledge can only be confirmed in virtue of intersubjectivity. 
De Beauvoir argues that maternity does not prevent the woman from 
developing the transcendent consciousness; but that the woman is taught 
from an early age to think and behave as though she is the natural sensuous 
being men throughout history have imagined her to be. By doing what is 
expected of her, the woman creates a prison, not only for herself, but for all 
women, because men can point to her to show deviant (m)others how they 
are supposed to be. De Beauvoir therefore recommends that the woman 
joins men in public life, even if she is a mother. 
In chapter two, I turned more directly to the question of what it is like to be 
pregnant. Iris Marion Young argues that the pregnant woman is a divided 
subject, having access to both public communicable knowledge (in the head) 
and private sensual knowledge (in the torso). The special authority of the 
pregnant woman is guaranteed by her privileged access to the sensations of 
pregnancy. But this private knowledge claim is Cartesian: knowledge about 
physical facts can be shared suggesting that the special knowledge is based in a 
non-physical fact. This claim leads to the possibility of zombies who are just 
like humans in all respects except that they do not have any experiences. The 
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possibility of zombies shatters the authority of the pregnant woman's 
knowledge unless Young can prove how she knows she is not a zombie. 
Wilfrid Sellars provides a better explanation of first person authority 
because, unlike Descartes or Hegel, he starts his explanation of knowledge in 
the third person. Epistemic development does not begin with immediate 
knowledge given by the senses, clouded and confused initially and 
developing into mature judgements in time. Rather, the process of epistemic 
development is explained by a range of innate abilities which are causally 
necessary for knowledge but which, in themselves, are non-cognitive. The 
human body can be conceived mechanistically, as a complex thermometer 
which reads off the environment and responds by exhibiting certain sorts of 
behaviour and making sounds. But biological development is influenced by 
a range of environmental and social factors so that everybody will differ 
slightly to mirror their environment and social situation. First person 
authority is only developed after the person can describe her broader 
situation, based on shared observations, with knowledge about the standards 
and practices of agreement. She must therefore learn to use her natural 
language competently and know what it is that makes her competent. In 
other words she must have third person authority to have any authority at 
all. 
Third person authority would be impossible if the human species did not 
have shared psychology. Hegel recognises this; and he recognises, contra 
Descartes, that first person authority is not given simply in virtue of having a 
human body. But Hegel distinguishes between first person knowledge, which 
is universally shared between all of us, and first person authority, which is 
particular to the individual in question. In Hegel's view, we know the 
contents of our own mind before we know anything else, but we cannot have 
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authority until we can separate ourselves out from the contents, and take 
control of what is happening in our own minds. He claims this is man's 
prerogative: childbirth and maternity need to remain natural to explain 
man's self-knowledge in the personal rather than professional domain of life. 
Sellars dismantles the distinction between the content of one's mind and 
the self as a distinct viewer of these contents. The viewer, to stay with the 
analogy for a moment, is reduced to her (or his) body as this mechanism 
which reads off the environment and responds, learning from others how to 
make observations, and to use language appropriately. Over time, and with 
competence, the embodied person qua viewer recognises herself as a viewer. 
The person sees that her behaviour mirrors the behaviour of others and that 
different behaviours are correlated with different patterns of thought. But 
seeing all this is really a matter of ~elf-talk, and the person recognises this by 
usiug Ll1e lucal fulk.-Lheury uf _µsyd1ulugy Lu iuler_µrel her uwu l.Jehaviuur. The 
process of interpretation enables her to identify a range of non-cognitive 
states, or feelings throughout her body and to recognise the chatter of inner 
speech. According to Sellars, every person's general awareness is caused by 
embodied processes and cognitive development enables us to make sense of 
this awareness in concert with the ways others make sense of their own. The 
viewer thus determines the contents of her own mind according to what she 
is thinking, and how others respond to her, making her the kind of person 
she is. 
In my view, dismantling the distinction between the person and the 
contents of her mind leads to a recognition that the very idea of feminine and 
masculine psychology is a false dichotomy. In Chapter three I presented 
Kristeva's attempt to revise the psychology of the sexes. Her story about early 
childhood development is like Sellars' thermometer view, but she brings self-
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knowledge into the story too soon in concert with Lacan. Unlike Sellars, 
Kristeva claims the infant has first person knowledge before developing third 
person knowledge. She does not dismiss the Hegelian distinction between 
the thinker and her thoughts. But, rather than being a Cartesian first person 
thinker, in Kristeva's view the thinker has to use language, and to do this she 
must direct all of her thoughts out onto the external world and cut herself off 
from her sensuality. The reason for this is that our sensuality makes us 
behave in an uncivilised manner which is counter-productive in the eyes of 
those who determine the standards and practices of western culture. 
Kristeva argues that the mother has the potential to see the false premises 
that structure our understanding of human civilisation. The potential 
privilege is not given in virtue of being a female, in Kristeva's view, being 
instead a socio-sexual privilege. The privilege is explained by the Freudian 
oedipus complex: having a penis gives men authority; having babies is a 
substitute for authority. Having babies permits the woman to return to a 
sensual state of embodied pleasures, otherwise deemed unproductive (apart 
from the hetero-sexual intercourse that causes her pregnancy). This kind of 
state is repressed in childhood development to stop us from exhibiting anti-
social behaviour and the process of repression affects our psychology by 
making us ignore our inner experiences and learn to think like everybody 
around us. 
The person develops as a thinking subject because she is a speaking subject 
but Kristeva recognises that speech and inner experience are only 
conventionally exclusive, rather than being necessarily exclusive, of each 
other. But, as I argue in chapter two, the Cartesian self is also divided 
between the inarticulable immediate knowledge given by experience and the 
clear and distinct judgements expressed in language. Like Lacan, she 
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redescribes these two kinds of psychological states as feminine and masculine: 
evident in each subject, irrespective of their sex. Her theory of abjection 
brings in the body as mediating between the world of outer objects described 
by speech and the non-cognitive domain of feelings. By tailoring our bodies 
to the standards of sexual difference, we see ourselves as, and are seen as, 
either masculine or feminine. We are only permitted to see ourselves from 
the third person perspective, as others see us. The mother, as the silent 
martyr, is thus constructed. 
This creates the ideology of persons which presupposes the institutions 
from which persons are positioned as either cold, impersonal self-made 
individuals or warm, caring and self-less. The distinction enables Hegel to 
overcome the difficulty of explaining how two different kinds of 
consciousness interact. The more primitive non-cognitive consciousness is 
given by the body, in Hegel's view, being more natural and suitable for 
women whose duty it is to bear and raise children and to look after their 
husbands. The more advanced intentional consciousness is a human 
construction, enabling men to become self-made individuals who work 
together to create and perform within the institutions of public life. The 
interaction between women and men in the family is necessary for each to 
have access to the other. Women have access to intentional consciousness as 
it is mediated by their husbands; and men have access to the sensual 
consciousness as it is mediated by their wives. Hegel's conception of 
feminine consciousness endorses the ideology of childbirth as mechanistic 
production rather than as a properly human experience that the woman can 
know about rationally. Only men can have a rational authority about 
anything, including women's bodies, endorsing the establishment of an 
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obstetric institution run by men. In this chapter I have shown that authority 
over birthing remains squarely in the institutional domain. 
In chapter two I argued that Iris Marion Young's private knowledge 
argument fails to show that the pregnant woman's maternal experiences can 
be known rationally. I maintain that Wilfrid Sellars' epistemology is a better 
alternative for explaining the pregnant woman's authority than any post-
Hegelian conception of consciousness. Sellars' view that all cognitive 
experience is based in theoretical episodes accepts the importance of language 
in making sense of any experiences including those otherwise thought to be 
ineffable. Sellars provides a non-Cartesian alternative for understanding 
maternal authority. 
In chapter three I introduced the psychoanalytic theories by which we 
understand that inner experience must be sacrificed to make way for theory; 
on the all too Hegelian assumption that inner life is uncivilised. Although 
Kristeva contests the idea that human sensuality is outside culture and 
language with her theory about avant-garde poetry, I argue that she does not 
fully succeed to show how we get to know ourselves as both sensuous and 
rational. But I agree that her theory of abjection is useful for understanding 
that the subject and object are not opposed to each other in consciousness, 
being instead mediated by a third term. The subject and object are epistemic 
terms, describing cognitive events, whereas the abject describes the non-
cognitive domain of human experience, described in this chapter as use of the 
essential indexical. Kristeva's discussion of abjection upsets the dichotomies 
used by Hegel to create an ideology of the family based on the 
abovementioned claims about sexual difference. I agree with Kristeva that 
there is no essential psychological difference between the sexes. 
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In chapter four I argued that Nancy Hartsock does not contest the Hegelian 
vision that women's knowledge is based in experience, but argues that he and 
other male philosophers falsely value the abstract over the concrete. She 
draws from Marxian standpoint epistemology to show that the sexual 
division of labour oppresses women and that their oppression gives them an 
epistemic privilege. As in chapter two, I argue that epistemic privilege is 
unhelpful for rescuing the pregnant woman's epistemic authority. But I 
think Hartsock raises an important issue of value, showing that women's 
work is not recognised as such; and that men are often reluctant to engage in 
childrearing and domestic duties. Although I acknowledge theories like 
Chodorows' have changed parenting among those with raised consciousness, 
leading to some changes in parenting patterns, I recognise that political 
institutions continue to disadvantage women. Far fewer women than men 
have positions of institutional power, most likely because they rarely find 
partners who are willing to give up their own careers to stay home and do all 
the domestic work. 
In chapter five I turn more directly to the Marxian ideas of alienation and 
false consciousness to better understand Hartsock's claims about the partiality 
and perversity of masculine individualism. I identify a serious contradiction 
in her idea that men are both individual and perverse insofar as these terms 
are mutually exclusive. As Kristeva demonstrates, the sensuous 
consciousness is associated with perversion; not the rational consciousness. 
Turning to exemplar of perversion, Georges Bataille, I identify the source of 
t,he contradiction in Marx's conception of sensuous experience in terms of 
productivity. To better understand experience for its own sake I introduce 
Bataille's ideal of a general economy in which life is balanced between work 
and non-productive expenditure, suggesting that this ideal is fruitful for a 
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more holistic understanding of maternal authority than any theory borne out 
of a Hegelian dialectic. 
In this chapter I have established that Hegelian family values continue to 
influence birthing practices. The promotion of feminine behaviour and the 
command to submit a passive mind and body to the care of an active doctor 
indicate a misunderstanding of the birthing woman's subjective authority. 
Her psychology is characterised as regressive because she is engaged in non-
cognitive bodily states; the same kinds of states each person has simply in 
virtue of being an embodied person. But, I have argued, this characterisation 
is based on the Cartesian premise that the mind is incorrigible and 
incorrigibly given; and that rational thought is impossible in situations like 
childbirth when the body is difficult to ignore. The idea that we cannot think, 
either at the time or retrospectively, about our own embodied experiences 
represents that which Bataille calls the restricted economy, or limited 
recognition of what human life is about. 
I shall begin with an explanation of Bataille's distinction between a general 
economy and a restricted economy to demonstrate that current discourse on 
birthing is viewed only in terms of productivity and not in lieu of a broader 
understanding of the human condition. The preferred general economic 
view requires looking beyond the limits of a Hegelian dialectic, in which 
human purpose is solely understood in terms of production and the 
accumulation of goods and knowledge. My aim in this conclusion is to show 
that the pregnant woman's authority, as described above, gives us a more 
holistic view of society than Hegel's dialectical engagement between public 
and private spheres. 
As it became clear in chapter five, Bataille's focus on death of subject is 
contentious. (Nancy Hartsock interprets his claims about the death of the 
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subject as endorsing rape, murder and snuff movies.) But the death of the 
subject is a metaphorical term for breaking out of the restricted economy to 
embrace the non-productive expenditure: expenditure otherwise ignored as 
part and parcel of embodied existence. The metaphorical death of the subject 
by transgressing prohibitions takes the person out of the restricted economy of 
the public sphere, as it is represented in Hegelian ideology, to include life qua 
embodied experience. 
Bataille's general economy is more accepting of the animal-like traits of 
human existence that Hegel associates with femininity. The general economy 
thus values the so-called feminine traits and recognises a kind of wealth 
beyond the restricted vision of economics. The wealth of the general 
economy recognises the generosity of nature in providing energy and 
resources which are not there to be bought and sold, but rather to be shared. 
The same sort of wealth is to be found in intense experience, in Bataille's 
view, in sacrifice, surrender, and community each of which connect us to 
others rather than separate us out as rational individuals. The generosity of 
the general economy is understood through experiences like childbirth. 
The view of birthing I am promoting does not sit in opposition to the 
medicalisation of childbirth. This is not a more natural mode of birthing to 
replace the instrumental approach. Rather, this is a more general approach 
which incorporates the best of medical technology, but does so without 
undermining the authority of the birthing woman by making out her 
experiences are not an important aspect of her humanity - even if they are 
incredibly painful and not the kind of venture one would want to repeat too 
often. The view I am promoting is holistic, rather than reductionist, based on 
embracing rather than denial of the non-cognitive, demonstrating that the 
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cognitive aspects of humanity are necessary so that we can better understand 
and integrate our non-cognitive experiences into our self knowledge. 
But there is one important issue that I must add before closing. The 
situation of mothers in general will not improve without recognition that 
productivity is implicit in a restricted view of humanity. The more holistic 
view balances sacred time with working time; non-productive expenditure 
with productive expenditure. Most of us spend too much time at work and 
our children are suffering in our absence. This is not women's problem any 
more: it is the structure of the workforce which needs to change so that both 
parents can spend more time raising their children, taking time out from 
engaging in paid work. I have made clear that there is no essential sexual 
difference when it comes to public life. Having rescued maternal authority 
from the primordial swamp I have shown that each of us is embodied, 
sensual and rational, irrespective of sexual and reproductive capacities. It is 
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